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ABSTRACT  
 
In their criticism of various approaches to upbringing and related American 
family law jurisprudence, liberal theorists tend to underweight the interests of parents in 
directing the development of children’s values. Considered through the lens of T.M. 
Scanlon’s contractualism, providing a good upbringing is not a matter of identifying 
children’s “best interests” or acting in accordance with overriding end-state principles. 
Rather, children should be raised in accordance with principles for the general regulation 
of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general 
agreement. The process of ascertaining such principles requires an understanding of 
relevant values; a good upbringing is what children receive when parents properly value 
their children, enabling them to appropriately recognize what it is that they have reason to 
do given the roles that they play. By developing the account of upbringing hinted at in 
Scanlon’s contractualist monograph, What We Owe to Each Other, this project identifies 
and responds to some common mistakes in contemporary liberal theorizing on childhood, 
suggests that contractualism yields a more plausible account of upbringing than 
alternative approaches, and along the way identifies some implications of contractualism 
for public policy where individuals properly value the children of others in their 
community. 
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PREFACE 
How should children be raised? The question—call it the “upbringing question”—
seems important. Also pressing, to anyone who finds themselves actually raising 
children, and interesting, to those who care to evaluatively reflect on such things, but also 
important in a more general sense. While moral and political philosophers do not always 
trouble themselves with practical considerations, either as “input” from which to derive 
theory or as “output” in the form of practical advice, those who do have a long history of 
finding their projects thwarted, to various degrees, by common parental intuitions and 
practices. Small wonder, then, that political utopias (like those presented by, say, Plato or 
Marx) tend to prescribe substantial government intervention in childrearing. But even 
theorists with more modest aims encounter challenges from ordinary approaches to 
upbringing—in particular, the raising of children within families. Perhaps most famously, 
John Rawls, who identifies actual families as exemplars of certain liberal ideals,1 also 
believes that his influential account of fair equality of opportunity “can be only 
imperfectly carried out, at least as long as the institution of the family exists.”2  
While this is not strictly an assertion that fair equality of opportunity can be 
achieved by destroying the institution of the family, the words “at least” are reminiscent 
                                                 
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 105. Given this assertion it seems implausible to me 
that Rawls himself actually thought the institution of the family should be done away 
with—but unfortunately the tension between it and other claims he makes concerning the 
family is not something he ever specifically addressed in his own work. 
2 Ibid., 74. Relatedly, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 167, Robert Nozick notes also the 
“ambivalent position of radicals toward the family,” observing that the family’s “loving 
relationships are seen as a model to be emulated and extended across the whole society, 
at the same time that [the family] is denounced as a suffocating institution to be broken 
and condemned as a focus of parochial concerns that interfere with achieving radical 
goals.” 
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of Henry II’s complaint against the turbulent Archbishop Thomas Becket, taken by 
courtiers as an implicit request to carry out the clergyman’s execution. The analogy is 
strengthened by the number of theorists occasionally styled “Rawlsian” who have set 
themselves against the institution of the family as commonly understood—though some, 
at least, are quick to aver no such hostility. Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, for 
example, purport to defend “family values.”3 Nevertheless, their account of family life at 
least weakly condemns several traditional exercises of parental responsibility and 
discretion. Other philosophers of childhood, notably including David Archard and 
Matthew Clayton, follow similar arguments to similar conclusions. It is perhaps 
understandable for theorists to conclude, when they discover that the way children are 
ordinarily raised undermines the plausibility or implementation of their preferred political 
theories, that it must be impermissible to raise children that way. But one philosopher’s 
modus ponens is ever another’s modus tollens; assertions that people act impermissibly 
when they e.g. send a child to private school can, instead, give the impression that one’s 
theory is absurd. This is perhaps no great concern if all one cares about is theory-crafting, 
but it is failure if one’s goal is to actually guide behavior and implement policy for the 
good of individuals and the communities where they live. Unless, of course, one 
somehow convinces individuals and communities to actually adopt policies and 
behaviors grounded in absurd theory, in which case one’s theory “succeeds” primarily in 
doing (potentially quite substantial) harm. 
                                                 
3 Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child 
Relationships, ix. 
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The present project, then, is justified on several overlapping bases. The question 
of how children should be raised is both theoretically and practically interesting on its 
own. But to the extent that absurd or potentially harmful answers to that question enjoy 
some present currency among moral and political theorists, this is further reason for 
inquiry. Though advocacy is not the primary aim of this project, pointing out the errors of 
people engaged in advocacy is often indistinguishable from counter-advocacy, so much 
of what follows can serve as a philosophical defense of the institution of the family 
against some of the theories presently en vogue. It is not a defense against Rawls himself, 
but against a certain kind of philosophical courtier (so to speak)—the theorist who 
resolves an open Rawlsian “at least” by asserting that some aspirational aim or end-state 
principle places overriding constraints on parental discretion in upbringing. This defense 
is complicated by intuition and argument that children’s interests often do constrain 
parental discretion, but these intuitions and arguments are not unanswerable. In 
particular, there is an important distinction between parenting choices that are morally 
impermissible and those that just arguably result in an undesirable or dis-preferred state 
of affairs. 
Or so I argue, by applying the moral and political philosophy of T.M. Scanlon to 
the upbringing question. Chapter 1 explores Scanlon’s account of right and wrong or, at 
least, those portions most plainly applicable to matters of upbringing. This requires some 
exegesis, given Scanlon’s tendency to mention upbringing only in passing, but his 
approach to rights and interests accommodates more particular inquiry without 
substantial revision. One drawback to adopting Scanlon more or less uncritically is that 
anyone who rejects Scanlon’s account of right and wrong will have largely the same 
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objections to my account of upbringing—just as anyone who rejects Rawls’ account of 
equality will have largely the same objections to derivative accounts of upbringing. It is 
not my intent to offer a general defense of Scanlon’s contractualism here, but it does 
seem to me that honest approaches to the upbringing question are most compatible with 
contractualist answers. To the extent that Scanlon’s contractualism does generate a more 
plausible account of upbringing than alternative approaches, this additionally seems like 
good reason to favor Scanlon’s analysis on other matters. 
Scanlon’s account of right and wrong is not the whole story, of course, so more 
will be said concerning contractualism in Chapter 2. Crucially, Scanlon himself observes 
that although the values of parenthood both shape and are shaped by “what we owe to 
each other,” “being a good . . . parent involves understanding and responding to values 
that go beyond this central form of morality.”4 One extremely common way to talk about 
the moral domain of parenting is to make reference to children’s “best interests,” but 
unfortunately this has led some theorists to minimize or even disregard uniquely parental 
values in connection with the raising of children—at best treating such values as 
derivative of or subordinate to children’s interests. Taking uniquely parental values 
seriously can help to avoid the absurdities generated by competing accounts of 
upbringing. 
 With the framework of contractualism in place, I examine some of these 
competing accounts of upbringing. Chapter 3 deals with the idea, most famously asserted 
by Joel Feinberg, that the relationship between parental authority and children’s rights 
should be understood in terms of a “trust.” While I do not deny that treating the parent-
                                                 
4 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 174. 
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child relationship as a trust has some appeal, I argue that it is potentially question-
begging in ways that caution against this approach. Chapter 4 addresses the role 
“equality” plays in upbringing, especially as asserted by Harry Brighouse and Adam 
Swift. In spite of offering a theoretical account of upbringing that appears broadly 
compatible with my own view, these authors conclude that it is morally permissible to 
prevent parents from enrolling children in private schooling or bequeathing to children 
family wealth. The prima facie absurdity of such conclusions suggests very strongly that 
something has gone awry, whether in Brighouse & Swift’s theorizing or their empirical 
understanding. Chapter 5 is a response to a similarly perplexing assertion by Matthew 
Clayton that the “autonomy” of children forbids parents from enculturating them with 
particular conceptions of “the good,” for example by taking them to church or teaching 
them that all religion is superstitious nonsense. All of these chapters are guided by the 
aim of participating in what Scanlon identifies as a “continuing process”5 of identifying 
morally relevant considerations for acting as we do (or should). 
The final chapter of this project examines, through a contractualist lens, the 
contemporary public policy issue of state-mandated cultural education for the children of 
migrants in Denmark. There are a variety of similarly extant debates concerning children 
and public policy, any one of which might serve to demonstrate in detail the practical 
application of the contractualist account of upbringing generated and honed in preceding 
chapters. But the situation in Denmark has a number of features that make it especially 
interesting. In particular, it highlights very well the interests that non-parents have in the 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 157. 
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upbringing of children in their community—interests in which child-directed public 
policy is often purportedly grounded. 
Admittedly, much of what follows tends toward the polemic, albeit in a purely 
scholarly sense. This is at least partly a consequence of writing applied contractualism in 
the liberal tradition. Rawlsian egalitarianism, in all its many flavors, is by far the 
dominant mode of contemporary moral and political theorizing. It would be quite a 
coincidence for this to be totally unrelated to the contemporaneous rise of political and 
cultural developments that undermine the institution of the family, to the detriment of 
families and, perhaps, nations. But even if it is a coincidence, it remains that heterodox 
scholarship on upbringing must today contend not only with a body of (often, 
celebrated!) theoretical literature too voluminous to comprehensively address, but also a 
cluster of cultural dogmas so contentious that they have been colloquially dubbed the 
“Mommy Wars.” Such meta-philosophical concerns are not the subject of this project, so 
I will strive (and, occasionally, fail) to keep related remarks prefatory. But it may be 
helpful to the reader to note from the outset that this project contains very little in the way 
of specific upbringing recommendations, beyond arguing for the permissibility of some 
things that competing and influential accounts have condemned as impermissible, and 
vice versa. Among the claims made both explicitly and implicitly herein, the central one 
is this: theorists who, based on their prior commitment to various egalitarian or 
communitarian political theories, seek to place novel constraints on parental discretion in 
upbringing, are in general advocating for the enactment of policies that are themselves 
morally impermissible.
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CHAPTER 1 
REASONABLE CAREGIVING 
 
There is a commonplace, sometimes codified into law, that the primary 
consideration of upbringing is how caregivers attend to the realization of children’s “best 
interests.” This chapter discusses some possible ways to think about what makes an 
upbringing good, and whether or to what extent a child’s “best interests” 
comprehensively identify the features of a genuinely good upbringing. One of these 
ways—the one I will call reasonable caregiving, though the relevant question will be 
developed throughout this chapter, and a final formulation of the answer will not be 
available until late in Chapter 2—attempts to account for the rights and interests that 
people, including but not limited to children, have. It would not be incoherent to 
contemplate matters of upbringing without reference to such constraints, especially where 
those constraints arise from empirical rather than theoretical concerns. But to the extent 
that one’s thinking about upbringing does address the rights people have, some 
identification of what it means to have a “right” will be necessary for inquiry to proceed. 
Although children’s “rights” are often discussed in aspirational terms, it is not clear that 
this approach can meaningfully account for the rights of others also. The contractualist 
account of rights offered by T.M. Scanlon is preferable, in this and other ways. The final 
section of this chapter illustrates some of the advantages of contractualist analysis by 
examining the landmark American case Wisconsin v. Yoder alongside some of the 
criticism it has accrued. 
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1. THREE APPROACHES TO UPBRINGING 
 The upbringing question—“how should children be raised?”—is often asked in 
hopes of learning what choices caregivers should make to ensure the best possible 
outcomes for children. Which toy will ensure optimal neurodevelopment? Which school 
will impart the finest education? Which church will inculcate the keenest moral 
sensibilities? Is there some person, smarter or kinder or wealthier than the child’s 
“default” caregivers, who can be persuaded to raise this child instead? If we want to 
know how to raise children such that their lives could not possibly go (or have gone) 
better, given different childhood experiences, we might say we are interested in the ideal 
upbringing. Doubtless some caregivers consider this their duty, impossibly demanding 
though it may seem. Indeed it might be a perfectly worthwhile aspiration in spite of the 
veritable certainty of falling short.  
On a slightly less demanding view, incorporating a firmer nod to “ought implies 
can,” the question might be asked in hopes of learning what choices caregivers should 
make to ensure the best possible outcomes for children given that children are ordinarily 
stuck with a particular caregiver or set of caregivers until they reach adulthood—and that 
these caregivers will, rightly or wrongly, not ordinarily be inclined to pass the privilege 
along to someone else. The question is then how children can be raised such that their 
lives could not possibly go (or have gone) better absent alternative caregivers; call this 
ideal caregiving. Like ideal upbringing, ideal caregiving might be a worthwhile 
aspiration. It also has the appeal of contemplating how specific caregivers might best 
carry out their role, rather than inviting them to first verify that no one in the world is 
better-suited to it. 
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Yet even ideal caregiving seems impossibly demanding. If children should be 
raised such that their particular caregivers could not have given better care, it is hard to 
imagine any child actually receiving ideal caregiving. For example, perhaps I could be a 
better caregiver by securing a high-paying job as an attorney instead of pursuing a career 
teaching philosophy. My children could live in a nicer neighborhood, attend better 
schools, and enjoy greater variety in their learning and leisure activities. But suppose I 
don’t particularly want full-time employment as an attorney—suppose it would impose 
costs on me that I am unwilling to bear in exchange for moving my children from their 
comfortable suburban lifestyle to a more-comfortable suburban lifestyle with a slightly 
bigger house, more exotic vacations, and access to more expensive educational 
opportunities. If my children should be raised such that their lives could not possibly go 
better, short of assigning their upbringing to a superior caregiver, then it would appear 
that I am not raising my children as I should. 
In the face of such analysis, it is tempting to offer justifications. I might clarify 
that if working as an attorney would spare a child of mine from, say, homelessness or 
hunger or pain, I would assume the associated costs without hesitation. I might say “I’m 
teaching my children the value of sufficiency over excess” or “I’m setting an example of 
how to live a life of meaning rather than avarice.” I hope these things are true, and 
appreciate anecdotes justifying quality caregiving over caregiver income! Nevertheless, I 
am persuaded by empirical inquiries that family income correlates strongly with 
children’s apparent well-being,1 in spite of any self-serving confirmation bias I might 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Shannon Cavanagh, “An Analysis of New Census Data on Family Structure, 
Education, and Income.” 
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care to exercise. Parents who decline to pursue increased income, at least where such 
pursuit poses little possibility of making a child’s life go worse in other ways, likely are 
not ideal caregivers—and that is just one of many ways for caregivers to fall short. It is 
perhaps uncontroversial that a caregiver who smokes tobacco at home is not ensuring the 
best possible outcomes for their children, but what about caregivers who consume 
alcohol, or allow children to watch television, or permit children to use social media, or 
take children to church? These are all things some adults do that some other adults will 
argue fall short of ideal caregiving. But has there ever been a caregiver who never, based 
on other considerations, acted to secure something less than the apparent “best possible” 
life for their children? This seems unlikely.  
So perhaps all children are raised in ways they should not be raised! Ideal 
upbringing and ideal caregiving are two versions of what Matthew Clayton calls 
“maximalist” positions—accounts of child-raising that assert “children are owed the best 
available upbringing.”2 Caregiving idealism suggests a narrower interpretation of 
“available” than upbringing idealism, so there are certainly different ways to be a 
maximalist, but Clayton suspects “we should be maximalists in general” because 
“anything less than maximalism implies missed opportunity.”3 How much should it 
bother us, then, that probably nobody lives a life devoid of missed opportunity? Should it 
                                                 
2 Matthew Clayton, “How Much Do We Owe to Children?,” 249. I use the term 
“maximalist” to refer to any theory that appears to posit an obligation for caregivers or 
societies to provide “as much as possible” of something identified as good, be that 
material wealth, learning opportunities, or more abstract goods like autonomy. The 
broadest kind of maximalism would be a maximalism that posits an obligation to provide 
as much as possible of every kind of good; narrow maximalism simply posits an 
obligation to provide as much as possible of some kind (or kinds) of good. 
3 Ibid., 251. 
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bother us that, in fact, it is almost certainly not possible to live such a life? Perhaps all 
caregivers, or nearly all, fall short; perhaps all children, or nearly all, should (at least in 
theory) be raised differently.  
Even if this is so, caregivers can accept upbringing or caregiving idealism in a 
theoretical or aspirational way but still sometimes want to know how their children 
should be raised given that no better caregiver is likely to assume the role, and given that 
securing a child’s best possible outcome might impose intolerable costs elsewhere, even 
after various caregiver limitations have been accounted for. Call this the reasonable 
caregiving approach to the upbringing question. On this approach, the question of how 
children should be raised seeks a first-person, all-things-considered account of caregiver 
obligations. Reasonable caregiving does not presuppose that children should have the 
best possible childhood, or that children should have the best possible childhood given 
practical constraints on caregiving. Reasonable caregiving does presuppose that children 
have caregivers, but this is a good assumption insofar as human children are altricial; 
absent, at minimum, someone to periodically place appropriate sustenance in their 
mouths, human children less than about two years old (and perhaps many years older) 
will simply die. This is an important empirical fact about humans: all of us have an 
existence that depends not only on the tolerance extended to us by others, but on the 
willingness of some of those others to actively sustain our lives at direct cost to 
themselves. So assuming children should be raised at all, the existence of a 
caregiver/child relationship is baked into the question of how. The ways of thinking about 
that question can be restated in the following ways: 
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 Ideal Upbringing: What arrangements and experiences would result in the best 
possible life for this child? 
 Ideal Caregiving: What arrangements and experiences would result in the best 
possible life for this child, short of terminating existing caregiving arrangements? 
 Reasonable Caregiving: Given the facts about the world they live in, who they 
are, what they know, and the resources available to them, what should this 
caregiver do in connection with that child? 
 
Note that these are not formulations of the relevant standards, but ways of asking 
after such formulations—provisional ways of framing the upbringing question more 
clearly, in hopes of generating a useful answer. Thinking about ideal upbringing seems 
worthwhile, both in the development of theory and when hypothesizing about ways to 
improve one’s present circumstances. However most such hypothesizing probably occurs 
at the level of ideal caregiving, assuming caregivers are not generally interested in or 
capable of improving their children’s circumstances by replacing themselves with 
superior caregivers. Contemplation of ideal caregiving is a way for caregivers to ask, 
“how can I, personally, make this child’s life better?” But there are many situations in 
which causing a child’s life to go better would be objectionable on other grounds. The 
1991 case of Wanda Holloway serves as a memorable example: when her daughter, 
Shanna, failed to secure a spot on her junior high school’s cheerleading squad, Halloway 
took it on herself to create a new opening. This she planned to do by giving one of the 
girls on the squad a reason to quit: the death of a loved-one. Fortunately for Verna Heath, 
the mother of a girl who scored better than Shanna at squad tryouts, the person Halloway 
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contacted to hire a “hitman” did not actually kill Heath, and instead reported the request 
to law enforcement.4 Assuming the best possible life for Halloway’s daughter included 
participation on the junior high school cheerleading squad,5 and assuming Halloway had 
proven capable of carrying off her plan successfully and with no collateral impact on 
Shanna, she would appear to be meeting the standards of caregiving idealism. Clearly this 
hypothetical Halloway would be seriously blameworthy, but would it be accurate to say 
she was a bad parent? 
I think yes, but an affirmative response here suggests that giving children the best 
possible upbringing or care is at times something caregivers should not do, as caregivers. 
Murdering the mother of your daughter’s cheerleading rival is not a case of quality 
caregiving gone too far; it is not an elsewise-bad thing that exuberant parents might 
reasonably suspect they have a responsibility to carry out. It is not how children should 
be raised. Rather, a list of things that it is actually permissible for caregivers to do surely 
cannot include actions that violate anyone’s rights, no matter how much better a child’s 
life might be made by such violations. This suggests the following amendment to the 
framing of an inquiry into reasonable caregiving: 
                                                 
4 See Maureen Balleza, “New Trial for Woman Convicted in Plot Against Daughter’s 
Rival,” New York Times (9 Nov. 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/09/us/new-
trial-for-woman-convicted-in-plot-against-daughter-s-rival.html. 
5 This may be a significant counterfactual; some twenty years after these events, Shanna 
claimed in an interview that she never really wanted to be a cheerleader, and only tried 
out in the first place because it was her mother’s dream. See Anne Lang and Kristen 
Mascia, “The Texas Cheerleader Case: A Daughter’s Painful Journey,” People (20 Feb. 
2012), http://people.com/archive/the-texas-cheerleader-case-a-daughters-painful-journey-
vol-77-no-8/. The question of whether Shanna might feel differently today had she 
simply made the team to begin with is a specific instance of broader questions that will be 
contemplated in Chapter 5, which deals with the problem of retrospective regret adults 
sometimes experience about their upbringing. 
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 Reasonable Caregiving: Given the facts about the world they live in, who they 
are, what they know, and the resources available to them, and without violating 
anyone’s rights, what should this caregiver do in connection with that child? 
 
But a complete understanding of the question as modified requires an inquiry into the 
rights people actually have, which in turn depends on what it means to have a right in the 
first place. 
2. EXCLUDING “MANIFESTO” RIGHTS 
Such inquiry might be unnecessary, or at least reasonably straightforward, if there 
was anything like a consensus view on the nature of rights. However I am unaware of any 
such consensus. Even generic rights claims that seem obviously true, like “humans have a 
right to not be killed by hired hitmen,” have a way of becoming matters of serious 
dispute—for example, when the person hired to do the killing acts under the auspices of 
euthanasia or abortion. So, to put it mildly, “rights” are the site of substantial 
philosophical dispute and, often, confusion, perhaps especially when it comes to parents 
and children. This is particularly evident in one of the most influential declarations of 
children’s rights ever penned: the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC).6 Like many political declarations of its kind, the CRC spends no time defining 
key terms. This has not prevented 194 countries (notably excepting the United States, 
South Sudan, and Somalia) from ratifying it, however, nor discouraged the approbation 
of theorists: 
                                                 
6 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 Nov. 1989, 28 ILM 1448. 
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[T]he CRC is generally thought to get it right. It codifies a recognisable 
canon of thought about the rights of children. The rights given to children 
in the CRC are the rights that we—at least the ‘we’ of Western liberal 
democratic post-Enlightenment societies—now think it important to give 
children. The CRC gives children rights to, inter alia, freedom of 
expression, association, thought, conscience and religion, protection 
against abuse and violence, enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health, education, rest and leisure, protection from economic exploitation 
and hazardous work. 
 . . . [A]nyone concerned with the welfare of children would have 
good reasons to endorse the CRC, and to make use of its provisions in any 
argument to advance their interests.7 
 
David Archard’s endorsement of the CRC is not unqualified; for example, he 
claims that the CRC’s repeated appeal to children’s “best interests” should be interpreted 
as rhetoric rather than a codification of maximalism.8 Archard’s corrective does render 
some of the CRC’s puzzling assertions substantially more plausible, by moving them 
away from codification of something like ideal upbringing toward codification of 
something like reasonable caregiving. However there is no apparent basis for Archard’s 
interpretation in the text of the CRC itself. Rather, Archard’s recognition that the CRC’s 
reference to children’s “best interests” must be merely rhetorical identifies a problem that 
affects much of the document, including the signatory process—namely, that the 
document does not really stand on its own. This may be why “the practical and legal 
impact of the CRC is at present [so] limited” that it “has not yet had a significant impact 
                                                 
7 David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood, 108. 
8 Ibid., 113, Archard writes, 
Construed as a maximising principle, the best interests requirement seems 
unfeasibly demanding. . . . It is probably most sensible to interpret the 
‘best’ of the ‘best interests principle’ as serving, rhetorically, to emphasize 
that the child does have interests of her own, and that these have an 
importance and weight that should not, when set besides those of adults, 
be discounted or ignored. 
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on domestic legislation.”9 Aside from being occasionally referenced to criticize the 
United States for having the unique (among developed Western liberal democratic post-
Enlightenment societies) temerity to decline ratification of a doctrinally vague but 
emotionally appealing treaty which no signatories seem especially committed to putting 
into enforceable practice, the CRC is functionally dead letter. Strictly speaking, contra 
Archard, the CRC “gives” no children any rights at all, legal or otherwise. 
 Unless, perhaps, one accepts something like Joel Feinberg’s account of what are 
sometimes termed “manifesto” rights. Manifesto rights are “human rights,” “generically 
moral rights of a fundamentally important kind held equally by all human beings, 
unconditionally and unalterably.”10 These are associated with no particular duties, at least 
to any concretely identifiable actors, instead “expressing the conviction that they ought to 
be recognized by states as potential rights and consequently as determinants of present 
aspirations and guides to present policies.”11 This definition is a good fit for many of the 
rights asserted in the CRC, as well as for the CRC’s apparent interpretation by signatories 
as merely aspirational. Aspiration does seem to play an important role in human 
endeavor. However it also foments substantial confusion to conflate moral or legal 
aspirations with moral or legal rights. 
 Consider, for example, people who aspire to immortality. This should not be too 
difficult, given that there is little in the world more obviously of moral weight to most 
people than their own continued existence. Of course, the chances anyone has of actually 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 109. 
10 Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 85. 
11 Ibid., 67. 
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living forever are small—asymptotically approaching zero. Actuarial tables suggest there 
is a much better chance of being killed by basically anything than of living forever. Still, 
many people take affirmative steps, as often as they can, to live as long as possible, and 
encourage others to do the same, whether those others think they want to live forever or 
not. It appears to be in virtually everyone’s interests to not die, ever, particularly if their 
immortality results from processes that alleviate illness and the physical deterioration 
associated with advancing age. People who recognize this aspiration might advocate for 
and contribute to the funding of organizations dedicated to the eventual eradication of 
human death. They might be familiar with myriad practical and theoretical objections to 
immortality and simply find none compelling, especially where those objections are made 
in connection with other arguments concerning the immortality of human souls. If 
someone developed a medical treatment capable of granting immortality tomorrow, 
people who aspire to immortality would likely pour every resource available to them into 
securing that treatment for themselves and their loved-ones. They might even believe that 
developing human longevity toward immortality should figure heavily in the present 
political policies and spending priorities of every nation on Earth.12 
 Given the existence of such aspirational thinking about immortality, might 
humans have a “manifesto right” to become immortal? On Feinberg’s approach, the 
answer appears to be yes. Because manifesto rights assert that individuals can have an 
unconditional and unalterable claim to some state of affairs that no one has any particular 
                                                 
12 There is much more that might be said about immortality, but it is not the subject of 
this project. Readers who find philosophical inquiry into human immortality more 
compelling a topic than upbringing should consult Nick Bostrom and Rebecca Roache’s 
“Ethical Issues in Human Enhancement.”  
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duty to promote or provide, “impossibility” appears to be no bar to the assertion of 
manifesto rights, much less “improbability.” But while there is nothing obviously 
incoherent about aspiring toward apparently impossible or improbable things, there is an 
objectionable amphiboly in an assertion like “I have the right to bear arms and live 
forever.” One’s moral and legal right to bear arms places identifiable limits on other 
people’s behavior—though they are, surely, defeasible limits. An apparent manifesto 
right to immortality bears no such relation to anyone. This is not an argument that there 
are no manifesto rights, though perhaps it is true that there are no manifesto rights. 
Rather, this is an argument that using the word “rights” to refer to manifesto rights 
creates confusion that is easily avoided. It is avoided by simply being clear about the 
difference between the ways we’d prefer the world to be, and the ways we consider 
ourselves and others morally obligated to act given (among other things) the interests of 
others. The most obvious way to be clear about this difference is to use the word 
“aspiration” when we mean aspiration. Then we can use the word “rights” when we are 
talking about ways in which some people’s discretion is morally constrained by the 
interests of others. 
 It might be objected that this fails to charitably consider either the CRC or the 
idea of manifesto rights. Many, perhaps most, “manifesto rights” express neither 
impossible nor improbable aims; indeed much of the CRC simply purports to codify 
matters of broad, cross-cultural agreement concerning the things that are important to 
human children everywhere. Furthermore, it seems likely that at least some of the rights 
identified in the CRC are not manifesto rights at all, but moral rights complete with 
correspondingly concrete obligations, regardless of whether signatory nations ever 
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actually treat them that way. Portions of the CRC likely do identify important moral 
rights, and a comprehensive theory of ideal upbringing or ideal caregiving might very 
well require an account of something like manifesto rights.  
Nevertheless, if reasonable caregivers must not violate anyone’s rights, no matter 
how much better a child’s life might be made by such violations, accounting for 
manifesto rights would make reasonable caregiving indistinguishable from maximalist 
accounts. Given Feinberg’s definition of manifesto rights, to “violate” them appears to be 
a matter of negatively impacting someone’s likelihood of securing some aspiration—for 
example, a legislative body might be accused of “violating” children’s manifesto right to 
quality education by prioritizing corporate tax breaks over increased spending on public 
schooling.13 But imagine a caregiver with children who have a manifesto right to the best 
                                                 
13 It might actually be better to say that manifesto rights can’t be violated, because they 
are not rights at all, but merely a rhetorical device for expressing certain kinds of need or 
want even in the absence of much likelihood (or possibility) of need- or want-fulfillment. 
In fact Feinberg himself sometimes treats them this way, distinguishing them from 
“actual” rights: 
Manifesto writers are easily forgiven for speaking of [manifesto rights] as 
if they are already actual rights, for this is but a powerful way of 
expressing the conviction that they ought to be recognized by states as 
potential rights and consequently as determinants of present aspirations 
and guides to present policies. That usage, I think, is a valid exercise of 
rhetorical license.  
Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 67 (emphasis added).  
I disagree that this is a valid exercise of rhetorical license, because it confuses 
discourse. I also think it is only “easily forgiven” by people whose projects stand to 
benefit from a little philosophical sleight-of-hand. I have treated manifesto rights as if it 
is possible to violate them because I want to take seriously the possibility that manifesto 
rights are more than a bad-faith rhetorical device for misappropriating the moral urgency 
of rights discourse in furtherance of mere political aspirations. However if it is asserted 
that manifesto rights can’t be violated because they are not rights at all, then they needn’t 
be addressed when it is observed that reasonable caregiving forbids rights-violations in 
furtherance of a child’s interests. 
 Stated a little differently: I suspect the assertion of manifesto rights is most often a 
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possible care, and further suppose that giving those children the best possible care will 
negatively impact some third-party’s manifesto rights. Whatever the caregiver chooses, 
they will be “violating” someone’s manifesto rights—their child’s, or someone else’s. In 
cases where apparent rights clash, theorists often propose balancing tests, but there does 
not seem to be any coherent way for “fundamentally important” rights held 
“unconditionally and unalterably” to be subjected to balance without making them 
subordinate, conditional, or alterable.14 So in spite of their potential helpfulness in 
identifying theoretical ideals, manifesto rights must be excluded from the “rights” that 
reasonable caregiving seeks to accommodate.  
The exclusion of manifesto rights from consideration also suggests something 
about the kind of rights reasonable caregiving should accommodate: rather than 
aspirationally guiding policy, relevant rights are those that impose specific duties on 
                                                                                                                                                 
rhetorical move of the kind characterized by Nicholas Shackel, in “The Vacuity of 
Postmodernist Methodology,” as a motte-and-bailey doctrine. What proponents of 
manifesto rights appear to actually want is for their political aspirations to be treated in 
academic and public discourse as having the weight of moral obligations; this desirable 
territory is characterized as a “bailey.” But a bailey is not an especially defensible 
position, so when critics raise objections it is useful to be able to retreat into the highly-
defensible “motte”—in this case, “valid exercise of rhetorical license.” What I am 
pointing out is, whether in the manifesto writer’s motte, or the manifesto writer’s bailey, 
in neither case is reasonable caregiving constrained by the assertion of manifesto rights. 
14 One way to balance conflicting manifesto rights might be to say that they are held 
unconditionally and unalterably even when circumstance requires they be violated. But if 
this is correct, it stops being clear how holding a right could be meaningfully distinct 
from having an interest. Even if rights are just important interests, calling them “rights” 
then looks like either a rhetorical or question-begging move, depending on whether the 
associated claim is, respectively, “these interests are important” or “these interests have 
priority over those interests.” That is, if identifying something as a “right” is just another 
way of claiming that an interest is important, then it is simply rhetoric. If identifying 
something as a “right” is what we do to claim that one interest has priority over a 
competing interest, then we are assuming the thing we should be proving. This seems like 
further reason to be skeptical of “manifesto rights” generally. 
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caregivers. Meeting this expectation does not appear terribly difficult; in fact T.M. 
Scanlon has suggested that there is “fairly wide agreement among philosophers writing 
about rights that claims about rights involve, on the one hand, claims about duties that 
particular agents have and, on the other, claims about the values that these duties protect 
or promote, which ground the claim that there are such duties.”15 Still, wide agreement is 
not total agreement, and given how often philosophers of childhood, as well as political 
documents like the CRC, appeal to maximalism or manifesto rights or otherwise fail to 
identify duties particular agents have, it is important to be clear that such accounts have 
little, if anything, to do with reasonable caregiving. 
3. WHY RELY ON SCANLON? 
This appeal to Scanlon on the question of rights is inspired in part by his 
expression of another important insight, something Scanlon identifies as foundational to 
his contractualism: 
Those who are concerned with morality look for principles for application 
to their imperfect world which they could not reasonably reject, and which 
others in this world, who are not now moved by the desire for agreement, 
could not reasonably reject should they come to be so moved.16 
 
In other words, according to Scanlon, the “ideal to which contractualism appeals” is “that 
of being able to justify your actions to others on grounds that they could not reasonably 
reject.”17 On this view, rational beings have reason to want to be able to justify their 
actions to others, even when they are unable or unwilling to actually justify their actions. 
                                                 
15 T.M. Scanlon, “Rights and Interests,” 69. 
16 Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” 111. 
17 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 154. 
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Considered in practical terms, the idea that morality relies in part on others being moved 
by a desire for moral agreement captures the central psychological importance of being 
both willing and able to coexist with others. Many contemporary accounts of rights are 
explicitly or implicitly liberal—a Western intellectual tradition which is historically and 
at heart concerned with matters of coexistence.18 However these accounts often seem to 
take for granted either that we all already wish to coexist, or that, to exist at all, we must 
coexist, whether we wish to or not. Even John Rawls, unquestionably the most influential 
liberal theorist of the 20th century, paints a compelling picture of our ideally rational pre-
existent selves selecting principles for coexistence with no knowledge of our “place in 
                                                 
18 A particularly compelling characterization of liberalism was recently penned by 
pseudonymous psychiatrist blogger Scott Alexander, in an essay entitled “Against 
Murderism.” 
People talk about “liberalism” as if it’s just another word for capitalism, or 
libertarianism, or vague center-left-Democratic Clintonism. Liberalism is 
none of these things. Liberalism is a technology for preventing civil war. It 
was forged in the fires of Hell—the horrors of the endless seventeenth 
century religious wars. For a hundred years, Europe tore itself apart in 
some of the most brutal ways imaginable—until finally, from the burning 
wreckage, we drew forth this amazing piece of alien machinery. A 
machine that, when tuned just right, let people live together peacefully 
without doing the “kill people for being Protestant” thing. Popular 
historical strategies for dealing with differences have included: brutally 
enforced conformity, brutally efficient genocide, and making sure to keep 
the alien machine tuned really really carefully. 
During the initial drafting of this chapter, I referred to Alexander as an “obscure” 
pseudonymous psychiatrist blogger, but his views have lately become part of a national 
conversation about liberalism, thanks in part to approving citation in the national press. 
See for example David Brooks, “Understanding Student Mobbists,” New York Times (8 
Mar. 2018), http://nytimes.com/2018/03/08/opinion/student-mobs.html. While that 
conversation is not directly relevant to the present inquiry, there is a very ancient sense in 
which all political debates are relevant to the present inquiry: the impact they have on the 
relationship between family and government, about which more will be said in later 
chapters. 
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society”19—but why, in this tale, do our pre-existent selves decide that they want any 
place in society at all? His assumption (and I don’t think it’s a bad assumption; certainly 
it is common one among liberal thinkers generally) appears to be that we all want to be 
better off, and social cooperation contributes to our welfare. But what, in the parlance of 
business, is the “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA) for pre-existent 
intelligences haggling over the implementation details of eventual social cooperation? 
That is, if we found ourselves unable to reach an accord, what would be the result? 
Would it be a Hobbesian state of nature? Could pre-existent intelligences engage in 
rational negotiations without knowing their BATNA? Of course, like Hobbes, Rawls does 
not mean for such stories to be taken literally, and the fact that we do find ourselves 
living in a society (or pitying people in places where peaceful coexistence can’t be taken 
for granted) may justify certain assumptions about the desirability or necessity of 
coexistence. Still they largely remain assumptions. Scanlon’s account, by contrast, does 
not assume that people necessarily wish to coexist, but frames his contractualist morality 
as an exploration of what it is reasonable for people to do when they have this desire. The 
“only relevant pressure for agreement comes from the desire to find and agree on 
principles which no one who had this desire could reasonably reject,”20 or in other words, 
from the desire to be able to justify our actions to others. 
                                                 
19 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 137. 
20 Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” 111. In later work, Scanlon amends his 
view to encompass reasons, not necessarily reducible to desire, to find and agree on such 
principles, however he does not appear to believe that the earlier formulation is incorrect, 
only that it is unnecessarily narrow in a way that generated certain objections inspiring 
reformulation. That is, on Scanlon’s view, people have good reason to pursue coexistence 
even if they do not particularly desire to coexist. Still it seems to me that such desire is an 
important psychological aspect of applied contractualism. 
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 It seems to me that, in addition to reasons we have as rational agents to pursue 
coexistence, we begin to accumulate practical, personal reasons to behave in ways we can 
justify to others from the moment we come into existence. The very first practical 
encounter any of us have with anyone’s desire to be able to justify their actions to others 
is not subjective, but as someone “not now moved by the desire for agreement”—on 
account of our infancy. When we are helpless children, our continued existence 
absolutely depends on the willingness—the desire—of caregivers to coexist with us, and 
their sensitivity to what that willingness reasonably requires of them. Regardless of what 
rational beings actually have reason to do, there are no humans who survive beyond 
infancy in the absence of some minimal psychological commitment from caregivers to 
the practice of coexistence, which makes caregiving the practical foundation of all 
human thought and experience—including, and perhaps especially, moral reasoning. This 
is because the fact that others cared for us through our own incapacity is itself a reason 
for us to act in ways we can justify to them. The centrality of caregiving to our 
psychological experience of morality has led some to criticize liberal theory generally, 
and Rawls in particular, as making normative claims that must borrow moral motivation 
from psychological experiences, like the love of parents, for which the theory in question 
furnishes no normative demand.21 Scanlon’s contractualism evades this criticism by 
                                                 
21 This point is perhaps most eloquently made by Annette Baier, using Rawls as an 
exemplar of all “current men’s moral theories” because she regards his theory as “the 
best” of those available: 
Rawls’ sensitive account of the conditions for the development of that 
sense of justice needed for the maintenance of his version of a just society 
takes it for granted that there will be loving parents rearing the children in 
whom the sense of justice is to develop. “The parents, we may suppose, 
love the child, and in time the child comes to love and trust the parents.” 
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focusing, not on what people would choose if they were stripped of their identities and 
negotiating on the structure of society, but what they have reason to do given the 
circumstances they are in—and we are all in the circumstance of having been cared for, 
even if, at times, grudgingly, imperfectly, or badly. It is easy to imagine caregivers 
looking (perhaps, desperately!) for principles for application to their imperfect world 
given that they want to coexist with the tiny, vulnerable human in their charge. I am 
aware of no other liberal theory that so clearly captures in its foundational claims the 
lived experience of caregiver-child relationships.22 This strikes me as excellent reason to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Why may we suppose this? Not because compliance with Rawls’s version 
of our obligations and duties will ensure it. Rawls’s theory, like so many 
other theories of obligation, in the end must take out a loan not only on the 
natural duty of parents to care for children . . . but on the natural virtue of 
parental love (or even a loan on the maternal instinct?). 
“What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?,” 6. It does seem evident that Rawls was 
perplexed by familial relationships. What Baier missed was that there actually was a 
“man’s theory” capable of accommodating her criticism. Whether her oversight is 
explained by the fact that “What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?” was published 
only a few years after Scanlon’s “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” or that Scanlon 
does not specifically contemplate childhood in that piece, is difficult to discern—
especially since the bulk of Baier’s criticism of Rawls was omitted from her essay’s 
original publication. Whatever the case, Scanlon had, albeit perhaps not deliberately, 
already described a theory of obligation with no need to “take out a loan” on the virtue of 
parental love. On Scanlon’s view, rational beings have normative reason to coexist even 
if they are not psychologically inclined to do so. That loving parental relationships incline 
us, psychologically, toward a desire to be able to justify ourselves to others is a reason to 
favor and encourage the development of such relationships, but nothing is “loaned” by 
recognition of that fact. Whether this means it was not Rawls but Scanlon who penned 
the “best,” “men’s” moral theory of the twentieth century, I leave an open question.  
22 Here Carol Gilligan and her disciples might protest that I was approaching the event 
horizon of enlightenment, only to veer wildly astray at the final instant. If the lived 
experience of caregiver-child relationships ought to be foundational to our moral theory, 
then perhaps liberalism is not the right moral theory! Of course, Gilligan’s own views, 
famously promulgated in In a Different Voice, seem to imply that my own commitment 
to liberalism may merely evidence my background and gender; certainly I am neither a 
psychologist nor a mother, while Gilligan is both.  
The best response I have is that, if care ethics and contractualism lead to similar 
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rely on Scanlon’s insights in the development of my own philosophy of upbringing, and 
neatly parallels Scanlon’s own phenomenological reasons for accepting contractualism.23 
4. SCANLON ON PERMISSIBLE CAREGIVING 
 After excluding manifesto rights from consideration and identifying Scanlon’s 
contractualism as the relevant framework for analysis, the claim that caregivers should 
not violate anyone’s rights can be seen as a claim that it would be wrong for caregivers to 
otherwise-improve the lives of children through rights-violations, because to do so would 
violate a principle “for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably 
reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.”24 The practical identification 
of such principles requires an “informal comparison of losses,”25 but at the level of 
normativity it is true by definition that no one could reasonably reject a principle 
                                                                                                                                                 
claims, so much the better for both. I don’t presently see myself as having anything of 
value to say about the relationship between care ethics, feminism, and liberalism. It is not 
even clear to me how antagonistic the relationship really is, though certainly some, like 
Baier, portray it that way. Indeed, one reason I have so far referred to “caregivers” rather 
than “parents,” much less “mothers and fathers,” is that I do not want to be guilty of 
assuming too much when I make arguments later about the importance of mothers and 
fathers. Possibly this is a mistake; perhaps it would be better to begin with the care of 
mothers and fathers, without whom none of us would exist, and develop a philosophy of 
upbringing from there. But this project aims in great measure at formulating a liberal 
critique of certain liberal accounts of upbringing; inquiry into whether my account might 
be specifically compatible or incompatible with care ethics or other feminist theory might 
be worthwhile, but is simply beyond the present scope. 
23 Specifically, Scanlon writes, “I myself accept contractualism largely because the 
account it offers of moral motivation is phenomenologically more accurate than any other 
I know of.” What We Owe to Each Other, 187. 
24 Ibid., 153. 
25 Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” 128. In fact Scanlon claims that informal 
comparison of losses is “central” to his contractualism. 
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requiring caregivers to refrain from rights violations. This is because rights are 
constituted by valid moral principles. On Scanlon’s view,  
the claim that there is a right is a claim that certain limitations on the 
discretion to act of individual and institutional agents are necessary if 
important interests are to be adequately protected, and feasible as a way of 
providing this protection. This claim of feasibility is that the cost these 
limitations impose on our other interests is acceptable given the 
importance of the interests being protected.26 
 
In other words, to correctly identify something as a right is to say that an informal 
comparison of losses would yield (or has already yielded) the claim that a rule limiting 
relevant discretion in order to protect an important interest cannot be reasonably rejected.  
Or so it seems to me. Scanlon tends to write about rights and contractualism 
separately, and the concise definition of rights he routinely deploys in more recent work 
appears to have evolved from a comparatively complicated account with no immediately 
obvious connection to contractualism,27 so the precise relationship between rules no one 
could reasonably reject and necessarily, feasible, interest-responsive limitations on 
discretion is not always clear. However, as Peter de Marneffe persuasively observes, 
                                                 
26 Scanlon, “Rights and Interests,” 77. 
27 See for example Scanlon, “Rights, Goals, and Fairness,” 89, where Scanlon suggests 
that  
the view that there is a moral right of a certain sort is generally backed by 
something like the following: (i) An empirical claim about how 
individuals would behave or how institutions would work in the absence 
of this particular assignment of rights (claim-rights, liberties, etc.). (ii) A 
claim that this result would be unacceptable. This claim will be based on 
valuation of consequences of the sort described [elsewhere], taking into 
account also considerations of fairness and equality. (iii) A further 
empirical claim about how the envisaged assignment of rights will 
produce a different outcome. The empirical parts of this schema play a 
larger or at least more conspicuous role in some rights than in others. 
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if a rule prohibiting [something] is necessary to protect some important 
interest adequately, and this rule does not impose unacceptable costs on 
other important interests, then it makes sense to claim that no one could 
reasonably reject this rule as part of a system of rules for the general 
regulation of . . . conduct.28 
 
A rule allowing caregivers to act in ways that give no weight to the interests of others 
would be impossible to reasonably justify to those others, because it is something they 
have every reason to reject.29 A rule allowing caregivers to act in ways that give 
insufficient weight to the interest of others would likewise be impossible to reasonably 
justify to them. In general, whether 
a principle could reasonably be rejected, depends . . . on a comparison of 
the reasons that can be offered against it with those that can be offered in 
its favor against alternative principles from the point of view of people 
who occupy various positions in a situation of the kind to which the 
principle applies. We never know exactly which individuals will occupy 
these positions in all the various situations of this kind, so questions of 
right and wrong must be ones we can answer in the abstract, without such 
knowledge. The reasons we consider in assessing a principle are therefore 
are [sic] not precisely the reasons that particular actual individuals have, 
but what I call generic reasons—reasons that people in general would have 
in virtue of being in the positions in question.30 
 
                                                 
28 Peter de Marneffe, “Do We Have a Right to Use Drugs?,” 240. While de Marneffe 
specifically makes this claim about government conduct, the relationship observed 
appears to hold true for any conduct. 
29 In particular, Scanlon writes,  
In the contractualist analysis of right and wrong, what is presupposed first 
and foremost is the aim of finding principles that others who share this 
aim could not reasonably reject. This aim then brings other reasons in its 
train. Given this aim, for example, it would be unreasonable to give the 
interests of others no weight in deciding which principles to accept. For 
why should they accept principles arrived at in this way?  
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 192. 
30 Scanlon, “Reply to Gauthier and Gibbard,” 181–182. 
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Any reason a caregiver might give, qua caregiver, to violate someone’s rights would be a 
claim that, even though they could act in a way that adequately protected the interests of 
the rights-holder, without imposing unacceptable costs on their own (or their child’s) 
interests, they have reason to not act in that way. But this is not the kind of behavior it is 
possible to justify to others; a rights-holder in such a case would have ample reason to 
reject any principle permitting such behavior. Since it is never permissible for caregivers 
to violate rights of this kind, a contractualist revision to the question of reasonable 
caregiving can incorporate concerns about rights violations by reference to permissibility: 
 
 Reasonable Caregiving: What is permissible for this caregiver, given the totality 
of their circumstances, to do in connection with this child’s upbringing?  
 
This contractualist revision of the question seems sufficiently clear that we can also begin 
to sketch out an answer. So far, Scanlon’s contractualism furnishes an answer that looks 
something like this: 
 
1. Caregivers should act in accordance with a set of principles for the general 
regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement. 
a. This means, in part, that it is not permissible for caregivers to violate 
anyone’s rights in pursuit of caregiving, because rights are constituted by 
principles that no one could reasonably reject. 
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This is a fairly straightforward gloss on Scanlon’s contractualism, the kind we 
might naturally expect to generate by simply asking, “what does Scanlon’s 
contractualism have to say about caregiving?” What is significant at this point is not so 
much Scanlon’s answer, which has so far taken roughly the same form as all answers to 
the question “what does Scanlon’s contractualism have to say about φ,” but the way that 
Scanlon’s contractualism clarified the question. The main clarification is that reasonable 
upbringing is a matter of permissibility, as distinct from maximalist accounts that focus 
on what is “best” along some other axis. Sometimes this is the “best interests” of the 
child, but it could also be some overriding or end-state principle to which a theorist is 
elsewise committed. For example, upbringing theorists apparently committed to equality 
as an end-state principle often appear to be answering a question like, “How should 
children be raised, given egalitarianism as a moral obligation?” Of course, there is 
nothing particularly objectionable about constraining philosophical inquiry in ways one 
happens to find interesting or enlightening (or correct). But resultant accounts are 
necessarily hypothetical: asking “how should I raise my child if I want to be a good 
egalitarian” differs very little from asking “how should I raise my child if I want her to 
become a ballerina,” in the sense that even if the answer produced is very, very good, it 
will be of limited value to anyone who is opposed to, or even merely uncertain about, 
egalitarians or ballerinas.31 And where such inquiries negligently or mendaciously fail to 
                                                 
31 I am not, here, making the substantive claim that egalitarianism is morally optional. In 
fact contractualism does not entail egalitarianism, and so it is true that egalitarianism is 
not morally required of us. However all I am observing here is that contractualism helps 
to clarify the upbringing question in part by inviting us to think about upbringing itself, 
rather than inviting us to think about our prior commitments to other principles. This 
seems to me a much more plausible way to think about upbringing. It is true that one way 
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mention their prior commitments, they can appear to be exploiting the deep, protective 
emotional connection many people feel with children and childhood, in furtherance of 
separate (often, political; sometimes, suspiciously anti-family) aims. By contrast, the 
contractualist response to “how should children be raised?” is that children should be 
raised according to principles caregivers could not reasonably reject, and which others 
(including their children) could not reasonably reject should they come to be similarly 
moved. Rather than inviting caregivers to answer the upbringing question by 
contemplating egalitarianism, feminism, autonomy, or the like, Scanlon’s approach 
invites caregivers to contemplate the particulars of caregiving and what it reasonably 
requires of them. Instead of making the question subordinate to other aims, Scanlon’s 
contractualism clarifies what it is that the question means when asked by a caregiver in 
search of practical answers.  
Here a clever reader might ask, “and what if I am opposed to, or even merely 
uncertain about, contractualism?” The short answer is that such a reader would 
presumably find propositions of the form “contractualism recommends φ” to be of 
limited value. But the goal of this chapter is not to demonstrate that contractualism 
recommends any particular φ. The goal of this chapter is to raise a practical question, 
unconstrained by prior philosophical commitments—how should children be raised?—
and to show how careful thinking about the question leads to a (partial) answer: that the 
nature of caregiver-child relationships, the practical requirements for which include 
                                                                                                                                                 
to undertake a project like this one would be to simply ask, “what does Scanlon think 
about upbringing?” But my own approach has been to think about upbringing, and 
discovering that this approach was compatible with Scanlon’s contractualism was 
persuasive evidence, to me, that Scanlon’s contractualism is the correct account of 
permissibility. 
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caregivers with some minimal psychological commitment to coexistence with their 
children, recommends contractualism as the best theory of permissible action. 
Contractualism, in turn, helps to clarify the upbringing question. Among other things, 
such clarification is essential to achieving a correct understanding of certain intuitions 
about caregiving—including judicial outcomes in cases philosophers of childhood tend to 
find perplexing. A brief discussion of the landmark American case Wisconsin v. Yoder 
will serve to illustrate how this unfolds. 
5. WISCONSIN V. YODER32 
A. The Facts 
 In Green County, Wisconsin, the children of Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and 
Adin Yutzy (hereafter “the parents”) were withdrawn from public school attendance after 
completing the eighth grade. This was in violation of Wisconsin’s compulsory attendance 
law, which required children between the ages of 7 and 16 to regularly participate in full-
day public or private schooling. The parents received a fine and appealed on grounds that 
the law violated (among other things) their First Amendment right to free religious 
exercise. They argued that because “high school tends to emphasize intellectual and 
scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social 
life with other students” while “Amish society emphasizes informal ‘learning through 
doing;’ a life of ‘goodness,’ rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical 
knowledge; community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather than 
                                                 
32 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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integration with, contemporary worldly society,” high school attendance endangered the 
salvation of their children and themselves.33 
Wisconsin agreed that the parents had a legitimate religious interest at stake, but 
made a variety of arguments in defense of its position, most stemming from a failure—all 
too common, even among the judiciary, even today—to understand that “free exercise” 
does not mean freedom to believe what you want only as long as it makes no practical 
difference in anyone else’s life. Religious liberty is adequately protected only when “free 
exercise” is understood to include action as well as belief—even, at times, when facially 
neutral regulations appear to forbid such activity.34 Of special relevance to the present 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 211. 
34 See ibid., 220:  
[T]o agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the 
broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of 
conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations 
of general applicability. . . . This case, therefore, does not become easier 
because respondents were convicted for their “actions” in refusing to send 
their children to the public high school; in this context, belief and action 
cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments. Nor can this case 
be disposed of on the grounds that Wisconsin’s requirement for school 
attendance to age 16 applies uniformly to all citizens of the State and does 
not, on its face, discriminate against religions or a particular religion, or 
that it is motivated by legitimate secular concerns. A regulation neutral on 
its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional 
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free 
exercise of religion. 
The language of undue burdens seems approximately analogous to the “feasibility” prong 
of Scanlon’s definition of rights; that is, some religious practices can of course be 
forbidden by facially neutral statutes, and some cannot, but this will depend on a specific 
balancing of the actual interests at stake. American jurisprudence today appears to be in 
flux on the matter, as animus against religious belief and practice alike has inspired a 
succession of high-profile cases that appear to be aimed at chasing religion out of the 
public square and excluding religious reasoning from the Overton window of public 
discourse. Much more might be said concerning the tension between the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, but for purposes of this project it should suffice to 
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inquiry, Wisconsin also argued that the parents’ position was “one fostering ‘ignorance’ 
from which the child must be protected by the State.”35 Because “some degree of 
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our 
open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence” and “education 
prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society,”36 
Wisconsin argued, its system of compulsory education existed in part to protect 
children’s interests against the influence or wishes of their parents. 
B. The Holding 
 The Supreme Court, while accepting the claim that Wisconsin had a compelling 
interest in maintaining its system of compulsory education, held that requiring Amish 
children to attend two years of full-day schooling beyond eighth grade harmed the 
parents’ legitimate religious interests more than permitting parents to withdraw their 
children harmed the state’s legitimate interest in the children’s schooling. In light of 
specific facts about Amish living, the Court held that what Wisconsin was mostly 
preventing was not ignorance but an upbringing that tended to produce precisely the self-
reliance and self-sufficiency it claimed to so value. Crucially, three justices participated 
with the caveat that their concurrence hinged on the relatively slight difference between 
                                                                                                                                                 
observe that, as of this writing, the Supreme Court continues to treat free exercise (as 
opposed to mere belief) as something that is in fact protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
35 Ibid., 222. 
36 Ibid., 221. 
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an eighth grade education and a tenth grade education; had the case been about keeping 
children out of school altogether, it might have come out differently.37  
C. A Sampling of Liberal Criticism 
 It would be quite impossible to consider even a noticeable fraction of the 
available commentary on Yoder, but a sampling of philosophical criticism should suffice 
to illustrate the difficulty that contractualism alleviates. Joel Feinberg—the same theorist 
who christened manifesto rights—in 1980 penned one frequently-cited critique to which 
Chapter 3 of this project will give additional attention. In one section of that piece, 
Feinberg makes a variety of complaints against Yoder, though he avers that he does “not 
wish to contend that the decision in Yoder was mistaken.”38 Rather, he suggests that 
while he is sympathetic, at least, to the reasoning of the concurrence, in general the Court 
ought not to be so quick to defer to parental discretion. This is because Feinberg thinks it 
would be ideal for the state to instead  
act to let all influences, or the largest and most random possible 
assortment of influences, work equally on the child, to open up all 
possibilities to him, without itself influencing him toward one or another 
of these. In that way, it can be hoped that the chief determining factor in 
the grown child’s choice of a vocation and life style will be his own 
governing values, talents, and propensities.39 
 
This is maximalism, not of outcomes but of a good Feinberg calls “opportunities”—
Feinberg thinks that compulsory education should send children “out into the adult world 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 236, reads, “This would be a very different case for me if respondents’ claim 
were that their religion forbade their children from attending any school at any time and 
from complying in any way with the educational standards set by the State.” 
38 Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future,” 136.  
39 Ibid. 
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with as many open opportunities as possible, thus maximizing [their] chances for self-
fulfillment.”40 Or at least Feinberg seems to think this, at times; elsewhere his position 
appears more moderate. David Archard calls this an equivocation, then goes on to 
suggest that the maximalist version is “absurd.” This is because children  
could not both learn enough to have a professional career in music and 
have the time for the intensive training that would be required should she 
want to be an Olympic sportswoman. . . . [furthermore] it seems evident 
that some life choices are morally unworthy—that of the career criminal, 
for instance—and not such that a child should be able to choose them.41 
 
Robert Noggle raises similar concerns, though he also offers a moderate defense 
of opportunity maximalism as something to take “in isolation,”42 apparently meaning that 
it is something that would characterize an ideal upbringing assuming, counterfactually, 
that there were no other considerations to weigh. Weighing and balancing is, Noggle 
thinks, precisely what the Court deciding Yoder was trying to do, and something many 
theorists fall back on in their own discussions of caregiving, namely 
balancing the parents’ free exercise and other autonomy rights against the 
rights of the children (primarily their right to a decent education). Much of 
the commentary on Yoder seems to take this balancing model for granted, 
and simply quibbles about whether the courts got the balance right or 
balanced the right things . . . . But the balancing rights model is not 
confined to discussions of legal cases like Yoder.43 
 
Noggle goes on to cite a handful of philosophers of childhood who rely, often implicitly, 
on the notion of striking some kind of balance between relevant interests in resolving 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 135. 
41 Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood, 76. 
42 Robert Noggle, “A Chip off the Old Block,” 99. 
43 Ibid., 99–100. 
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questions of rights violation. In spite of ultimately rejecting what he calls the “balancing 
model,” Noggle acknowledges it as “intuitively plausible.”44 What he doesn’t do is delve 
any further into why it is so intuitively plausible, much less what exactly it is that 
theorists are or should be placing on the scales. But such “quibbles,” as he labels them, 
are at the heart of understanding what Yoder—and, indeed, reasonable caregiving—is all 
about. 
 What Feinberg, Archard, and Noggle all seem to suffer alike is a profound 
ambivalence on the question of caregiver discretion. They acknowledge the importance 
and unavoidability of caregivers in shaping children’s lives but also seem committed to 
the idea that caregiver discretion should be more constrained than Yoder appears to 
permit. Feinberg identifies his thinking as paradoxical, but resolvable through simple 
recognition that life is always messier than theory. Archard and Noggle treat the tension 
more dialectically, calling for moderation or modesty but providing little guidance on 
what moderation or modesty actually entails. All seem skeptical that there is any such 
thing as a caregiver’s (i.e. parental) right to shape children’s lives, but none takes the step 
of specifically claiming that Yoder was wrongly decided because it was decided in terms 
of caregivers’ rights. The idea of “balance” seems to creep in repeatedly; Feinberg 
balances theory against practicality, Archard balances liberation against caretaking, and 
Noggle claims to reject balancing caregiver interests against children’s interests but 
espouses a “moderate view of the child’s right to an open future.”45 “Moderate,” of 
course, is a synonym for “balanced.” 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 100. 
45 Ibid., 111. 
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 Something none of these theorists do in connection with their discussion of Yoder 
is first clearly establish what they mean by “rights.” This goes a long way toward 
explaining their ambivalence. Particularly in Feinberg’s case, his own notion of 
“manifesto rights” seems to be lurking in the background of many of his assertions, but 
Archard and Noggle inherit the problem. Identifying particular “rights” as unconditional 
and unalterable, then subjecting them to various kinds of balancing in response to 
theoretical or practical concerns, is exactly backwards. As noted in section 2 of this 
chapter, to subject something to a balancing test is to treat it as conditional and alterable. 
A contractualist approach avoids this ambivalence and clarifies the Court’s reasoning by 
conducting the relevant inquiry in the proper order. 
D. An Abbreviated Contractualist Analysis 
The first thing Scanlon might suggest to Noggle is that it is not rights being 
balanced, but interests.46 Furthermore, “the process involves a significant element of 
empirical calculation and institutional design: finding ways to redefine the rights in 
question so that they protect the relevant interests at feasible cost.”47 This suggests a very 
different approach than maximization, because maximization seems inevitably to produce 
principles for the general regulation of behavior that can be reasonably rejected. When 
Archard calls Feinberg’s maximalism “absurd,” he backs this characterization with 
                                                 
46 See Scanlon, “Rights and Interests,” 78. There Scanlon notes that “insofar as this 
process involves balancing, what are balanced are interests—in some but not all cases, 
interests that call for the protection of rights.” Typically our interests bear some relation 
to our well-being, though not always—for example, on Scanlon’s view, we have an 
interest in being treated fairly, even when being treated unfairly would not leave us 
worse-off. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 229. 
47 Scanlon, “Rights and Interests,” 78. 
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hypothetical scenarios illustrating reasons to reject the principle on offer. When Noggle 
defends maximalism by appeal to something like (aspirational) ideal upbringing, he does 
so by setting aside all the reasons people have to reject maximalism, suggesting it should 
be considered “in isolation.” But from the perspective of actual caregivers asking 
practical questions, “consider it in isolation” is surely no defense at all. What Noggle 
dismisses as quibbling is in fact the essential process of weighing and balancing interests 
in pursuit of the proper identification of relevant rights, so as to adopt principles for the 
general regulation of behavior that can’t be reasonably rejected.  
Consider a handful of principles from which the Court might have selected. One 
might be stated as “parents have plenary authority over their children’s education.” 
Certainly such a principle might be advocated by a strong proponent of parents’ rights—a 
Lockean proprietarian, say, for whom something like child-ownership derives from self-
ownership. Could anyone reasonably reject such a principle? The informal comparison of 
losses here contemplates, among other things, what parents stand to lose by being denied 
plenary authority over their children’s education, and what children stand to lose by being 
treated as the property of their parents. In the United States of the late twentieth century, 
what parents stand to lose by being denied plenary authority over their children’s 
education appears slight, especially if they retain some authority over their children’s 
education instead—in other words, principles must be considered not only in light of 
relevant interests but also in light of relevant alternatives. While the children of loving 
and educated parents might very well have no complaints about a principle granting their 
parents plenary authority over their education, the children of parents who refuse to send 
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their children to school48 or arrange for any alternative education would have good reason 
to reject such a principle. Such a child’s important interest in, among other things, 
obtaining sufficient education to participate in their community would not be protected 
by this principle. 
On the other hand, the Court might have ruled that “parents cannot interfere with 
the state-sanctioned process of education.” But such a principle would cost parental 
interests dearly; it sweeps aside important parental interests in attending to their 
children’s education and in transmitting their cultural values, and to whose gain? 
Children, too, may have reason to reject such a principle, given the strong likelihood that 
their parents are rather more likely to care about them than any state actor. There are 
presumably children, perhaps many children, who would benefit from a principle 
forbidding parental interference in their education. But the claim that “this principle 
would make someone’s life better” does not, on its own, prevent its rejection as a rule for 
                                                 
48 The classic literary example, of course, being Mark Twain’s Huck Finn, whose father 
disapproved of Huck’s schooling:  
“Well, I’ll learn her how to meddle. And looky here—you drop that 
school, you hear? I’ll learn people to bring up a boy to put on airs over his 
own father and let on to be better’n what he is. You lemme catch you 
fooling around that school again, you hear? Your mother couldn’t read, 
and she couldn’t write, nuther, before she died. None of the family 
couldn’t before they died. I can’t; and here you’re a-swelling yourself up 
like this. I ain’t the man to stand it—you hear? Say, lemme hear you 
read.”  
I took up a book and begun something about General Washington 
and the wars. When I’d read about a half a minute, he fetched the book a 
whack with his hand and knocked it across the house. He says:  
“It’s so. You can do it. I had my doubts when you told me. Now 
looky here; you stop that putting on frills. I won’t have it. I’ll lay for you, 
my smarty; and if I catch you about that school I’ll tan you good. First you 
know you’ll get religion, too. I never see such a son.”  
Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, chap. 5. 
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the general regulation of conduct. The costs to others must also be accounted for, and if 
they are unacceptable, then those others have reason to reject the rule. If forbidding 
parents from interfering in state-sanctioned education would substantially benefit one 
child, while merely inconveniencing others, and no relevant alternative principle was 
available, no one could reasonably reject the adoption of that principle. But if the cost to 
others were very high, or similar benefits could be achieved without so much as 
inconveniencing others, then the principle forbidding parental interference could be 
reasonably rejected. 
So consider the principle, “parents may not act to prevent their children from 
acquiring sufficient education to participate in their community.” Could anyone 
reasonably reject such a principle? Likely not; children definitely have an important 
interest in participating in their community. What cost might be imposed on parents by 
adopting this principle as a rule for the general regulation of conduct? This will depend 
on further details about their situation. In Yoder, the Court found that compulsory high 
school education would place too great a burden on the parents’ interest in providing a 
religious upbringing, precisely because there was no evidence that the community lives 
of the Amish were hindered by missing out on two years of high school. In light of the 
concurring opinion, Yoder would likely have come out quite differently had the parents 
insisted on withdrawing children from school at an earlier age. Why the difference? 
Because, given the totality of the circumstances, an eighth grade education seemed 
sufficient. The primary education of the children seemed, to the Court, sufficiently 
important that even if parents raised a religious or other important objection, that 
objection would be outweighed. But two years of high school seemed both less important 
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an interest than primary education, and likely to impose a greater cost on other relevant 
interests. 
Did the Court strike the right balance? Likely yes. Certainly the balance they 
struck is well-explained by Scanlon’s contractualism, and not explained in a satisfactory 
way by competing approaches. Maximalist positions can’t explain the outcome: at no 
point does the Court suggest that being withdrawn from school after the eighth grade 
constitutes the best possible life for Amish children, which is what upbringing idealism 
would require. A caregiving idealist might argue that it is in the child’s best interests for 
parents to allow children to get a high school education—and indeed, if what they mean 
by “best interests” is “likely future income” or “self-reported life satisfaction” then there 
is probably some solid empirical support for their position. But maximizing principles 
that appeal to children’s “best interests” can be reasonably rejected if there is any 
likelihood at all that one child’s best interests will ever conflict with another child’s best 
interests—something that does seem likely to occur, as an empirical matter. What can’t 
be reasonably rejected is a rule requiring caregivers to provide children with, or at least 
not interfere in children’s acquisition of, sufficient education to participate in their 
community. What counts as sufficient will depend on particular facts about the caregiver, 
the child, the world they inhabit, and the others who inhabit that world. Maximalist 
accounts are only sensible, if at all, in isolation from such confounders. Reasonable 
caregiving offers a reasonable alternative. 
6. CONCLUSION 
There are a variety of ways to think about upbringing. At least two of these 
represent slightly different approaches to upbringing maximalism—the view that there 
  37 
should be no “missed opportunities” in a child’s life, possibly given the constraint that 
they aren’t owed the best possible caregivers. But it is not especially practical to hold the 
belief that any time a certain child’s life could be made better, it should be made better. 
Caregivers must account for other considerations, often important considerations, in 
deciding how to raise their children. The relevant question, from a contractualist 
perspective, is approximately as follows:  
 
 Reasonable Caregiving: What is permissible for this caregiver, given the totality 
of their circumstances, to do in connection with this child’s upbringing? 
 
The contractualist approach to permissibility incorporates into this question the idea that 
caregivers must account for the rights that people have—not their aspirations, but their 
important interests that can be protected “feasibly,” or in other words, at an acceptable 
cost to other important interests. This means that caregivers must at least sometimes 
forgo opportunities to make a child’s life go better. They should instead act according to 
principles they could not reasonably reject, that others also could not reasonably reject if 
they shared this aim. Reasonable caregiving refers to this application of Scanlon’s 
contractualism to the role of caregiver. Scanlon’s contractualism looks like a good way to 
think about upbringing in part because it captures the importance of balancing interests in 
the enterprise of caregiving, and in part because its normative basis is mirrored in the 
psychological experience of altricial parent-child relationships. The landmark case of 
Wisconsin v. Yoder helps illustrate the comparative shortcomings of maximalism in 
generating practical responses to caregiving concerns.  
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That said, Scanlon himself observes that although the values of parenthood both 
shape and are shaped by “what we owe to each other,” “being a good . . . parent [also] 
involves understanding and responding to values that go beyond this central form of 
morality.”49 In particular, Scanlon claims that parents “have reason to want their 
children’s lives to go as well as possible, taking into account all the various elements of 
well-being, and they may be open to moral criticism when they fail to promote this.”50 
The phrase “as well as possible” looks, prima facie, sufficiently maximalist to raise a 
serious concern: is reasonable caregiving actually a misapplication of Scanlon’s 
contractualism? This is not a line of reasoning to which Scanlon gives any direct 
attention, however my observation that— 
 
1. Caregivers should act in accordance with a set of principles for the general 
regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement. 
a. This means, in part, that it is not permissible for caregivers to violate 
anyone’s rights in pursuit of caregiving, because rights are constituted by 
principles that no one could reasonably reject. 
 
 
—is, on Scanlon’s contractualism, as true for anyone as it is for caregivers. So what can it 
mean to be “open to moral criticism” when selecting among alternatives that are, in terms 
of what we owe to each other, permissible? That is the subject of the next chapter.
                                                 
49 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 174. 
50 Ibid., 139.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DOMAIN OF PARENTING 
 
In spite of never, so far as I have been able to discover, having written an essay 
specifically concerning caregiving, T.M. Scanlon makes numerous claims, in What We 
Owe to Each Other, concerning the relationship between parents and children. Although 
these claims are almost always passing illustrations rather than carefully and 
substantively developed, they consistently suggest that by the time Scanlon wrote What 
We Owe to Each Other, he had come to view parenting (among other forms of beneficent 
relations, like friendship) as straddling the boundaries between “what we owe to each 
other” and morality more broadly construed. This was part of a shift in his thinking; in 
earlier formulations, Scanlon’s contractualism was posited as a complete account of the 
nature of morality. But eventually Scanlon attended to the “fragmentation of the moral,” 
amending that his contractualism is an account of the “domain of morality having to do 
with our duties to other people” or, in other words “what we owe to each other.”1 He now 
claims that this domain does not include all of morality, though it does encompass that 
portion of morality on which moral theorists have historically been focused. Then, with 
specific regard to caregiving, Scanlon claims that the values of parenthood both shape 
and are shaped by “what we owe to each other,” such that “being a good . . . parent 
involves understanding and responding to values that go beyond this central form of 
morality.”2 
                                                 
1 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 6–7. 
2 Ibid., 174. 
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So on Scanlon’s view, what I have called “reasonable caregiving” cannot be 
completely understood by sole reference to “what we owe to each other.” The morality of 
what we owe to each other identifies the boundary between permissible and 
impermissible activity, but identifying an action as permissible does not show it to be 
required, and does not show it to be the best available option. The morality of what we 
owe to each other rules out certain ways of treating our children, but there are many ways 
we can behave toward our children that appear to warrant criticism even when we are not 
doing anything impermissible. A theoretical ability to justify ourselves to others is not the 
only thing we value, and certain kinds of relationships depend on those relationships 
being valued in other ways—including behaving in ways that we can actually justify to 
others, in terms of reasons they are likely to accept. With specific regard to parents and 
children, it is true that  
obligations to one’s children might be explained by the fact that they are 
particularly dependent on us for support and protection. . . . but [these 
obligations] do not seem to cover all that we expect of . . . parents. 
Moreover, even if they did, they do not have the right kind of motivational 
basis: we expect a good . . . parent to be moved by special concern, not 
just by a general sense of obligation. . . . [I]t is apparent that the values at 
stake . . . draw on sources of motivation that are distinct from the one that 
underlies the requirements of morality in the narrow sense, or “what we 
owe to each other.” . . . [A] man who took good care of his children, 
because he recognized that he was responsible for their existence and that 
no one else would look after them if he did not, might still lack the 
motivation that a good father would have. . . . [B]eing a good . . . parent 
involves understanding and responding to values that go beyond [“what 
we owe to each other.”]3 
 
Once those values are identified, Scanlon thinks, they “will be seen to have a structure 
                                                 
3 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 172–174. 
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similar to that which most obviously characterizes our ideas of right and wrong,”4 so it 
should still be adequate in characterizing reasonable caregiving to inquire after what it is 
that caregivers have decisive reason to do, all things considered. Here is the hurdle: 
Scanlon claims that parents “have reason to want their children’s lives to go as well as 
possible, taking into account all the various elements of well-being, and . . . may be open 
to moral criticism when they fail to promote this.”5  
1. IS SCANLON A CAREGIVING MAXIMALIST, OR NOT? 
 The idea that parents may be open to moral criticism for failing to promote a 
child’s life going “as well as possible” looks, at first glance, like approximately the sort 
of maximalism to which reasonable caregiving was supposed to present a coherent 
alternative. Recall from Chapter 1 that maximalism refers to views positing an obligation 
for caregivers or others to provide “as much as possible” of something identified as good. 
One clear way for parents to be open to moral criticism for failing to promote a child’s 
life going “as well as possible” would be for them to fail to live up to an obligation to 
maximize that child’s welfare.  
I see at least three possible responses to the apparent difficulty. The first would be 
to suspect that the discussion of “what we owe to each other” in Chapter 1 went wrong 
somewhere—that Scanlon himself thinks, once we’ve accounted for all the relevant 
interests and weighed them appropriately, caregivers in fact do owe a particular version 
of maximalism, namely, welfare maximalism, to their children. But while there is 
undoubtedly some risk of error in dealing with so comprehensive a theory as Scanlon’s 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 79. 
5 Ibid., 139.  
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contractualism, it seems unlikely that Scanlon is actually a maximalist. Writing of the 
value of human life generally, he raises the possibility that “recognizing the value of 
human life is a matter of respecting each human being as a locus of reasons, that is to say, 
recognizing the force of their reasons for wanting to live and wanting their lives to go 
better.”6 Then Scanlon rejects this view as, among other things, “impossibly unwieldy, 
since we cannot respond to or even contemplate all these reasons at once.”7 He claims 
that because we “cannot respond to all the reasons that every human creature has for 
wanting his or her life to go well . . . we must select among these reasons, and . . . do this 
in a way that recognizes the capacity of human beings, as rational creatures, to assess 
reasons and to govern their lives according to this assessment.”8 This acknowledgment 
that we can’t possibly respond to all the reasons that every human has for wanting his or 
her life to go well captures the inevitability of missed opportunities, which—as noted in 
Chapter 1—is what maximalism is supposed to eliminate. Scanlon’s identification of 
humans as rational creatures requires some finessing in connection with children, who are 
at least initially not rational creatures, but this will be addressed somewhat in both section 
4 of this chapter, and Chapter 3 generally. For now it should suffice to observe that 
caregiving maximalism is unwieldy in the same way Scanlon thinks that responding to 
others as a locus of reasons is unwieldy, and that reasonable caregivers surely do “select 
among” reasons in non-maximizing ways—for example, when living up to their more 
general duty to not raise children in a way that violates someone’s rights. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 105. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 106. 
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 The second response would be to suspect that Scanlon has made a mistake. While 
I strongly favor a presumption of deference to Scanlon in those instances where he makes 
explicit claims about caregiving, it is surely possible that, in staving off some anticipated 
objection or illustrating an unrelated point about well-being, Scanlon misstated or 
overstated his position. Unlike many moral theorists, Scanlon writes relatively little about 
well-being, except when he is making arguments that it is not something that requires our 
attention, especially from a first-person perspective. But since he clearly identifies 
caregiving—specifically, parenting—as an exception to the general rule that notions of 
well-being are of limited value in understanding what it is that we have reason to do,9 we 
are left with something of a puzzle. Scanlon is sometimes interpreted to claim that 
notions of well-being serve no practical purpose in moral inquiry,10 and certainly he 
doubts it is possible to have a theory of well-being at all.11 Even when he tries to 
                                                 
9 Other exceptions Scanlon mentions include being a friend, and being a spouse. 
10 “One immediately odd aspect of Scanlon’s position that ‘well-being’ is an otiose 
notion in ethics is that he himself seems to have a view on what well-being is.” Roger 
Crisp, “Well-Being.” 
11 This doubt is expressed at various points in What We Owe to Each Other, but perhaps 
most clearly in this passage: 
[A] person’s well-being is certainly increased if her life is improved in 
[various ways while] others are held constant. But this list of fixed points 
does not amount to a theory of well-being. Such a theory would go beyond 
this list by doing such things as . . . provide a more unified account of 
what well-being is, on the basis of which one could see why [various 
things] contributing to well-being in fact do so. It might also provide a 
clearer account of the boundary of the concept . . . . [and] provide a 
standard for making more exact comparisons of well-being—for deciding 
when, on balance, a person’s well-being has been increased or decreased 
and by how much. I doubt that we are likely to find a theory of well-being 
of this kind. 
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 125. 
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acknowledge some value, to “benefactors” alone, of having a notion of well-being, 
Scanlon concludes that “it is not clear how important the boundaries of well-being are, 
even from a benefactor’s point of view.”12  
When Scanlon suggests that parents might be subject to moral criticism for failing 
to promote something like welfare maximalism, he’s not only departing from conclusions 
about caregiving implied by his contractualism, he’s doing so in a way that raises 
difficulties for his other arguments about well-being. This is in part because his primary 
criticism of the notion of well-being is that a first-person perspective on one’s own well-
being plays no role in deliberation about what one has reason to do. In order to show this, 
Scanlon argues not only that there is not any single notion of individual well-being that 
can fill all the roles philosophers assign to it, but that even a more practical, intuitive idea 
of well-being plays no role in first-person deliberation. When Scanlon notes that from 
other perspectives, especially the perspective of a benefactor, some notion of well-being 
is of “greater significance” derived from its “role in the moral structures” in which it 
figures,13 it is not obvious how this distinguishes the benefactor’s perspective from the 
first-person perspective. Just as a caregiver might sometimes wonder, “How can I 
increase my child’s well-being?,” when questions like “How can I make my child 
happy?” or “How can I help my child learn this important lesson?” might put their 
immediate concerns more clearly, surely individuals can and do ask themselves, “How 
can I cause my life to go as well as possible?”—even if putting the question that way is, 
as Scanlon claims, unnecessary or distorting. If this is right, then Scanlon’s claim—that 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 135. 
13 Ibid., 110. 
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parents may be open to moral criticism when they fail to promote their children’s lives 
going as well as possible, taking into account all the elements of well-being—may reflect 
a failure to recognize that his criticism of well-being fully extends to third-person 
perspectives, in short, that caregivers are in no more need of a notion of children’s well-
being than are individuals in need of a notion of their own well-being. And since one 
could hardly be expected to maximize something of which one requires no notion, the 
contractualist critique of maximalism is preserved.14 
There is another way to preserve the contractualist critique of maximalism while 
also maintaining deference to Scanlon in those instances where he makes explicit claims 
about caregiving. This is to focus, not on well-being or what it means to cause a child’s 
life to go as well as possible, but on the nature of the moral criticism to which Scanlon 
suggests parents might be susceptible. Perhaps the moral criticism to which Scanlon 
thinks parents might be susceptible for failing to pursue something like maximalism does 
not arise from “what we owe to each other,” but from a separate domain of morality. That 
might be taken to suggest that the present project should be limited to the domain of 
                                                 
14 Scanlon may have another way out, depending on what it means to “promote” the 
project of causing a child’s life to go “as well as possible.” Maybe Scanlon would say 
that what he means is something like the following: “parents aren’t under any particular 
obligation to actually cause their children’s lives to go as well as possible, but they are 
under an obligation to make reasonable efforts to cause their children’s lives to go as well 
as possible, taking into account all the various competing claims that must be balanced 
against any one child’s well-being.” This would preserve the importance of 
understanding well-being from the position of a benefactor, and would append a caveat to 
the phrase “as well as possible” that renders it non-maximizing, since the position would 
no longer be that children are owed as much of something as possible, but as much as 
possible without violating various other obligations. But even on this interpretation 
Scanlon has, at best, overstated his claim. I am comfortable with the term “possible” 
indicating either logical or physical possibility, but I do not think the term “possible” 
should ever be assumed to imply moral permissibility as well. 
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Scanlon’s contractualism, setting aside all other domains of morality to strictly discuss 
how children should be raised given a caregiver’s desire to be able to justify themselves 
to others on grounds those others could not reasonably reject. However the account 
ultimately yielded by such an approach would, on Scanlon’s view, be an incomplete 
account of upbringing. Scanlon’s work equips us to construct a more complete account, 
one that gives a clearer picture of at least some ways that the values of caregiving both 
shape and are shaped by “what we owe to each other.” 
2. THE VALUE(S) OF PARENTING 
 Because Scanlon thinks that at least some moral domains beyond “what we owe 
to each other” arise from our having certain values, this more complete account begins 
with Scanlon’s definition of value: 
To value something is to take oneself to have reasons for holding certain 
positive attitudes toward it and for acting in certain ways in regard to it. 
Exactly what these reasons are, and what actions and attitudes they 
support, will be different in different cases. They generally include, as a 
common core, reasons for admiring the thing and for respecting it, 
although “respecting” can involve quite different things in different cases. 
Often, valuing something involves seeing reasons to protect it . . . in other 
cases it involves reasons to be guided by the goals and standards that the 
value involves . . . in some cases both may be involved.15 
 
Scanlon claims that “it is natural to say, and would be odd to deny, that I value my 
children.”16 Just so! But what is the content of this particular value? And how might it 
differ (if at all) from saying that I value children generally, or that I value caregiving? On 
this point Scanlon’s account of value is difficult to follow, because his discussion of 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 95. 
16 Ibid. 
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value is primarily targeted at showing that “value is not a purely teleological notion,”17 
which claim I accept. In the process, however, he distinguishes between valuing 
something and recognizing something as valuable; the former is a personal attitude, while 
the latter is a claim that the attributes of a thing “merit being valued generally.”18 So for 
example I value my children, and I value caregiving, but others have no reason to value 
my children any differently than they would value any other stranger’s children, while 
others do have reason to value caregiving—even if they themselves are not and will never 
be caregivers. With regard to both my children and caregiving generally, understanding 
the value of each “is not just a matter of knowing how valuable it is, but rather a matter of 
knowing how to value it—knowing what kinds of actions and attitudes are called for.”19 
Called for, presumably, by what it means to admire, respect, or protect the thing being 
valued. 
 Although someone who valued caregiving might thereby take himself to have 
reasons to do things that are involved in being a good caregiver,20 someone who values 
his children will take himself to have all those same reasons, and many more besides. By 
contrast, a claim that caregiving is valuable is a claim that “others also have reason to 
value it.”21 What general reasons are there to value caregiving, without reference to our 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 96. 
18 Ibid., 95. 
19 Ibid., 99. 
20 Ibid., 88. What Scanlon actually asserts is that a “person who values friendship will 
take herself to have reasons, first and foremost, to do those things that are involved in 
being a good friend,” but the pattern appears to apply to all special relationships. 
21 Ibid., 95. 
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own children? Or in other words, what properties does caregiving have that provide 
reasons for adopting certain behaviors and attitudes toward it? It is tempting to respond 
by pointing to the reasons we have to value such caregiving as kept us alive into 
adulthood, or to the reproduction of our own culture through the education of community 
youth, or to the economic benefits of our nation-state maintaining a certain birthrate. But 
it is quite possible to value the results of caregiving while believing, for example, that it 
would be better if we could bring these results about in some other way—decanting 
preprogrammed clones in vats, say, as vividly imagined in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New 
World.  
Rather, if we want to genuinely understand why caregiving specifically “is worth 
engaging in . . . we do better to consider why the questions it addresses are important and 
why it offers an appropriate way of trying to answer them than to focus on any particular 
results” that caregiving might produce.22 And indeed, there are a number of reasons to 
value caregiving quite apart from any results it might produce. To begin with, infants 
need caregiving in order to live, to develop, and to flourish. For adults, the activity of 
caregiving establishes rewarding relationships and develops important human capacities. 
These are not necessarily reasons that everyone has, but they are considerations that 
count in favor of, for example, participating in family life.23 They are reasons for people 
                                                 
22 Most of what I am claiming here Scanlon claims about either friendship or science, 
rather than familial relations. In spite of his assertion that morality beyond the domain of 
“what we owe to each other” lacks a single manner of reasoning, there appears to at least 
be substantial overlap anyway, as Scanlon himself observes. Ibid., 94, 165. 
23 It might be objected that, since there are approaches to the advancement of procreation 
and caregiving that do not require (but admittedly may result in) traditional familial 
relationships—sperm donation, in vitro fertilization, womb surrogacy, orphanages, 
halfway houses, retirement homes—there is no reason to pursue participation in family 
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who do not have families to pursue practices that might secure such a life, and for people 
who do have families to protect their families and to be guided by relevant standards of 
behavior. They are reasons to favor public policies that seem likely to strengthen family 
bonds, and disfavor policies that tend to erode such bonds or obscure their nature and 
value, because those are the kinds of reasons we may take ourselves to have in 
recognizing that caregiving is valued and valuable. 
 By contrast, as a caregiver I value my children by taking myself to have personal 
reasons for certain attitudes and activities—reasons that others do not have. When 
Scanlon asserts that parents have reason to want their children’s lives to go as well as 
possible, he makes that claim in contrast with a point about the concern we owe to others 
                                                                                                                                                 
life unless that additionally happens to be one’s preferred approach to procreation and 
caregiving. But it seems to me that the existence of alternatives to the advancement of 
procreation and caregiving serves primarily to emphasize the general value of the 
ordinary cases on which they are modeled. It would be very strange, for example, to 
describe routine deposits at a sperm bank as “trying to have children,” or for a 
heterosexual couple with no biological fertility hurdles to give any consideration at all to 
IVF or surrogacy. Children living in orphanages, foster care, or adoptive families almost 
always evidence something having gone wrong, in terms of the life or fitness of their 
biological parents. And anyone who spends appreciable time in a retirement home will be 
heartbreakingly familiar with the refrain, “Why don’t my children visit me?” It may not 
be the desire of all the senescent to die in their own bed, in their own house, attended by 
loved-ones, but it is undoubtedly an ordinary desire. 
 Of course, there is much reason to value the availability of alternative approaches 
to procreation and caregiving. The adoption of orphaned or abandoned children can be 
beneficial not only to children and communities, but also to adults who wish to raise 
children but, for whatever reason, cannot produce children on their own. Reproductive 
technologies expand procreative options and retirement homes extend some comfort to 
the elderly whose families cannot or will not provide. Pointing out, for no other reason 
than to point it out, that some particular person’s life deviates from the ordinary case is 
rarely a helpful, necessary, or kind thing to do. But in the development of theory, the goal 
is not to assuage feelings of privation; in this case, the goal is to examine what people 
actually have reason to do. And there does not appear to be any reason for people to 
pursue alternative approaches to the advancement of procreation and caregiving when 
ordinary approaches are available to them—beyond a compassionate impulse to also 
provide alternatives to the deprived. 
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being more limited than that. The very general reasons I have for wanting other people’s 
lives to go well overlap quite a lot with the reasons I have for valuing caregiving, insofar 
as I want other people’s lives to go well even while they are children. So if Scanlon was 
speaking about children from a perspective of valuing caregiving generally, there would 
be no contrast to draw, and we might conclude that Scanlon had made a mistake, that 
well-being is ethically otiose even from the perspective of a benefactor, and so forth. But 
this is not, I think, the right interpretation. When Scanlon says that parents have reason to 
want their children’s lives to go as well as possible, he’s not making that claim from the 
perspective of someone who values children or caregiving generally, but from the 
perspective of someone who has reason to value a particular child in a certain way. One 
property children have that constitutes such reason is that they belong to their parents, not 
in a proprietarian sense (probably!) but in the sense that children do not spontaneously 
and acausally erupt into existence; they are beings for whom two actors are, in the 
ordinary course, responsible.24 
                                                 
24 It might be asked why being causally responsible for bringing a child into existence 
gives me reason to personally value the child. But bringing a child into existence does not 
give me reason to personally value the child, it is a reason for me to personally value the 
child, in much the way that I value my body because it is my body. That a child is my 
child counts in favor of holding certain positive attitudes toward, and for acting in certain 
ways in regard to, that child. It must be granted that someone could claim that creating a 
baby is not a reason to value that baby, but I would have a genuine value disagreement 
with such a person; I could only respond that they apparently do not understand the value 
of having babies. Writing of music rather than babies, Scanlon suggests that one kind of 
values disagreement, perhaps the most interesting and important kind, “is about the 
attitude with which one should approach” certain things. In the case of a certain type of 
music,  
is it to be savored or contemplated in a serious and concentrated way, or taken 
more lightheartedly, even casually, as something diverting and amusing. 
These are only two among many possible answers, and different answers 
will be appropriate when different music is in question. A disagreement of this 
  51 
 Here, at last, we can discard the stilted and potentially misleading nomenclature 
of “caregiving.” Stilted, because we do not naturally think in terms of children and 
caregivers but of children and parents; potentially misleading, because in fact there are a 
wide variety of caregiving arrangements and relationships, many of which will bear 
structural resemblance to parenting and even participate in the institution of the family, 
but none of which are the primary concern of this project. Parenting—as distinct from the 
relational fact of being a parent—is a kind of caregiving, valuable in the general way that 
all caregiving is. While the word “parent” can be understood in a variety of ways, what 
all these ways have in common is a measure of responsibility.25 Scanlon identifies two 
                                                                                                                                                 
kind is not just a disagreement about the mood and outlook that are necessary in 
order to induce the kind of experience it is valuable to have but, rather, a 
disagreement about the attitudes one should have toward that experience itself. It 
would be very natural and appropriate for one person to say of someone else with 
whom he or she disagrees on this question that that person “does not understand 
the value of this kind of music.” Having recordings of Beethoven’s late quartets 
played in the elevators, hallways, and restrooms . . . for example, would show a 
failure to understand the value of music of this kind. What I am suggesting is not 
that this would show a lack of respect for this music, but rather that it shows a 
lack of understanding of what one should expect from it, and in what way it is 
worth attending to. The question of what music, if any, to play in such a setting 
may not be a weighty one. But it illustrates a point of more general importance: 
that understanding the value of something often involves not merely knowing that 
it is valuable or how valuable it is, but also how it is to be valued. 
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 99–100. 
 I note in passing that, in the case of infants, there appear to me many reasons 
beyond causal responsibility to value children as one’s own, with the assumption of 
custodial responsibility being perhaps the most obvious. More will be said about this 
shortly. 
25 Specifically, the word “parent” is also commonly used to identify any adult with 
primary responsibility for a child’s life and existence, or continued life and existence, 
whether or not they brought that child into being. There is actually quite a lot of analytic 
literature on what makes someone a “parent,” with particular attention paid to the kinds 
of edge cases that tend to drive contemporary moral discourse. Are “parents” the genetic 
contributors, gestational mothers, primary or secondary caregivers, or what?  
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ways to be responsible for something: attributive responsibility, which is a question of 
whether an actor is “properly subject to praise or blame for having acted in that way,” 
and substantive responsibility, which is a claim that the actor “cannot complain of the 
burdens or obligations that result” because their responsibility arises “in large part from 
the importance, for agents themselves, of having their actions and what happens to them 
                                                                                                                                                 
The events of contributing genetic material, gestating, and administering post-
partum caregiving are all arguably ways of “parenting” that can be conducted by a variety 
of individuals, especially with the help of reproductive technologies. Elizabeth Brake and 
Joseph Millum identify at least four distinct accounts of “becoming parents” in the 
philosophical literature. They also identify the possibility of “a ‘pluralist’ account which 
allows that more than one of these relations (such as causation or intention) may be 
sufficient, but not necessary, for parenthood”—but aver that such accounts “have not yet 
been developed in depth.” “Parenthood and Procreation,” sec. 4.4. 
In case it is not already clear, I think we should be pluralists about how one 
becomes the primary bearer of parental rights and responsibilities. Indeed it seems to me 
that most arguments about what “really” makes a person a parent foment more confusion 
than clarity. This is especially true when they get caught up in political or metaphysical 
wrangling over the meaning of sex or gender in connection with motherhood and 
fatherhood. Since I find, via Scanlon, that the best way to contemplate moral problems is 
through an informal comparison of losses, attempting to derive general rules from a litany 
of edge cases seems unlikely to yield clarity. Indeed, a preoccupation with edge cases 
could have a decidedly distorting impact on one’s thinking about practical matters 
(perhaps especially, public policy). It seems to me that the word “parent” can intelligibly 
apply to anyone substantially responsible for either the creation or the upbringing of a 
child, and where finer detail is helpful or informative, the English language admits no 
paucity of descriptive qualifiers. Since being the biological parent of a child is good 
reason to be involved in their upbringing, in the ordinary case there is substantial identity 
overlap between what are sometimes distinguished as the “causal parents” and the 
“custodial parents” of any given child—the various people responsible for a child’s 
existence, and the people responsible for a child’s upbringing. But the act of assuming 
responsibility for a child is as surely a reason to be a good caregiver as having conceived 
that child in the first place, so adoptive parenting, step-parenting, and the like are 
practical arrangements that will not ordinarily present any special difficulties. In that 
sense my account of reasonable parenting may be the first “in-depth” development of a 
pluralist account of parenthood, insofar as contractualism is quite capable of 
accommodating any number of reasons a person might have both to subscribe to the 
values of parenting and to be recognized, by their community, as a parent. In those rare 
cases where complicated facts give rise to serious disputes, the appropriate response is to 
conduct an informal comparison of losses—not to contest the ontology of parenthood. 
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depend on and reflect their choices and other responses.”26 Children almost always result 
from the choices of one or both of their genetic parents, and so parents cannot in general 
complain of the burdens and obligations that result from engaging in plausibly 
procreative activities. This appears to be so even when adults take measures intended, but 
not guaranteed, to prevent pregnancy; only where one or both genetic parents have been 
coerced in some way might responsibility be denied, defeating the obligations that come 
with being a parent. Absent such circumstances, parents have reason to reject general 
rules for behavior that interfere with their fulfillment of parental obligations. Crucially, 
however, those obligations do not include maximalist caregiving, and such obligations 
are not even the right kind of motivational basis for a lot of what we ordinarily think of as 
“good parenting.” But the reason parents have a responsibility to attend to their children’s 
needs is also a reason that parents have to value their children in certain ways. 
 That is, the form of morality typically termed “parenting” goes beyond the 
obligations incurred by bringing others like ourselves into existence. Scanlon claims that 
a “man who took good care of his children, because he recognized that he was 
responsible for their existence and that no one else would look after them if he did not, 
might still lack the motivation that a good father would have”27 because being a good 
parent involves being motivated in certain ways. One way that Scanlon, at least, thinks 
we properly value our own children is by seeing ourselves as having reason to promote 
our children’s lives going as well as possible, which seems to me to reflect a commitment 
to some measure of welfare maximalism. It also seems to me that children are properly 
                                                 
26 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 290. 
27 Ibid., 174. 
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valued by parents who see themselves not as maximalists but more modestly as having 
reason to ensure their children have enough of whatever it is that matters, but it is not 
essential to agree with Scanlon on this point for the contractualist critique of maximalism 
to be preserved. Parents can and do take themselves to have reason to maximize their 
children’s well-being; the focus in family law on children’s “best interests” seems like 
evidence that judges and legislators also take themselves to have such reasons. Now we 
can see clearly the error of documents like the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC): maximalism is a way of valuing one’s own children that others have 
no reason to share. Not only do others lack corresponding responsibilities to e.g. protect 
and provide, they also lack any reason to value such children as their own. A maximalist 
conception of my own child’s well-being might be something I should entertain, but 
while such a view might both influence and be influenced by what I owe to my children, 
others will in general have no reason to value my children in this way. 
 This also helps to explain why the error of documents like the CRC is so 
commonplace. If I value my children in a way that seems to demand welfare maximalism 
from me, and many other people value their children in a way that seems to demand 
welfare maximalism from them, then it might appear quite natural to suspect that what 
morality demands from all of us is a mutually reciprocal posture of welfare maximalism 
where all children are concerned. But no one involved in such a process actually values 
all children in this way; at minimum, to do so would require that we live in a world where 
the best interests of each individual child are fully compatible with the best interests of 
every other individual child. As an empirical matter, this is unlikely to ever be the case. 
Practically speaking, it would be very difficult for any parent with more than a single 
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child to maintain a convincing maximalism for long, given the extent to which parents 
must often divide their time and effort among children with varying and sometimes 
conflicting needs and wants. Nevertheless it is a common enough sentiment that I see no 
benefit in arguing for some “true” account of parental values (though I suspect a 
sufficientarian account would be superior). Rather, the takeaway is that while caregiving 
generally and parenting specifically are valuable, maximalism is not entailed by these 
general values. Maximalism does appear to be one common way for parents to value their 
own children, at least aspirationally, such that a maximalist might well consider e.g. 
sufficientarian parents to be subject to a kind of moral criticism—”you don’t value your 
children properly!” But this explains why, when Scanlon says parents “may” be open to 
moral criticism when they fail to promote a maximization of their children’s well-being, 
the “may” is very important. It points toward moral domains beyond “what we owe to 
each other,” preserving the contractualist critique of maximalism without raising any 
difficulty for other things Scanlon says about parenting in connection with parents 
valuing children in certain specific ways. 
3. PARENTAL PRIORITY 
 Recall that in Chapter 1, the upbringing question was interpreted as an inquiry 
after reasonable caregiving, revised in response to contractualist considerations as 
follows: 
 
 Reasonable Caregiving: What is permissible for this caregiver, given the totality 
of their circumstances, to do in connection with this child’s upbringing? 
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It was then shown from Scanlon’s contractualism that 
 
1. Caregivers should act in accordance with a set of principles for the general 
regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement. 
a. This means, in part, that it is not permissible for caregivers to violate 
anyone’s rights in pursuit of caregiving, because rights are constituted by 
principles that no one could reasonably reject. 
 
This applies to anyone acting as a caregiver, whether to children or not—including, but 
not limited to, parents. But the kinds of reasons with which the upbringing question is 
specifically concerned are the kinds of reasons parents have, aside from any more general 
reasons they might have to want to be able to justify their actions to others (including 
their children). In fact parents have reason to make certain upbringing choices entirely 
apart from “what we owe to each other.” Such reasons will be related to how they value 
their children. Given that people “simply have different reasons because of differences in 
their social circumstances, in what they are interested in, and in their aims and ends,”28 it 
is unsurprising that different people value their children differently, such that even if 
some are welfare maximalists, some likely are not. All this suggests the following point 
about reasonable caregiving: 
 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 71. 
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2. Parents are responsible for their children. Such responsibility is both reason to 
meet caregiving obligations and reason to value children in certain ways. But 
different parents will value their children differently, depending on various facts 
about themselves and their world.  
 
As formulas for navigating the moral complexities of parenthood go, this is not 
one that seems likely to generate much in the way of detailed upbringing advice. Still it 
represents a substantial improvement over competing liberal accounts of upbringing. In 
particular, a common mistake in such accounts is the assumption, implicit or explicit, that 
there is something objectionable about valuing one’s own children in ways that one does 
not value other people’s children. For example, this will be discussed at greater length in 
Chapter 4, but theorists like Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift object to valuing one’s 
children in ways that result in their having advantages over other children, on grounds 
that conferring advantages on one’s children permits “unfair inequalities between those 
raised in different families” to arise.29 Their explanation for why people should not value 
their children in such ways consists primarily in appeals to the value of equality. 
Brighouse & Swift never actually explain why they think the latter value trumps the 
former. Perhaps this is something they think egalitarianism entails? 
More detailed discussion of the matter will be furnished in later chapters. Note for 
now that reasonable caregiving improves the discussion first by recognizing the dispute 
for what it is—a values conflict—then raising the question, “how should I proceed, when 
                                                 
29 Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, Family Values, 115. 
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disparate values come into apparent conflict?” Scanlon calls this “the problem of 
priority,”30 and suggests a strategy: 
(1) . . . argue that insofar as these are things that people have reason to 
pursue and to value, these reasons will be among those that can make 
it reasonable to reject some principles. Therefore there will be pressure 
within the morality of right and wrong to make room for these values. 
 
(2) . . . there will of course be limits . . . [so] argue that when these limits 
are reached we have good reason to give priority to the demands of 
[what we owe to each other]. 
a. This can be done in part by appealing to the great importance 
of justifiability to others and to the particular interests that 
moral principles protect, 
b. and in part by arguing that other values, properly understood, 
have a built-in sensitivity to the demands of [what we owe to 
each other].31 
 
Scanlon then notes that approach (2)b is “particularly important” for cases in which 
“relations with other people are the central concern, such as the values of family life.”32 
This is of course because properly valuing one’s own children requires, in part, that one 
respect what they are: other people to whom we have reason to want to be able to justify 
ourselves. 
 This approach to priority explains the moral intuitions that differentiate between 
the ideal upbringing and ideal caregiving versions of maximalism. Suppose I have a 
daughter and take myself to have reason to promote her life going as well as possible. 
When I ask myself how I should raise her, I might initially think the question means 
something like this formulation from Chapter 1: 
                                                 
30 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 160. 
31 Ibid., numbering and lettering added. 
32 Ibid. 
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 Ideal Upbringing: What arrangements and experiences would result in the best 
possible life for this child? 
 
Assuming I’m reasonably honest with myself, might I reflect on my own shortcomings 
and conclude that the first thing to do is ensure there is no one better to raise my 
daughter? If there is someone wealthier, kinder, or better-educated in want of a child, 
then persuading them to value my daughter as their own, assuming all related 
responsibilities, would be something to take as an aim.33 But taking such an aim would be 
contrary to valuing my daughter as someone who I want to raise and have a certain kind 
of relationship with. So I might very naturally retreat to a more modest idealism: 
 
 Ideal Caregiving: What arrangements and experiences would result in the best 
possible life for this child, short of terminating existing caregiving arrangements? 
 
I think a sufficiently self-sacrificing parent of only one child might plausibly value that 
child in approximately this way. Such a parent would likely encounter the limits imposed 
                                                 
33 It might be suggested that some parents do take this aim in placing their children with 
adoptive parents, but such cases, if they exist at all, are surely vanishingly rare. The 
decision to abdicate parental responsibility to others, in those cases where it is a decision 
rather than the unfortunate consequence of tragedy, appears to arise not from maximalism 
but from a combination of properly valuing one’s child while recognizing one’s inability 
to provide adequate upbringing anyway. In other words, it is not my position that placing 
a child for adoption reflects a failure to properly value the child, because there are surely 
circumstances in which a properly-valued child is best respected and protected by 
adoption. Rather, the fact that some other parent might be a better parent for a given 
child’s welfare is not, by itself, sufficient reason to transfer parental responsibility. 
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by (2)a with regularity! In other words, it would be perfectly sensible for such a parent, 
whether or not they have any particular notion of well-being, to believe that properly 
valuing one’s child requires one’s commitment to promoting a child’s life going as well 
as possible, but competing values—especially, “what we owe to each other”—will often 
interfere with that commitment. Parents of multiple children tend to learn that sometimes 
the needs and wants of one must take priority over the needs of wants of another, in ways 
that fail to promote their lives going as well as possible. Such parents encounter an 
internal rather than external values conflict, not between the values of parenting and the 
values of “what we owe to each other,” but between their parenting commitment to 
promoting one child’s life going as well as possible, and their parenting commitment to 
promoting the other child’s life going as well as possible. This is because ideal 
caregiving, as I have characterized it, is distinct from reasonable caregiving in that it calls 
for an ideal judgment rather than an “all-things-considered” judgment. Of course we do 
not generally conclude that parents who prioritize the needs of (say) a sick child over 
those of a well child are therefore bad parents, for their failure to properly value the well 
child. Though it would also not surprise us if the well child were to receive some special 
attention or reward after the crisis had passed—sometimes the thing we have most reason 
to do in the moment is still, in some sense, regrettable,34 and feeling we have reason to 
apologize for circumstance may also be a way of properly valuing our children.  
                                                 
34 This is perhaps best articulated by Christopher W. Gowans in Innocence Lost: An 
Examination of Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing. Though it is beyond the scope of this 
project, a contractualist examination of Gowans’ claims strikes me as a worthwhile 
undertaking for future projects. 
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So while parenting maximalism is plausible in certain limited circumstances, in 
practice it simply can’t amount to much beyond the regret of feeling the pull of separate 
moral domains and only being able to respond adequately in the one that has priority. 
And while a parenting sufficientarian might judge a parenting maximalist to be “spoiling” 
her children, and the parenting maximalist might imagine the sufficientarian to be 
“depriving” his, both would be constrained in their expression of those values by the 
morality of right and wrong or “what we owe to each other.” More commonly, parents 
from different societies will value their children in ways that might differ greatly, or 
scarcely at all, or anywhere in between. We will often have reason to attend to such 
differences.35 But these are personal ways of valuing one’s own children, rather than 
assertions about ways people should value children not their own—though of course the 
way we value our own children will influence the way we think they should be valued. 
The point is not that parents can’t have any reason to maximize their own children’s well-
being, but that there is no general reason for others to maximize the well-being of 
children not their own. 
4. INFANTS AND JUSTIFICATION 
 This inquiry into parental values and how they interact with the separate moral 
domain of “what we owe to each other” has left at least one loose end: namely, biology. 
Most of what has been observed about parenting hews to the approach taken by Scanlon 
in his treatment of friendship: both are values in which moral domains beyond “what we 
owe to each other” are grounded, and both constitute motivational bases essential to 
                                                 
35 Scanlon identifies at least three—personal edification, concern about emerging 
consensus that might affect us personally, and the possibility of divergence from 
community standards. See What We Owe to Each Other 74–75. 
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having certain kinds of relationships with others. In most passages where What We Owe 
to Each Other uses friendship to illustrate a point about value or reason or priority, 
Scanlon could as easily have used parenthood instead—and often he specifically notes 
that what he claims about friendship is also true of various other interpersonal 
attachments, especially familial ones.  
There is an important empirical difference between friends and family, however: 
as the celebrated Atticus Finch taught his son, Jem, “you can choose your friends but you 
sho’ can’t choose your family, an’ they’re still kin to you no matter whether you 
acknowledge ‘em or not, and it makes you look right silly when you don’t.”36 Friendship 
is, to borrow the language of the social sciences, a cultural artifact; family, conceived in 
its most basic form as a network of consanguineous relations between parents who have 
children who in turn may become parents to children of their own, is for humans a 
biological fact.37  
The difference seems important. To be someone’s friend is a reason to value them 
in certain ways, including wanting to be able to justify one’s actions to them in terms of 
reasons they are likely to accept. This appears to be what Scanlon is talking about when 
he refers to “other values,” including friendship and parenting, having a “built-in 
sensitivity to the demands of right and wrong.”38 One of the ways we value our 
                                                 
36 Harper Lee, To Kill A Mockingbird, chap. 23. 
37 Like the word “parent,” the word “family” is subject to some definitional wrangling. 
Since this section is concerned with the implications of biology, those debates are not 
especially relevant here. 
38 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 166. It might be asserted that this “built-in 
sensitivity” to what we owe to each other simply follows from the fact that the 
individuals involved in these relationships are human beings with interests. I think this 
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relationships is by wanting to be able to justify our actions to others, which process is 
central to the identification of right and wrong. But unlike the generalized, theoretical 
justification called for by “what we owe to each other,” our ability to justify our actions 
to specific people with whom we enjoy relationships will depend in great measure on the 
kinds of reasons they are likely to actually accept, given their own values, circumstances, 
and so forth. In fact the process of entering into such relationships will involve behaving 
in ways we can justify to others within the context of some set of norms. Becoming 
friends with someone in the first place typically requires us to not behave toward them in 
objectionable ways, where “objectionable” will be primarily determined by personal 
preferences and community standards. Failure to maintain sufficient deference to these 
standards may be grounds for termination of the relationship. In extreme cases, this might 
even put us in a position where having an ability to enjoy relationships with others in our 
community will be incompatible with having an ability to behave according to the 
morality of right and wrong.39 Since both the formation and maintenance of these 
                                                                                                                                                 
would be mistaken, because it does not explain why the moral domain of friendship has a 
built-in sensitivity to what we owe to each other—only why the people who happen to be 
friends must also be concerned with what they owe to each other, which is something 
they should be concerned about even if they are not friends. 
39 Specifically, Scanlon writes, ibid. at 165, that  
the degree to which there is a conflict between the morality of right and 
wrong and the goods of personal relations depends greatly on the society 
in which one lives. . . . If everyone in my society sees the world as divided 
between ‘them,’ the outsiders to whom nothing is owed, and ‘us,’ who are 
bound by relations of blood, affection, and patronage, then I really am 
faced with a choice between actual ties with my fellow citizens—strong 
and warm, perhaps, if also fierce—and the requirements of morality, 
grounded in an ideal of relations with others that must remain purely ideal. 
I have tried to argue that we are not in fact faced with this choice, but it 
must be conceded that others could be. 
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relationships depends on justifiability, even though these relationships ultimately 
constitute domains of morality outside the domain of right and wrong, it looks like this is 
what Scanlon means when he refers to these relationships as having a built-in sensitivity 
to what we owe to each other. 
But in the case of parents and children, the creation and maintenance of the 
relationship may not appear to require any justifiable behavior at all. At the level of 
biology, at least, parent-child relationships can come into existence regardless of whether 
they can be justified to the mother, father, or child, and are not relationships that can ever 
be terminated.40 This raises two concerns about parenting that Scanlon had no cause to 
consider in connection with friendship or, indeed, any other relationship. First, unlike 
friendship or other kinds of relationships, it appears possible for a relationship between 
parent and child to come into existence quite independently of any practical interpersonal 
justification—outside the context of any set of norms. And second, infants cannot be 
described as being likely to accept any reasons. So it may not be obvious that we should 
agree with Scanlon that the values of parenting actually do have a “built-in sensitivity” to 
the demands of what we owe to each other, the way that other relationships (like 
friendship) do by virtue of owing their creation and continued existence, at least in part, 
to a context of interpersonal justification. 
The first concern—that biological relationships can come into existence without 
any initial reference to interpersonal justification—is sufficiently complex that I can only 
                                                 
40 Absent, I suppose, the application of causality-violating or transhumanist technological 
innovations. Note that this is different than the legal “termination” of parental rights or 
obligations, which often result in the assignment of new custodial parent(s) but of course 
cannot actually sever causal parenthood. 
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offer a partial response. While it is true that parent-child relationships, unlike other 
relationships, are not created in an interpersonal context between parent and child, it is 
also a biological fact that human individuals have two genetic parents.41 Either or both of 
those parents might not have consented to the creation of the child; either or both might 
have taken active steps to prevent the creation of a child. But whatever way of valuing 
our children we might (or might not!) feel to arise from our biological connection with 
that child, there is always someone else with biological reason to value the child, whether 
or not they actually value the child properly: they have reason to value the child because 
it is their child. This is one way the values of parenting do have a built-in sensitivity to 
the demands of what we owe to each other: the relationship between a child’s parents is 
not purely biological and does come into existence in the context of norms and 
community standards—even if, at times, in violation of those standards. For example, the 
relationships between a rapist and a woman he impregnates, or a man who uses a condom 
during intercourse and a woman who secretly uses that condom to inseminate herself,42 
occur in the context of norms and community standards that have been broken in ways 
                                                 
41 The cutting edge of reproductive technology appears to be testing the boundaries of 
this claim, for example by inserting maternal DNA into third-party sperm for purposes of 
fertilization, or transplanting traditionally-fertilized blastocysts from one uterus to 
another for cross-womb gestation. But plausibly increasing the number of people 
arguably responsible for a child’s existence, if anything, only strengthens the argument I 
am making here. 
 Still it must be acknowledged that modern reproductive technology may someday 
complicate this account of inter-parental justification, for example by allowing 
individuals to create children without ever interacting with any other human beings. My 
suspicion is that there will always be someone to whom a truly single parent, should such 
a person ever exist, will desire to justify her child-directed actions, but perhaps not. 
Satisfactory discussion of all such cases would presumably require individual attention to 
each. 
42 See, for example, testimony in State v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
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that inform the parent-child relationship, for instance by (probably) depriving resultant 
children of any opportunity to be raised by both their biological parents. So it is not really 
accurate to say that the relationship between parent and child may come into existence 
outside the context of interpersonal justification, since the act of procreation will itself 
always occur within an interpersonal context between a male and female parent. This is 
true even if the male and female parent have never met; the context of sperm donation, 
for example, is governed by norms of justification as surely as any other interaction.43 
The importance of the inter-parental relationship to the moral character of the 
parent-child relationship may not be obvious, especially for people who wish to argue, 
for whatever reason, against the idea of “family” consisting paradigmatically of fathers, 
mothers, and their children (with “extended” family tracing steps through additional 
generations). But my account actually helps to explain the unease we might feel when 
people try to draw moral distinctions between, for example, biological parents and 
adoptive ones, or between children who are “legitimately” versus “illegitimately” 
conceived. To the extent that the values of parenting do have a built-in sensitivity to the 
desire to be able to justify ourselves to others, the desire a father who properly values his 
children feels to justify his actions to the mother of his children is the same desire an 
                                                 
43 One interesting recent example of this can be found in the case of Danielle Teuscher, 
who used a commercial DNA database to identify her daughter’s biological father, in 
violation of the confidentiality agreement she’d signed with the sperm bank. As a result, 
she has been denied the use of additional sperm she was saving for creation of full 
biological siblings for her daughter. See “Woman Uses DNA Test, Finds Sperm Donor—
and Pays a ‘Devastating’ Price,” CBS News (31 Jan. 2019), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/woman-finds-sperm-donor-after-using-dna-test-raising-
questions-about-donor-anonymity/. I will not undertake a thorough analysis of Teuscher’s 
dilemma here, but I think her story illustrates the interpersonal context that exists even in 
cases of artificial reproductive technology, as well as some of the ways people do treat 
biological facts about parentage as reasons to act in various ways. 
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adoptive parent might feel toward a child’s biological parents. Someone who assumes 
responsibility for a child he or she did not actually create will end up in approximately 
the same position, in terms of interpersonal justification, as a biological parent, so there is 
very little reason to treat them any differently.44 Appropriately assuming responsibility 
for a child is as surely a reason to value that child as conceiving a child in the first 
place—as well as a great service to both the child and to biological parents with 
compelling reason to arrange for alternative custodial parenting. Insofar as adults who 
engage in potentially procreative activity might be thereby entering into a long-term 
relationship with each other (in the sense that they are the biological co-parents of 
another human, whether or not they wish to participate in the work of child-raising), 
adults have good reason to approach sexual relations with seriousness, care, and in the 
context of a long-term commitment to one another and any resultant children. 
 The second reason it might be doubted that parenting has “built-in sensitivity” to 
right and wrong is that behaving in ways we can justify to specific others requires an 
awareness of the kinds of reasons those others are likely to accept. But any desire or 
responsibility we might feel to be able to justify our actions to infants is swiftly defeated 
by the fact that they are, unless we take silence for consent, unlikely to accept any 
reasons we could possibly offer, on grounds that they are totally incapable of 
understanding us. Scanlon has two things to say about this. First: 
The beings in question here are ones who are born to us or to others to 
whom we are bound by the requirements of justifiability. This tie of birth 
gives us good reason to want to treat them “as human” despite their 
                                                 
44 “Little” rather than “no” given the existence of certain obvious contexts like genetic 
counseling, where genetic parentage will remain, barring radical advancements in genetic 
engineering, inescapably relevant. 
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limited capacities. Because of these limitations, the idea of justifiability to 
them must be understood counterfactually, in terms of what they could 
reasonably reject if they were able to understand such a question. This 
makes the idea of a trusteeship appropriate in their case . . . . It also 
indicates a basis on which such a trustee could object to proposed 
principles. . . . [T]hings that [children] are capable of benefiting from . . . 
will include, at least, protection and care, affection, and those enjoyments 
of which [they are] capable. So, while a large part of the morality of right 
and wrong, including rights and liberties that are important to us because 
of our interest in controlling and directing our own lives, may have no 
application in this case, other basic duties will have their usual force.45 
 
It seems to me that pointing toward a “trusteeship” assumes too much, for reasons I will 
elaborate in Chapter 3, but we can understand counterfactual justifiability without that 
concept. In addition to being bound by the requirements of justifiability to their (other) 
biological parent(s), Scanlon thinks that because children are sufficiently “like us,” in 
dealing with them we have reason to consider ourselves bound by at least some of the 
requirements of justifiability in spite of their incapacity. It is tempting to imagine that 
what obligates us is a sort of deferred reckoning, with our justifications being offered to 
the child’s morally mature future self, but such a view is not, I think, the correct one. For 
one thing, some children will never become morally competent adults, sometimes for 
reasons that are known by parents well in advance. For another, many of the reasons the 
child might later have to complain about parental behavior will be unavailable to parents 
in the present, insofar as what those reasons actually will be depends, at least in part, on 
how the child is raised. For example, a child who was required to practice piano every 
day might come to resent it, or might grow to be quite glad of it. A parent with present 
reason to believe that the child will grow to be glad might later be sorry if the future turns 
out differently, but the fact remains that we can’t properly act on reasons it would be 
                                                 
45 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 185–186.  
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impossible, at present, to recognize. Instead, in considering what sorts of practices a child 
could reasonably reject if they were capable of understanding the question, parents need 
only account for their children’s present interests—in, e.g., adequate protection and care, 
but also any present interest a child might have in certain kinds of futures.46 Such future-
oriented present interests are not, I think, coextensive with the reasons the child’s future 
self might arguably have later, but this matter will be explored in greater detail later on, 
in Chapter 5. 
 The second thing Scanlon has to say about infant incapacity is related: 
I am not claiming that the desire to be able to justify one’s actions to 
others on grounds they could not reasonably reject is universal or 
“natural.” “Moral education” seems to me plausibly understood as a 
process of cultivating this desire and shaping it, largely by learning what 
justifications others are in fact willing to accept, by finding which ones 
you yourself find acceptable as you confront them from a variety of 
perspectives, and by appraising your own and others’ acceptance or 
rejection of these justifications in the light of greater experience.47 
 
There are reasons to perpetuate our species and our culture. Neither of these things can be 
accomplished by individuals unwilling or unable to co-exist with others. Some of our 
willingness to coexist with others may be natural, for example in the form of kinship 
attachments or sexual attraction, but a willingness to be reasonable is clearly far from 
universal. Learning to navigate the reasons people, including ourselves, have to reject 
                                                 
46 Stated a little differently, if parents fail to feasibly accommodate important interests 
they are presently warranted in believing their children will have in the future, they will 
be unable to justify their choices to the child’s future self. But in the context of imagining 
children to be sufficiently “like us” that we are bound by the general requirements of 
justifiability, such a parent would also be unable to justify such a choice to the child’s 
present self, provided the child were sufficiently rational. It seems to me that it is the 
present objection, rather than the future one, that matters. 
47 Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” 117. 
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principles for action is a process, something we must acquire in childhood and develop—
and exercise—throughout our lives.48 One way to properly value my own children is to 
see their moral incapacity as giving me reason to furnish them with a moral education. 
Stated more technically: if children were able to understand it, they could not reasonably 
reject a principle requiring their parents to provide them with a moral education of the 
kind described by Scanlon. This is so even if, as children, they do not enjoy their moral 
education; this is so even if, later on as adults, they determine that they do not wish to be 
governed by the requirements of justifiability and would rather not co-exist with the 
community of their upbringing or, for that matter, with anyone. Whatever else parents 
might have reason to do as a result of the ways in which they value their children, all 
parents have reason to promote their children’s moral education—to help them grasp the 
justifications of action that they and others in their community are likely to accept or 
reject. The foregoing suggests an addition to reasonable caregiving: 
 
2. Parents are responsible for their children. Such responsibility is both reason to 
meet certain caregiving obligations, and reason to value children in certain ways. 
                                                 
48 I wonder, though I make no argument here, whether the root of some “moral panic” 
over emerging technologies might be a perceived threat to, in liberal terms, the fraternity 
presently required to achieve our reproductive aims. Technological innovation in both 
biological and cultural reproduction, from artificial insemination to the Internet, appear to 
automate the process of perpetuating species and community in ways that minimize co-
existence and justifiability as practical prerequisites for propagation. There is a stereotype 
of transhumanist thinking that capitalizes on such objections by imagining a future where 
individuals inhabit digital worlds of our own design, attended by pleasure- or 
satisfaction-maximizing automatons that tile the universe with maximization 
infrastructure. A critique of literary transhumanist dystopias would well exceed the scope 
of this project, but the thought that “hell is other people” is one that people do sometimes 
entertain. Recent trends toward “loneliness” among tech-savvy urban adolescents and 
young adults strike me as very likely related. 
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But different parents will value their children differently, depending on various 
facts about themselves and their world.  
a. Whatever else parents have reason to do, one way that “what we owe to 
each other” influences the domain of parenting is by obliging parents to 
furnish their children with a community-appropriate moral education, 
because a principle allowing parents to neglect such education could be 
reasonably rejected both by other parents and by affected children. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 The foregoing equips us with a functioning account of what Scanlon’s 
contractualism claims concerning reasonable caregiving—really, reasonable parenting. 
Along the way it was shown first that what might be interpreted as “maximalism” in 
Scanlon’s account of parenting is actually a claim about the way (some) parents might 
value (or claim to value) their children, not a claim about what we owe to each other. 
This observation helped to clarify some intuitive concerns about the impracticality of 
various kinds of maximalism, in which what children are owed is as much as possible of 
some good or other. In fact the primary constraint on permissible parenting is not any 
kind of maximalism, but the priority of “what we owe to each other.” While this is true of 
interpersonal values generally, the relationship between parents and children is biological 
in its origins and strongly characterized by infant incapacity, so “what we owe to each 
other” additionally gives parents reason to attend to the moral education of their children. 
This must be carried out in part by equipping them to grasp the justifications of action 
that they and others in their community are likely to accept or reject—since participation 
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in their community will require relationships that will depend in their formation on 
contextually justifiable behavior. 
 It should now be possible to offer clear criticism of competing accounts of 
upbringing, and ultimately say something useful concerning the relationship between 
parents and the state. But first I will take a brief detour to address a certain reformulation 
of the “best interests” commonplace: the identification of parents as “trustees” of 
children’s rights or interests. This is not simply because Scanlon makes offhanded use of 
the reference, but because almost every theorist writing about children makes offhanded 
use of the reference—usually in ways that are, I think, liable to introduce unnecessary 
confusion to some of my later arguments.
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CHAPTER 3 
DO CHILDREN HAVE “RIGHTS-IN-TRUST?” 
 
In his exploration of the “scope of morality,” T.M. Scanlon argues that infants and 
young children belong to a class of beings we owe contractualist justifications, in spite of 
the fact that their limited capacities mean “the idea of justifiability to them must be 
understood counterfactually, in terms of what they could reasonably reject if they were 
able to understand such a question.”1 As further explanation, he suggests that “in 
deciding which principles could not reasonably be rejected we must take into account 
objections that could be raised by trustees representing”2 such children. In Chapter 2 I 
suggested that understanding justification counterfactually does not appear to present any 
special difficulties. This is so at least in part because the contractualist view holds only 
that our actions should be justifiable in a way that “others could not reasonably reject 
should they come to be” moved by the desire for agreement on rules no one could 
reasonably reject.3 Assuming that some of the people not yet moved by the desire for 
such agreement are not children, understanding the idea of justifiability 
“counterfactually” seems to be an ordinary feature of (much) contractualist reasoning, not 
due to incapacity but due to the failure or refusal of others to be moved by appropriate 
considerations. So it is not immediately clear what the idea of “trusteeship” is supposed 
to add or clarify in connection with justifiability to beings of limited capacity, as distinct 
                                                 
1 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 185. 
2 Ibid., 183. 
3 Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” 111, emphasis added. 
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from beings who for some other reason are not presently moved by appropriate 
considerations.  
Scanlon is not the only moral theorist who makes reference to the notion of 
trusteeship in connection with children’s rights, interests, or capacities. Typically, 
philosophical discussions of trustees or fiduciary obligations arise in connection with 
some claim that the power one party has to do certain things can only be permissibly 
exercised to the benefit of certain parties. So “parents are like trustees” is an extremely 
common idea in contemporary upbringing debates, often made in reference or deference 
to Joel Feinberg’s distinction between rights ordinarily attributed to adults (“A-rights”) 
and those characteristic of children (“C-rights”). The most interesting “C-rights,” 
according to Feinberg, are the “anticipatory autonomy rights” he characterizes as “rights-
in-trust.”4 Some of the ways in which Feinberg’s account of rights might prove confusing 
were addressed in Chapter 1, but nothing said there obviously precludes rights from being 
held “in trust.” The problem, as it has elsewhere been remarked, is that the “idea of a trust 
is so familiar to us all that we never wonder at it. And yet surely we ought to wonder.”5  
What I will call the “trust model” of adults exercising stewardship over children 
“in trust” borrows the idea of trusteeship from common law jurisprudence so frequently6 
                                                 
4 Joel Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future,”125–126. 
5 Frederic William Maitland, “The Unincorporate Body,” 272. 
6 For example, David Archard writes, in Children: Rights and Childhood, 72, that the 
“caretaker . . . chooses for the child in the person of the adult which the child is not yet 
but will eventually be. One way in which this line of thought has been expressed is by 
means of the notion of a ‘trust.’” Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift also write, in Family 
Values, 53–54, that “the person holding and exercising . . . rights, as trustee or fiduciary, 
possesses them not because they promote her well-being but because her possessing them 
is instrumental to the well-being of the person for whom she is acting as fiduciary. Many 
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that its apparent meaning has been reduced to something like “controlled by one for the 
benefit of another.” But this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the 
existence of a trust. This chapter explores the elements of trusts as they relate—or fail to 
relate—to children’s rights, but it is important to be clear about the purpose of conducting 
that exploration. The idea of treating parents as trustees has prima facie appeal; to the 
extent that children—most obviously, infants—can be said to have rights at all, they are 
characteristically ignorant they possess such things, and have no particular power to act 
in connection with them. In ordinary cases, overcoming that ignorance and incapacity 
will require some amount of paternalism from caregivers. Parents are not in this pursuit 
generally considered to have plenary authority over children, even though they have, at 
least initially, plenary control. Intuitions that parents are obligated to wield that control to 
the child’s benefit, and forbidden from wielding that control in furtherance of their own 
projects, bear clear analogy to the fiduciary duties of trustees, who are obligated to 
manage trusts to the advantage (and only, except incidentally, to the advantage) of 
identified beneficiaries. So the claim that children have “rights-in-trust” looks like a 
potentially helpful way of thinking about the relationship between parents and the rights 
or interests of their children. 
At some point, however, it appears to have been recognized that the relationship 
between parents and children was sufficiently unlike a trust that scholars began to focus 
on arguments that parents are “fiduciaries” rather than trustees. This was presumably 
because the legal usage of “fiduciary” retains some relationship to trust law but has not in 
                                                                                                                                                 
arguments for parents’ rights see them this way.” 
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living memory been limited to trust law.7 The shift from writing about parents as trustees 
to writing about parents as fiduciaries appears to be ongoing.8 Intellectual traffic between 
jurisprudence and moral theory may be counterproductive in this regard; the difference 
(assuming there properly is one) between moral and legal rights suggests that there may 
be an important differences between moral and legal trusts, but to the extent that trusts 
originated as instruments of equity rather than law,9 even this is not as obvious as it might 
seem.10 As a consequence of unstable usage, referring to parents as “fiduciaries” or 
                                                 
7 In fact non-trustees have arguably had “fiduciary” obligations—though not by that 
name—imposed at common law for almost as long as trusts have existed. See Seipp, 
“Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common Law,” 1034–1036. 
8 For example, in support of the claim that a “number of commentators have also 
developed arguments as to the fiduciary nature of the parent-child relationship,” Lionel 
Smith’s recent “Parenthood is a Fiduciary Relationship,” 2, cites to Connie K. Beck et 
al.’s  less-recent “The Rights of Children: A Trust Model.” While they certainly do argue 
that parents should be treated as having fiduciary obligations to their children, Beck et al. 
clearly use the term “fiduciary” with reference to full-fledged relationships of trust, not 
relationships that are merely trust-like. Then Smith argues that the defining characteristic 
of fiduciaries is not the existence of a trust, on which point he might very well be correct, 
but his essay goes on to make repeated reference to “trusts” and “trustees” anyway.  
9 The historic separation of courts of equity and courts of law, of course, is foundational 
to any understanding of jurisprudence in English-speaking nations—even though, in the 
United States today, most courts fill both roles. A complete and accurate explanation of 
the historic separation far exceeds the scope of this project. But an abbreviated account is 
that courts of law were charged with interpreting and enforcing the language of statutes 
generated by executive and legislative bodies, while courts of equity attended to issues of 
natural law, substantive justice, and similarly contentious matters where the lines 
between “moral” and “legal” often blur—perhaps, to the point of vanishing entirely.  
10 I have here in mind comments like one made by Scott Altman, in “Parental Control 
Rights,” 217, to the effect that “reference to being a fiduciary need not be understood as a 
literal mirror for legal doctrines.” But—why not? That is, yes, sometimes philosophical 
discourse borrows terminology from other disciplines or employs words in technical 
ways that differ in important respects from their ordinary usage, but at some point it 
becomes necessary to explain what it is that such usage is supposed to be importing (if 
anything), and why (only) these rather than other aspects of original usage. This is 
especially important for moral philosophers borrowing concepts from equity, since it is at 
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various of children’s rights as “rights-in-trust” begs an important question about 
parenting, reinforcing without argument the unproven implication that children must be 
the sole or at least primary beneficiaries of the control caregivers wield over them. 
Referring to parents as “fiduciaries” could literally just mean that parents are obligated to 
prioritize the “best interests” of their children, even to their own detriment or the 
detriment of others, which conclusion I have spent the last two chapters of this project 
disputing. Or it could mean that parents hold children’s rights “in trust.” Or it could mean 
that parents have a special relationship of loyalty plus legal or factual control. Or it could 
mean something else entirely! So in the interest of promoting clarity, it seems to me that 
we should reject arguments that the relationship between parents and children definitely 
constitutes a “trust” or imposes “fiduciary” obligations, especially in some a narrow 
sense the reader might suspect has been selectively pruned to maximize its compatibility 
with a given author’s personal intuitions about parenting.  
That said, none of these criticisms actually show the trust model to be mistaken. 
Indeed I am myself uncertain. What I propose is to simply take the trust model of 
children’s rights as seriously as possible, as a moral “mirror” of the legal doctrine of 
trusts. While this approach is unlikely to yield certainty on the matter, it should hopefully 
yield increased clarity—at minimum, on my concern that reference to parents as 
“fiduciaries” or “trustees” is substantially question-begging. 
                                                                                                                                                 
least arguably the purpose of judicial equity to recognize something like “morality” in 
cases where the black-letter law is either silent, or would appear to work an injustice. 
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1. WHAT IS A TRUST? 
 To take the trust model of children’s rights as seriously as possible, the first thing 
to get clear on is what constitutes a trust. Though some analogous practices existed in the 
ancient world,11 contemporary trusts have their origins in the development of equity in 
medieval England: 
It all started with transfers of land made to the use of the transferor or of a 
third person. Such transfers began not long after the Norman Conquest and 
had become common before the fifteenth century. At first no legal 
problems were involved since the beneficiaries of the use had no legal 
remedies. They had to trust to the honor of the transferee [to handle the 
property as promised]. But early in the fifteenth century the chancellors 
began to enforce the claim of the beneficiary against the transferee. They 
held that he should be compelled in equity to do what conscience required 
him to do. They punished him for contempt if he refused to carry out the 
purposes for which the property was given to him. There was no remedy 
in the courts of law but there was now a remedy in equity.12 
 
In courts of equity, the idea of a “trust” developed separately from property and contract 
law. Though analogy to both areas of jurisprudence is sometimes drawn, historically 
trusts became the vehicle de jure of social experimentation in spite of the laws of 
property and obligation as then constituted, notably in historic effect enabling married 
women to hold their own property long before the legislature saw fit to allow it.13 
Legislatures often find themselves in the position of specifically disallowing clever 
implementations of trust law, as when the profiteering behavior of American corporations 
                                                 
11 See generally David Johnston, The Roman Law of Trusts, discussing the Roman 
fideicommissum—an arrangement roughly analogous to contemporary testamentary 
trusts. 
12 Austin W. Scott, “The Importance of the Trust,” 177. 
13 Maitland, “The Unincorporate Body,” 278. 
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in 1890 inspired the Sherman Act14—the inception of antitrust law. The trend of social 
innovation through trust law continues; of particular significance to the present inquiry, it 
has in recent decades been argued that courts should formally adopt trust law as the 
operative rather than merely figurative model for recognition and enforcement of 
children’s legal rights.15 
 In the United States today, the separation of law and equity has been largely done 
away—and given the contemporary tendency toward codification, the common law is not 
what it once was, either. But it continues to be true that arrangements of obligations are 
only properly trusts when they have certain features. These vary somewhat by 
jurisdiction, but in general there must exist 
 
1) a grantor’s or settlor’s  
a. capacity and  
b. intent  
2) to impose particular duties on a trustee  
3) as concerning some identifiable trust property (corpus),  
4) in order to fulfill the purpose of the trust  
5) for the good of some identifiable beneficiary,  
6) all subject to the demands of public policy. 
 
                                                 
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7. 
15 For example, Beck et al., “The Rights of Children: A Trust Model.” 
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So-called “trust-fund babies” make paradigmatic poster-children: a wealthy grandparent 
(settlor) gives possession and control of a sum of money (corpus) to a parent, guardian, 
attorney, or other responsible party (trustee) with instructions like “use this to cover 
schooling expenses” (purpose). There may be other instructions, including investment 
instructions or provisions for the trustee to be reimbursed for their management of the 
corpus—and those who benefit (beneficiaries) are sometimes the recipients of interest 
(i.e. income)16 accumulated through wise trust management, rather than recipients of any 
portion of the corpus. In fact those identified as beneficiaries of trust income need not be 
the beneficiaries of the trust corpus when, or if, it is disbursed—at which point the trust 
terminates, which always occurs when the corpus no longer contains any property (or 
stated differently, when there is no corpus). Finally, the whole process must comport with 
public policy; there are a variety of ways for trusts to violate public interest, but some 
trust purposes that preclude enforcement in the United States are the promotion of bigotry 
and the restraint of marriage.17 Note that failure to benefit the public is not construed as 
harm; trusts are not required to benefit the public, though many trusts do exist to promote 
public interests. 
 So the short answer to the question “what is a trust?” is “a trust is a collection of 
obligations and entitlements centered on the disposition of certain property.” The finer 
details of trust creation, management, and enforcement can be set aside; it should be 
                                                 
16 Most trust literature refers to trust income as interest, but in an effort to avoid 
confusion between the interests people have and the interest generated by a trust, I will 
favor “income.” 
17 In other words, a trust benefit conditioned on not marrying, either a particular person or 
in general, will be granted as if the benefit had been extended without such a condition. 
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sufficient here to ask, “if children have rights-in-trust, who are the settlors, trustees, and 
beneficiaries? What is the corpus and what is the purpose of the trust?” Even assuming 
that the obvious interpretation of Feinberg’s reference to “rights-in-trust” is to see 
children as the beneficiaries, with parents or guardians as trustees, the settlor is totally 
absent and the corpus and purpose, largely unspecified.18 Who are the settlors, and what 
is their aim? What kind of income accumulates in a moral trust, if any? How much of the 
corpus is it permissible to expend in pursuit of the trust’s purpose? Every answer given 
bears implications for other questions in the series, making it difficult to discuss any 
single element of children’s moral trusts without addressing the trust in its entirety. 
2. ARE CHILDREN ALONE BENEFICIARIES OF RIGHTS-IN-TRUST? 
 Nevertheless, the clearest element in the trust model of children’s rights is 
probably the beneficiary, given that the motivating difficulty of Feinberg’s account is the 
relationship between children, their rights, and the control certain adults exercise over 
those rights. The idea of “rights-in-trust,” if it is to have any value, ought to explain 
something about why children should neither be abandoned to their own devices nor 
treated as property owned in fee, and perhaps also why adults are or are not morally 
blameworthy in their various interactions with their children’s present and future 
circumstances. This places caregivers, not children, under plausibly fiduciary obligations, 
suggesting that children are indeed the appropriate beneficiaries in the trust model. 
But we can, and often do, distinguish the rights or interests children have “in so 
far as they are children” from the rights or interests they have “in so far as they will 
                                                 
18 In fact Feinberg himself attaches some relevant disclaimers to the idea of “rights-in-
trust,” however these disclaimers are not generally cited by others who discuss the 
“rights-in-trust” view. 
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develop into adults.”19 One way to approach that distinction might be to consider the 
difference between “income” beneficiaries and “remainder” beneficiaries in traditional 
trusts. An income beneficiary is one who receives regular payments from profits 
generated by the trust corpus, while a remainder beneficiary takes control of the corpus at 
the termination of the trust. On the trust model, children might be income beneficiaries in 
the present and remainder beneficiaries in the future, insofar as choices made on behalf of 
the child today impact the choices that will later be available to the child’s adult self. 
Children are often different enough from their adult selves20 that a conflict of interest 
may exist between the two; on the trust model, such a conflict would be the trustee’s 
responsibility to mediate. For example, consider a child with a present interest in playing 
video games, whose parent believes the child’s adult self will have an interest in having 
practiced piano instead. Suppose for purposes of discussion that the trustee is a parent, 
                                                 
19 Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood, 62. 
20 It might be observed that a child’s “adult self” is at least arguably the same self that 
was once a child, such that one’s theory of personal identity will weigh heavily in 
interpretation of the corpus/remainder question. This seems like (another) good reason to 
be suspicious that the trust model is a helpful one. People have different interests over 
time, and sometimes our past does our present selves some disservice, such that we can 
imagine our present selves causing similar havoc for our future. This can be a useful 
motivational thought—I strive to do as many favors for my future self as I can. But for 
people who think there is no meaningful or morally relevant distinction between their 
child-self and their adult-self, I have no particular response; I find myself quite incapable 
of understanding such a perspective, insofar as it appears to posit no meaningful or 
morally relevant distinction between child and adult. For those who do perceive some 
distinction between child-self and adult-self, the precise contours of their theory of 
personal identity might incline them to one or another account of what a child’s moral 
trust looks like, but it will not preclude the possibility of alternative models. And one way 
to put my criticism of the trust model is this: theorists frequently reference trusts or 
fiduciary obligations as if this were a way to answer questions about parental obligation, 
but in fact the trust model appears to be broadly compatible with every account of 
upbringing, depending only on how one chooses to characterize the particular elements of 
trusts or fiduciary obligations. 
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the purpose of the trust furnishes no particular guidance on the matter, and both the 
present interest in playing video games and the future interest in having instead practiced 
piano are legitimate “properties” in the corpus of the relevant trust. Is it permissible (or 
obligatory) for the parent to compel the child to practice piano? 
Notice that the impossibility of ascertaining the future-adult’s actual interests 
never enters consideration. A trustee’s duty is not to act according to unknowable 
interests, but to preserve or possibly enlarge the corpus according to the trust’s stated 
purpose, while balancing competing claims on the income and the remainder. A trustee’s 
judgment about what is best for beneficiaries can be challenged, but in general it is 
enough that trustees have a reasonable belief that their choices satisfy the purposes of the 
trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries. So a parent could permissibly insist that the child 
practice piano rather than play video games based on that parent’s (possibly mistaken) 
belief in the eventual value to the child of music training over video game prowess, but 
not based, for example, on that parent’s desire to avoid the personal regret of paying for 
piano lessons for a child who doesn’t practice.21 In the latter case, it is the parent’s 
benefit, not the present or future child’s, being pursued; it would be a breach of trust or, 
in other words, a violation of the trustee’s fiduciary obligation to use the trust for the 
benefit of the beneficiary, and not for their own benefit. Simply being mistaken about the 
                                                 
21 I note in passing that while these reasons are reversible, I have never met a parent who 
required their children to play video games for a set amount of time each day in an effort 
to avoid the regret of purchasing video games their children never played. With the 
advent and growth of “eSports,” in which professional video gamers showcase their skills 
and compete for cash prizes, will children of the future drill jungling and laning the way 
children today drill scales and arpeggios? While it is beyond the scope of this project, the 
idea seems sufficiently ridiculous that it almost certainly bears careful consideration at 
some future point. 
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interests the child’s adult self will actually have does not constitute a breach of trust, in 
much the way that a bad investment would not, by that fact alone, constitute a breach of a 
traditional trust with a monetary corpus. Pursuing the parent’s interests with no regard for 
the child’s interests is what constitutes a breach. 
One peculiarity of trust law, however, is that trustees are often beneficiaries 
themselves. Too great a unity of identity between trustee and beneficiary can collapse the 
trust, for to exclusively control and exclusively benefit from a piece of property 
constitutes simple ownership. But a common use of legal trusts is to spare one’s heirs the 
cost and inconvenience of probate after one’s death; this is accomplished by moving 
property into a trust of which one is the exclusive beneficiary until death, at which point 
the property is dispersed to the remainder beneficiaries (one’s heirs). In other words, 
there is no reason in principle why the settlor of a child’s “rights-in-trust” would be 
unable to specify any number of beneficiaries beyond the child and the child’s adult self. 
Parents, siblings, church, state, really any entity could be an intended beneficiary, 
depending on how “rights-in-trust” originate. Notice, no matter how morally repugnant it 
might seem, that parents can and sometimes really do choose to have children for their 
own personal benefit, or the benefit of third-parties. A recent controversial example in 
medical practice is “savior siblings,” children conceived for the explicit purpose of 
providing stem cells or organs to treat an older child’s illness.22 It may well be 
objectionable for parents to hold their children’s rights in trust for the benefit of someone 
                                                 
22 Some of the emotional challenges presented by such arrangements were popularized in 
Jodi Picoult’s My Sister’s Keeper, a few years after the situation was first medically 
described by Yuri Verlisnky et al. in “Preimplantation Diagnosis for Fanconi Anemia 
Combined With HLA Matching.” 
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else, but this would have to be argued on other grounds; no feature of the trust model 
precludes it, for it is the settlor, not the beneficiary, who establishes both the corpus and 
the purpose of a trust. 
3. WHERE DO MORAL TRUSTS COME FROM? 
“Settlor” is a term incorporating at least two roles: the creator of the trust, who 
establishes its purpose, and the grantor of the trust, who imparts the corpus. The creator 
of a trust usually is the grantor, but sometimes it is a court imposing some remedy in 
equity. As part of establishing the trust, the settlor also selects trustees and beneficiaries. 
On the trust model of children’s rights, the identity of the settlor could reveal something 
about the nature of the corpus, and vice-versa. For example, in their argument for judicial 
adoption of trusts as the model for children’s legal rights, Beck et al. suggest that 
although “the state [may play a] role as trustee, in its legislative functions it operates also 
as the settlor of the trust.”23 I do not wish to suggest that legal rights are or ought to be 
coextensive with those explicitly granted by the state, but Beck et al. are at least thinking 
in the right direction. If the corpus of children’s legal “rights-in-trust” consists 
exclusively of legislatively-granted legal rights, then of course the legislature is the 
settlor, and the legislature’s purposes in granting those rights is the purpose of the trust, 
binding the trustees (whoever they may be). 
 So who settles rights-holding trusts? The answer is unclear—and possibly 
something of a political question. For example, in a Platonic Republic, the mandatory 
separation of children from birth parents in furtherance of state interests paints a very 
clear purpose and method for those entrusted with the management of children’s rights. 
                                                 
23 Beck et al., “The Rights of Children: A Trust Model,” 675–676. 
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However to the extent one believes moral rights exist against or prior to civil 
governments, the state could not be the settlor (at least, not the sole settlor) of a trust 
holding children’s rights in the corpus. The state might still be the creator of that trust, 
where equity demanded such a thing, but the role of grantor would still need to be filled. 
In liberal societies especially, it seems unlikely that states will in the ordinary case be 
either the creators or grantors of children’s rights-holding trusts.24 
 Other possible settlors might include abstract or incorporeal entities like nature or 
deity; it’s not clear to me that much can be helpfully said of these. If we have indeed been 
endowed by a divine creator with certain unalienable rights, identifying the corpus and 
purpose of any resultant trust is going to be more a theological undertaking than a 
philosophical one. Maybe that’s okay, but if we’re going to assert that children’s “rights-
in-trust” are connected in some way with the nature or creation of children, might we 
simply treat children themselves as settlors? If we think that the simple fact of children 
having interests is itself what constitutes the corpus, maybe this is the right approach, but 
in connection with identifying trustees, treating children as the settlors of their own trust 
results in either infinite regress or final appeal to practicality instead of theory. If we 
think “rights-in-trust” are just an essential feature of live-born humans, children lack the 
competency to select their own trustees and so would need a trustee appointed to appoint 
                                                 
24 One way the state might arguably be the creator of a trust even in the absence of a clear 
grantor would be for the corpus of moral trusts to be treated as a windfall or “found 
property,” with the trust constructed to prevent something like unjust enrichment of the 
presumptive caregivers.  But this would be extremely peculiar, given that presumptive 
caregivers do not generally find children, but make them, and in the ordinary case must 
devote substantial time and treasure to further developing those children before anything 
that might arguably be called an “unjust enrichment” could possibly occur—raising the 
thorny question of whether and to what extent such enrichment is actually unjust. 
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an appropriate trustee to appoint an appropriate trustee, ad infinitum—or, more 
practically, would be arbitrarily assigned trustees in the form of parents and/or the state.  
If it is the child’s nature that grounds the child’s interests, then the settlor of the 
trust might instead be the creator of the child. Naturally, states cannot be said to create 
children any more than children can be said to create themselves—rather, parents are 
usually the creators of their children in a clear and not at all esoteric way.25 Could they be 
settlors of a trust bearing their children’s rights or interests? The idea that we receive our 
moral rights from our parents is undoubtedly peculiar, all the more so when it is realized 
how rarely some parents reflect on their children’s rights after their children are born, 
much less prior to conception. Given that a settlor must have both the capacity and intent 
to create a trust, it would be difficult to maintain on the trust model that every procreative 
act meets the requisite criteria, even if some do. On the other hand, setting aside failure of 
intent, treating parents as settlors of their children’s “rights-in-trust” does fit the pattern 
of many ordinary parenting practices. As observed in the previous section, sometimes 
parents create and even raise children for surprisingly specific reasons. Biological parents 
tend to select themselves as trustees, but placing children with relatives or for adoption 
looks like an act of selecting alternative trustees. 
 One way to address the apparent shortcomings of each candidate for settlor might 
be to simply think of them as joint settlors. This would require states and parents and 
perhaps also children and nature and God to all agree, however, not only on the purpose 
of the trust (the “best interests” of the child?) but also the identities of the beneficiaries 
                                                 
25 But see Chapter 2, especially note 25, for discussion of other meanings of the word 
“parent.” Naturally, the parents I have in mind here are causal parents, rather than 
custodial parents. 
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and trustees. This seems unlikely to occur. Is it instead a mistake to assume that each 
individual only has one trust relevant to the rights or interests of childhood? Do children 
have a trust containing their legal rights, established and managed separately from a trust 
containing their personal interests, with yet another for their moral rights, and so on? 
Resorting to a plurality of trusts complicates matters exponentially, such that any 
reference to children’s “rights-in-trust” points in so many directions as to hopelessly 
tangle the inquiry. 
4. DO MORAL TRUSTS HAVE AN IDENTIFIABLE TRUSTEE? 
 If we can’t clearly identify the settlors of children’s moral trusts, and are even a 
little fuzzy on the identity of appropriate beneficiaries, useful assertions concerning the 
corpus, purpose, or identity of trustees will need to be grounded in something beyond the 
trust model alone. It might seem obvious to some that parents should fill the role of 
trustees, with children as beneficiaries and the corpus of their trust a right to an “open 
future,” but it will seem equally obvious to others that the state fills the role of trustee, 
with the community as well as the child filling the role of beneficiary, all the child’s 
rights forming the corpus. Such a communitarian attitude would be no less accurately 
labeled a “rights-in-trust” view of childhood than the one advanced by Feinberg, even 
though it might constitute a rejection of everything else Feinberg claims about children’s 
rights.  
Perhaps this is why writing on children’s rights has tended in recent years to 
emphasize fiduciary duties rather than trustee obligations. What many contemporary 
theories of upbringing appear to assert is that adult caregivers have a special obligation to 
use their control over children’s development, lives, and choices for the benefit of those 
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children, with benefits accruing to others, if at all, only incidentally.26 The trust model of 
children’s rights can support such assertions because trustees have fiduciary obligations 
by virtue of their position in equity—but those fiduciary obligations arise from the 
relationship between the settlor and the trustee concerning the corpus, not from the 
relationship between the trustee and the beneficiaries. In fact beneficiaries generally have 
no enforceable interest in the trust corpus until after a trust has been settled. An account 
of children’s rights that uses selected portions of the trust model to describe the 
relationship between the trustee and the beneficiary, excluding troublesome questions 
concerning the identity of the settlor, requires some other justification for the fiduciary 
nature of that relationship. But referring to parental obligations as fiduciary without resort 
to the trust model requires the same thing; “fiduciary” describes the relationship, but 
what is the justification for describing the relationship in that way? In order to maintain 
that adults have a special obligation to use their control over children for the benefit of 
those children, some other argument must be provided. 27 Otherwise, fiduciary 
                                                 
26 In particular, I am thinking here of Brighouse & Swift, who assert that parents rights, 
whatever they are, must be identified “entirely by consideration of children’s interests.” 
Family Values, 121. 
27 One way this has been done in legal scholarship is to discuss various fiduciary 
relationships already recognized at law, look at the obligations imposed on parents by the 
law, then identify all the analogies and explain any apparent disparities. This is 
approximately the approach of Lionel Smith, for example, in “Parenthood is a Fiduciary 
Relationship.” The problem is that this does not explain why parents should be held to 
fiduciary standards—only that they apparently, often, are. 
 Another approach, this one from philosophy, is to argue that parental rights are all 
and only grounded in parental obligations. The account of rights advanced by Scanlon 
and adopted in Chapter 1 of this project is naturally incompatible with such claims, 
however, as parents may have important interests in upbringing that are not derived from 
anything they owe to their children. 
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obligations are simply smuggled into accounts of children’s rights by way of linguistic 
convention. 
 Rather than cling to the idea of parents as fiduciaries even as the trust model falls 
apart, perhaps we should prefer accounts of children’s rights that do not assert “rights-in-
trust” or anything like them. A children’s liberationist who believes that no one should 
exercise control over children, for example, will certainly need no justification for 
trusteeship; such a theory would naturally assert that no such justification exists. 
Opposite liberationists there are proprietarian accounts of childhood asserting something 
like ownership of one’s children in fee; because any successful proprietarian account ipso 
facto justifies total control over one’s children, the lesser power of trusteeship need not 
be established.  
However I find both liberationist and proprietarian accounts unpersuasive because 
children and parents both have strong reasons to reject such arrangements; it seems to me 
that children have special claim on their parents, such that both liberationist and 
proprietarian views would deprive children of something they are owed. The trust model 
of children’s rights occupies a rough continuum between the liberationist and 
proprietarian positions, positing an inverse relationship between a child’s capacity for 
self-determination and the extent of parental authority. Like the trust model itself, this 
continuum has intuitive appeal: the more capable a child grows, the less appropriate it 
seems for parents to exert control. The central puzzle is why and how adults ought to 
pursue capability growth and the accompanying diminishment of power—what it is that 
justifies an adult’s fiduciary relationship absent a clear settlor of a child’s moral trust. 
The fact of a child’s incapacity and expected maturation seems to explain why it is in 
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their interest to have a fiduciary, possibly even why it would be best for parents to fill the 
caregiving role, but it does not seem to justify the imposition of fiduciary responsibilities 
on any particular person, and that is the kind of justification needed to identify a specific 
“trustee” over a child’s “rights-in-trust” absent some clear settlor making a direct 
appointment. 
It might be observed that a possible justification can be found in a duty to rescue. 
At common law, where the trust model originates, there is no general duty to rescue; if I 
see someone drowning in a pond, I am under no legal obligation to intervene. But if the 
person in the pond is there because I pushed them—if I am responsible for their peril—
then a duty to rescue does arise. My responsibility for their circumstances obligates me to 
act in their best interests, and if I do not, then I am liable for such harm as may befall 
them. Because human infants are altricial, they are in a more or less perpetual state of 
peril from the instant of birth until several years into their upbringing. At minimum, they 
will actually starve to death if food is not placed directly into their mouths. People who 
procreate are directly responsible for this peril. The only rescue possible is to attend to a 
child’s upbringing, either by seeing to it oneself or persuading someone else to assume 
the burden.28 
Doubtless some will find this a peculiar justification for the identification of 
biological parents as the trustees (at least initially) of a child’s moral trust. David Archard 
suggests it is a “strange idea that the irreducible brute fact of procreation ‘creates’ moral 
rights and duties,” adding that while “it is not too odd to think of a created duty to care 
                                                 
28 Notice that this parallels the duties procreators were observed in Chapter 2 to have to 
their children under the auspices of what we owe to each other—and seems similarly 
inadequate, given any understanding of the values of parenting. 
  92 
for what one has brought into being, it is mysterious how this same event generates a 
right to rear.”29 But if we add upbringing-as-rescue to the trust model of children’s rights, 
the mystery abates. What Archard identifies as a “right to rear” just picks out those 
powers it is both necessary and feasible for parents to wield if they are to fulfill their 
obligation to rescue their child from his or her own incapacity. Since the trust model is 
itself derived from the common law, perhaps the duty to rescue should also be brought 
along. 
This approach to justifying the imposition of a fiduciary relationship between 
certain specific adults and certain specific children raises at least three further issues, two 
of which I will mostly set aside. The first is that the common law duty to rescue is 
sometimes regarded as inappropriately constrained; it seems to be a matter of general 
agreement that even if I lack a legal duty to rescue a drowning stranger, I have a moral 
duty to rescue a drowning stranger, provided I can do so with a reasonable expectation of 
safety to myself. So it is entirely possible that there may be a surprisingly large number 
of people with some moral obligation to see to any given child’s upbringing-as-rescue, 
even though they are not at all responsible for the child’s peril. Might this justify some 
community (or state) interest in upbringing? This, too, seems plausible on the trust 
model, though for purposes of this project, it is sufficient that we have identified even 
one adult—much less two—on whom it is justified to impose a fiduciary duty to see to a 
child’s interests, at least at infancy. 
The second is that a “duty to rescue” could be quite a lot more extensive than it 
initially appears, depending on what one is willing to count as “peril.” Rescuing a child 
                                                 
29 Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood, 165. 
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from the peril of being a helpless infant mostly requires a few years’ worth of food and 
shelter, but imparting other potentially life-preserving skills, like reading or swimming, 
might also be characterized as a rescue of sorts. How far does this reach? Might parents 
also have an obligation to address perils arising from social circumstance, for example by 
enrolling children in self-defense classes or teaching them how to read social cues and be 
alert for danger? What other perils might parents be said to place their children in by 
creating them, and what is the threshold of care at which we can say those children have 
been adequately “rescued?” Could the “peril” into which children are born be the peril of 
not developing into a certain kind of person—a “complete” or “mature” human, say? If 
so, sufficient parenting might be rather extensive; on such a view, upbringing-as-rescue 
could obligate parents quite heavily. 
5. THE PURPOSE AND CORPUS OF A MORAL TRUST 
 The third issue is that, whatever fiduciary duties upbringing-as-rescue might 
impose, they will be limited to the domain of “what we owe to each other.” That is—
upbringing-as-rescue does not appear to derive its force from the values of parenting, but 
from the values of right and wrong. Even if the rescue responsibilities of parents are quite 
extensive, they are unlikely to include the provision of piano lessons, video games, higher 
education, or inheritances. Nearly no one is out there arguing in favor of infanticide,30 but 
if a parent’s fiduciary or trustee obligations arise from something like a duty to rescue, 
                                                 
30 But see Alberto Giubilini & Francesca Minerva, “After-Birth Abortion: Why Should 
the Baby Live?” Recent developments in American politics, especially in connection with 
the disposition of infants born alive after failed abortion attempts, are beyond the present 
scope. But I observe that arguments against legalized abortion on grounds that it 
normalizes infanticide are sometimes identified as informally fallacious “slippery slope” 
arguments. In the United States circa 2019, we appear to be approaching the bottom of 
that particular slope. 
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what can be said about the values of parenting and the many ways parents shape 
children’s lives beyond anything ostensibly associated with “peril?” To this point I have 
left as open as I could the question of what it is, precisely, that adults exercising control 
over children’s lives are controlling. In a legal trust, what the trustee controls is the 
corpus—typically some real property, a sum of money, shares of a company, or arguably 
“any transferable interest, vested or contingent, legal or equitable, real or personal, 
tangible or intangible.”31 What adults control when they handle an infant is essentially 
everything—where the child travels, what the child eats and sees and hears, when and 
how the child does these things. Some of this is essential to keeping the child alive, but 
much of it is incidental to that task; keeping an infant fed or a toddler sheltered requires 
quite a lot of effort and attention that is difficult to provide without also determining 
much about the child’s environment, which in turn affects much about how the child’s 
future interests will develop. We might well wonder whether the control exercised over a 
child based on fiduciary obligations to preserve the child’s life generates further fiduciary 
obligations relating to the child’s well-being, that is, to ensuring as far as possible that the 
child’s life goes well. 
 Certainly many parents feel thusly obligated, to various degrees. But fiduciary 
control over a corpus is granted for some purpose, and that purpose—not other purposes 
for which the corpus might be used, or secondary effects use of the corpus might have—
is what binds fiduciaries in equity. In the absence of a clear settlor, identifying something 
like a duty to rescue as the source of parental rights and obligations also suggests that 
                                                 
31 George Bogert & George Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts § 25 at 69 (5th ed. 
1973), quoted in Beck et al., “The Rights of Children: A Trust Model,” 672, n. 24. 
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parental obligations could be quite minimal, even though the corpus with which they are 
entrusted might be managed to achieve a great many ends beyond a minimum standard of 
living. Of course it is quite permissible to manage a trust really well, achieving gains 
beyond the expectations of either the settlor or the beneficiaries! But it is not excellence 
to which trustees are obligated; mere competence in satisfaction of the trust’s purposes is 
quite sufficient. Does this obligate parents too lightly? On one hand, children can and do 
live through physical beatings, and worse. Surely parents are obligated against 
administering physical abuse? On the other, children surely have a great many interests 
the denial of which does not constitute peril into which their parents have placed them by 
virtue of conception. 
On the rescue model, then, the obligations owed to children by the “trustees” or 
“fiduciaries” controlling their autonomy are not established by the values of parenting. 
I’m clearly wrong about this if God gives children to parents for some identifiable reason, 
or even if the purpose of a child’s life is genuinely established by state interests or 
parental reasons for deliberate procreation. A trust with a clearly-settled purpose reveals 
much about trustee obligations and the identities and entitlements of beneficiaries. 
Asserting fiduciary obligations to preserve, enlarge, or maximize children’s well-being or 
future opportunities in the absence of a clearly-settled purpose, based on the brute fact of 
adult control over infant autonomy, simply assumes too much. That a child has some 
interest, present or future, is not any reason to claim that parents have fiduciary 
obligations to their children. Parents’ fiduciary duty to keep their children alive, 
justifying plenary-but-waning control over children’s autonomy, does not entail other 
fiduciary duties over how well their children’s lives go. The trust model can only impose 
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obligations as clear as its purpose; if no clearer purpose than upbringing-as-rescue can be 
established, then actions that do not endanger the child’s life but may or may not cause 
the child’s life to go well appear simply to be permissible.  
6. CONCLUSION 
There is a way of talking about children’s rights that goes something like this: 
children are highly suggestible incompetents. They have an important but inchoate 
interest in self-determination; until that interest vests, what’s best for them is preservation 
or expansion of that inchoate interest. So far, the most effective approach to success in 
such endeavors appears to be allowing certain interested parties to more or less control 
children’s lives until they are no longer children. Owing to children’s suggestibility, 
however, placing them under the control of others seems detrimental to the 
aforementioned, albeit inchoate, interest in self-determination. For those who find 
liberationism an unpersuasive account of children’s rights, the apparent inconsistency 
might be alleviated if adult power over children is limited to that of a fiduciary, with 
control not of the child simpliciter but of the child’s rights, interests, autonomy, or future 
self “in trust” (or something trust-like). The problem with the “caretaker’s thesis,” as 
David Archard labels it, is that it “argues against the liberationist for a denial of self-
determination but, in the last analysis, is unclear how much should be denied and what 
precise ends are served by the denial.”32 
What this chapter has illustrated is that the trust model of children’s rights, while 
descriptively appealing, can smuggle in a substantive claim. The substantive claim is that 
caregivers have fiduciary obligations concerning children’s rights, interests, or similar. In 
                                                 
32 Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood, 79. 
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the absence of a clear settlor or purpose (Archard’s “precise ends”) the trust model does 
not actually show that caregivers have any fiduciary obligations to children beyond, 
perhaps, some duty to rescue their children from the perils to which they were subjected 
by birth. Because it certainly seems as though parents have a great many obligations 
concerning their children’s well-being, the mistake is an easy one to make, all the more 
so if one’s theory needs some way to reconcile autonomy as an overriding interest with 
the observable fact that responsible parenting involves a great deal of paternalistic 
intervention in children’s lives. None of this shows the trust model to be correct, nor yet 
incorrect, but it does suggest caution where an assertion of trust or fiduciary obligation is 
used to explain parental duties that have not been specifically grounded in some other 
way (or grounded in other claims about parental duties that are not themselves, in turn, 
grounded). One way to ground such obligations while maintaining the trust model would 
be to identify a clear settlor or purpose of a child’s moral trust, but finding such a thing 
may require us to answer no less comprehensive a question than “what is the purpose of 
(this child’s/person’s) life?”  
Fortunately, there are other ways to ground obligations. There is also substantial 
room for analysis of caregiving in the absence of fiduciary obligations, by focusing on 
the meaning of rights instead of asserting the existence of a trust or something trust-
like—in other words, by appealing to contractualism and the values of parenting. For 
example, it might seem strange to say that parents on the upbringing-as-rescue view have 
no fiduciary obligation against beating their children, but it wouldn’t be a claim that 
adults have no obligation against beating their children; I expect I am quite obligated to 
refrain from beating anyone, never mind whether we enjoy a special relationship of trust. 
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It might be objected that the relationship I have developed with my children, by virtue of 
stewardship over their “rights-in-trust,” gives me extra or special reason to refrain from 
beating them, and this seems intuitively true, but in such a case it is not my identifiably 
fiduciary duty to refrain from beating my children. Beating my children is just something 
I have decisive reasons to refrain from doing. If we model parent-child relationships in 
terms of what we have reason to do, or to refrain from doing, rather than in terms of 
trusteeship or fiduciary obligation, I think we will be able to say much, and more clearly, 
about what it is that really constitutes appropriate caregiving. In other words: the values 
of “what we owe to each other,” combined with the values of parenting, are sufficient to 
address the rights and obligations of parents and children, without reference to legalisms 
like trusts or fiduciary relationships. In some contexts, these notions might be helpful or 
illustrative, but the question of whether children have rights-in-trust, if we insist on 
asking it that way, can only really be answered after it is first determined what specific 
parents in specific circumstances actually have reason to do.
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CHAPTER 4 
EQUALITY AND SUFFICIENCY IN UPBRINGING 
 
Contemporary criticism of the institution of the family commonly manifests as 
complaints that family relationships foment inequality and/or diminish autonomy. 
Probably the best-known examples are those addressing the equality and autonomy of 
women under a putatively “patriarchal” social order, but Western feminism’s century-
plus of sweeping cultural victories has, predictably, attracted imitation in other areas of 
advocacy. This is sometimes even explicit: in their influential and controversial account 
of parent-child relationships, Family Values, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift observe 
that they are “happy to think of [their] theory as doing for children what feminist 
philosophers have done for women. Where feminists reject patriarchy, [Brighouse & 
Swift] reject ‘parentarchy.’”1 To this end Brighouse & Swift indeed complain that parent-
child relationships, at least as they tend to take shape in Western liberal democratic post-
Enlightenment societies, foment inequality and diminish autonomy.  
Autonomy is the subject of the next chapter; this chapter addresses the matter of 
equality as it relates to upbringing, with particular attention to the view of Brighouse & 
Swift that “parents are currently allowed to do too much for their children, and in too 
many ways.”2 This is something of a promising start; on its face, the assertion that 
“parents are currently allowed to do too much for their children” certainly looks like a 
                                                 
1 Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child 
Relationships, 26. 
2 Ibid., 30–31. 
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rejection of caregiving maximalism (at least for parents), since it would be difficult to do 
“too much” for a child, in connection with securing any particular good, while under an 
obligation to secure “as much as possible” of it. Nevertheless, at publication Brighouse & 
Swift’s account became the subject of rather more media attention than is ordinarily 
afforded to academic philosophy. The headlines were, as headlines are wont to be, 
breathless:  
 
“Professor: If You Read To Your Kids, You’re ‘Unfairly Disadvantaging’ Others”3 
 
“Bedtime Stories ‘Allowed,’ but Not Church or Private School:  
Prof Re-engineers Family for Egalitarian Utopia”4 
 
“Check Your Bedtime Story Privilege at the Door”5 
 
“Should We Ban Bedtime Reading to Children or Simply Ban Families?”6 
 
The actual claims that incensed so many commentators are arguably less 
exciting—but, depending on how one interprets Brighouse & Swift (or values one’s 
                                                 
3 Katherine Timpf, “Professor: If You Read To Your Kids, You’re ‘Unfairly 
Disadvantaging’ Others,” National Review (6 May 2015), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/05/professor-if-you-read-your-kids-youre-
unfairly-disadvantaging-others-katherine-timpf/.  
4 Steve Weatherbe, “Bedtime Stories ‘Allowed,’ but Not Church or Private School: Prof 
Re-engineers Family for Egalitarian Utopia,” LifeSite (7 May 2015), 
https://www.lifesitenews.com/opinion/bedtime-stories-allowed-but-no-church-or-private-
school-in-british-profs-so.  
5 Neal Larson Kid, “Check Your Bedtime Story Privilege at the Door,” Magic Valley (12 
May 2015), http://magicvalley.com/news/opinion/columns/larson-check-your-bedtime-
story-privilege-at-the-door/article_a8568f27-d525-5d1d-af57-daf4a0794230.html.  
6 Jeanine Martin, “Should We Ban Bedtime Reading to Children or Simply Ban 
Families?,” The Bull Elephant (7 May 2015), http://thebullelephant.com/should-we-ban-
bedtime-reading-to-children-or-simply-ban-families/.  
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children), perhaps only slightly. Swift has clearly stated that he does not think anyone 
should be prevented from reading bedtime stories to their children—he just thinks parents 
should occasionally “have [the] thought” that doing so gives their children an “unfair” 
advantage.7 But Swift, with Brighouse, does suggest that parents have no right to make 
effective testamentary bequests, or perhaps even to send their children to private schools. 
Of course, such ideas are not original to Brighouse & Swift.8 For example, in hopes of 
preserving and perpetuating “a homogeneous American culture,” in the early 20th century 
a political coalition including the Ku Klux Klan successfully outlawed private schooling 
in the state of Oregon—only to have the ban overturned in a landmark decision from the 
Supreme Court of the United States.9  
Placing substantial limits on parental abilities to make intergenerational wealth 
transfers or wield discretionary authority over their children’s schooling does seem like 
pursuit of a measure of cultural homogeneity, though presumably Brighouse & Swift 
would be quick to disclaim any similarity between the homogeneity they favor and the 
homogeneity preferred by organizations like the KKK. So what is it, for Brighouse & 
Swift, that justifies the identification of such ordinary, widespread, and even 
                                                 
7 Joe Gelonesi, “Is Having a Loving Family an Unfair Advantage?,” Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation (1 May 2015), 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/philosopherszone/new-family-
values/6437058. 
8 For example, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), invalidating 
Oregon’s requirement, targeting the destruction of parochial schools, that all children 
attend public schools. Or see Allison Benedikt, “If You Send Your Kid to a Private 
School, You Are a Bad Person: A Manifesto,” Slate (29 Aug. 2013), 
https://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/08/private_school_vs_public_sch
ool_only_bad_people_send_their_kids_to_private.html. 
9 Robert Bunting, “Pierce vs. Society of Sisters (1925).” 
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Constitutionally-protected parenting practices as “unfair” or “too much?” The primary 
contributor is probably just contemporary egalitarianism; it is all too de rigueur to 
reflexively over-weight equality (in whatever form) as an important interest. This is 
typically done without explaining why or how any particular inequality grounds a 
weighty interest, including in cases where an interest in sufficiency appears equal (so to 
speak) to the task. But a complete understanding of Brighouse & Swift’s missteps—and 
why reasonable parenting constitutes a superior account—is best begun from common 
ground. 
1. BRIGHOUSE & SWIFT ON RIGHTS AND INTERESTS 
One aim of Brighouse & Swift’s Family Values is, they say, to justify the 
institution of the family—to “explain why it is good that children be raised by parents.”10 
The simplest summary of their explanation is that children have certain relevant rights 
and interests in having familial relationships. Early in their argument they helpfully 
define “interests” and “rights” as they intend to use these terms: 
We think of a person as having two kinds of interest. . . . [one] in anything 
that contributes to her well-being or flourishing . . . [and two] in having 
her dignity respected—in being treated in ways that reflect her moral 
status as an agent, as a being with the capacity for judgment and choice, 
even where that respect does not make her life go better. . . . 
For us, people have a right to do something when their interest in 
doing it is weighty enough that others have a duty to let them do it . . . .11 
 
This is very similar to the definition of a “right” offered by Joseph Raz and approvingly 
cited by T.M. Scanlon: 
                                                 
10 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 48. 
11 Ibid, 52–53. 
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“X has a right” if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being 
equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for 
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.12 
 
To this Scanlon adds that we have additional important interests, for example in 
“controlling and directing our own lives,”13 that can ground rights. These accounts of 
rights and interests appear compatible—indeed, very nearly identical. Both identify well-
being and some measure of autonomy as clearly among our interests, and both identify 
rights as grounded in interests important enough to impose obligations on others. 
Significantly, Brighouse & Swift do not appear to claim that they have anything like 
“manifesto rights” in mind. The way they justify parental discretion and authority over 
the lives of children is by observing, not that we should for whatever reason aspire 
toward certain modes of upbringing, but simply that children and adults have important 
interests “that bear on the question of how children should be raised.”14 The question of 
how children should be raised is, of course, the question motivating the present project. 
And while they don’t say so in as many words, Brighouse & Swift appear specifically 
concerned that children should not be raised in a way that violates anyone’s rights, 
including the rights (whatever those might be) of the child being raised—which is a 
central concern of reasonable parenting. 
With this account of rights in mind, the primary justification Brighouse & Swift 
offer in support of the institution of the family is that children have rights to “familial 
                                                 
12 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 166, as quoted in T.M. Scanlon, “Rights and 
Interests,” 71. 
13 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 186. 
14 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 53. 
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relationship goods.” More will be said about these in the next section, but familial 
relationship goods are, roughly, the objects of interests important enough to ground rights 
to the various practices that make it possible for intimate family relationships to exist and 
to flourish. When Brighouse & Swift claim that parents are nevertheless often allowed to 
do too much for their children, they frame this as a claim that Western societies routinely 
permit parents to violate the rights of others, perhaps including their own children, in 
ways unnecessary or unrelated to securing familial relationship goods. Echoing yet 
another feature of Scanlon’s contractualism, they even make a brief argument for all-
things-considered judgments and balancing tests that sometimes result in outcomes that 
are not optimal or, in other words, maximized along some preferred axis:  
Where an all-things-considered judgment means that a value or principle 
is not to be fully realized, we think it important not to obscure that fact.  
. . . The alternative, advocated by some (most notably Ronald Dworkin), is 
to allow conflicts to shape the very way that we understand the conflicting 
elements themselves. “Fair equality of opportunity,” on that kind of view, 
might mean “the kind of equality of opportunity that we should value, 
having taken into account the other values at stake.” On this approach, one 
should aim for a way of conceiving values or principles that allows them 
to form a coherent and systematic set, eliminating conflicts in the very 
process of conceptualization and labeling. It’s true that this is closer to the 
commonsensical or conventional way of dealing with the problem. In 
conventional political discourse, especially for politicians but also for the 
rest of us when we are thinking about political choices, it’s problematic to 
allow or acknowledge incompatibilities, to accept that all good things 
can’t always go together. So there is an understandable tendency to allow 
one’s appreciation of the inevitable conflicts between values or principles 
to influence the way one conceives those values or principles themselves. 
But this often becomes unhelpful fudging. Better to keep clearly in mind 
the values or principles at stake, accept that they will indeed conflict, and 
be honest enough, with ourselves and others, to acknowledge that all-
things-considered judgments are going to involve a balancing act, and 
hence the incomplete realization of any one.15 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 44–45. 
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In the ensuing discussion of values and principles, Brighouse & Swift make several 
references to “prima facie rights,” which they define as interests “weighty enough to 
ground duties in others” when taken on their own, “other things equal,” but potentially 
“outweighed by other considerations . . . that impose competing, and more morally 
urgent, duties.”16 Introducing the idea of a prima facie right looks like an attempt to 
facilitate discussions of balance, which appears to be further evidence of their 
commitment to an account of parents’ and children’s rights as largely a matter of 
appropriately balancing competing interests. Their account is, in other words, at least 
quasi-contractualist, and is correspondingly susceptible to contractualist critique. 
 If this is all correct, then I would expect Brighouse & Swift’s arguments—that, 
for example, parents have no right to “confer advantage” on their children—to proceed in 
approximately the following way: observe that there is some “familial relationship good,” 
like parental affection, supporting a prima facie parental right to confer advantage on 
their children, for example through testamentary bequests or private education. Then 
observe that there is also some other good, say “equality,” that gives rise to a conflicting 
prima facie right against the operation of testamentary transfers or private schooling. 
Assert that, on balance, a principle allowing parents to engage in such practices could be 
reasonably rejected because, after an informal comparison of losses (here Brighouse & 
Swift would bring some relevant empirical evidence or assumptions to bear), the 
objections people have to a principle permitting these practices are weightier than the 
objections to some feasible alternative principle forbidding them. Next show how the 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 56. 
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proposed alternative principle—taxing inheritances at a rate of 100 percent, say, or 
banning private schooling—cannot on this same empirical analysis be reasonably 
rejected. Conclude that parents do not have a right to engage in these practices, not 
because they lack relevantly important interests in affection or discretion or the like, but 
because allowing parents to engage in these practices imposes unacceptable limitations 
on other people’s interests (in contractualist terms, failing the “feasibility” prong of 
Scanlon’s account of rights). 
 But this is not how Brighouse & Swift’s argument proceeds. To Rawlsian 
objections that family relationships foment inequality they instead respond that “familial 
relationship goods are,” without qualification, “more important than fair equality of 
opportunity.”17 But they also claim that parents have no right to “benefit their children by 
                                                 
17 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 143 (emphasis added). Brighouse & Swift appear to 
intend this mention of fair equality of opportunity (FEO) a reference to Rawls, since their 
“defense” of the family is supposed to serve as a response to the liberal worry that fair 
equality of opportunity “can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as long as the 
institution of the family exists.” See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 105. Very 
generally, of course, FEO is supposed to describe a state of affairs in which the facts of 
one’s birth do not dictate the story of one’s life—arguably including one’s place in social 
hierarchies, educational or vocational opportunities, personal wealth, political power, and 
much else besides. But described in this way, FEO is as plainly aspirational. There is no 
life in which the facts of one’s birth are the only factor in one’s biography (e.g. a 
hereditary prince may be deposed well in advance of a presumed coronation), and there 
are no social hierarchies where the facts of one’s birth are wholly irrelevant, either (since 
a child born into a society with maximal FEO would likely benefit from FEO only as an 
accident of the time and place of their birth). On a sliding scale between these imaginary 
extremes, there is ample room for debate concerning both ideal and practicable balance. 
Theorists who argue in “favor” of FEO are mostly arguing, I think, that we should do 
things in the future such that facts about birth will matter less in people’s lives than they 
have in the (recent?) past. But of course there are many facts about birth it would be 
objectionable to cause to not matter; in particular, the personal relationships we have with 
our parents will ordinarily be something we would object to having made (or treated as) 
meaningless. 
 The literature on FEO is too vast, and too diverse, to comprehensively 
  107 
conferring advantage on them in a way that undermines fair equality of opportunity,”18 
even though parents may have a right to do things that “will, as a matter of fact, confer 
advantage.”19 What is going on here? Clearly Brighouse & Swift think that something 
about families is more important than (a certain kind of) equality. But their clearest 
policy recommendations are made in the context of denial that parents have the kinds of 
rights that seem like obvious candidates for securing familial relationship goods—rights 
that both law and tradition have recognized in the past and continue to recognize today. 
In particular, Brighouse & Swift clearly agree that it would be appropriate to tax 
testamentary bequests at a rate of 100 percent—in other words, that there is no (prima 
facie?) right to the operation of testamentary transfers. And there can be no question that 
Swift, at least, thinks private schooling should be outlawed entirely—in other words, that 
it would not violate anyone’s rights to ban private schools. He is especially clear about 
this in a book aimed not at philosophers, but at parents—a book aimed not at merely 
denying that parents have a right to send children to private schools, but at actually 
bringing about a political situation in which parents lack even the option. In How Not to 
be a Hypocrite, Swift writes that “the value to parents of being able to send their children 
to a private . . . school is not sufficiently great, and the costs of letting them do so are 
                                                                                                                                                 
accommodate here. Fortunately, it should suffice for the purposes of this chapter to 
recognize that “equality” is something in which many theorists think we all have an 
important interest, and that “fair equality of opportunity” is one kind of equality that 
seems, to many, a plausible formulation of that interest. Since my own position is that 
equality does not appear to be something in which anyone actually has an interest, further 
development of FEO seems moot. 
18 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 137. 
19 Ibid., 119. 
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sufficiently serious, for us to choose rules that ban that option.”20 He strives to fulfill the 
titular promise of How Not to be a Hypocrite by suggesting that where private schools are 
permitted to exist, parents may have a variety of justifications for enrolling their children, 
but should for Rawlsian reasons21 pursue a political agenda of outlawing private 
schooling. On his own, Brighouse approaches the issue more pragmatically, observing 
that egalitarians “used to argue for [the] abolition” of private schools and expressing 
doubt that this is ever likely to happen—but given his identification of certain private 
schools as “the most important symbols of educational inequality,” it would be 
disingenuous to suggest that Brighouse favors, or is even plausibly neutral toward, 
private education.22 When writing together, Brighouse & Swift identify one non-
                                                 
20 Swift, How Not to be a Hypocrite, 69–70. The omitted portion refers to selective 
schools, the United Kingdom’s approach to academic tracking—sorting students by 
academic ability. Swift’s main concern about selective schools appears to be that he 
thinks community cohesion is better-engendered by common schools. This issue is 
clearly related to the question of parental rights in directing their children’s education, but 
is more empirically complicated, and will typically depend more on the inherent 
capabilities of any given child than on the interests of parents generally. In an effort to 
keep this chapter to a manageable length, and since it is not an issue raised by Brighouse 
& Swift in Family Values, I will not here take up the question of selective schools and 
academic tracking. 
21 Specifically, Swift refers without citation to a simple version of Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance as an “unbiased way of thinking about how biased people should be allowed to 
be.” Ibid. 14. 
22 Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice, 206. In conversation on 23 Feb. 2019, 
Brighouse suggested to me that he favored the banning of private schools in the U.K., but 
reiterated that he did not think such a ban was a political possibility. He also suggested 
that he did not favor banning private schools in the U.S., but that he held this view in 
response to prevailing First Amendment jurisprudence forbidding religious education in 
publicly-funded schools. In the U.K., by contrast, many “faith schools” are publicly 
funded and teach the national curriculum but are permitted to determine their own 
religious studies curriculum—so banning private schools would not have the same 
religious liberty implications there. 
  109 
exhaustive reason to deny that parents have a right to enroll their children in public 
school, but possible reasons to affirm such a right they do not explore at all. 
 Something they do explore—indeed, the thing they seem most interested in 
resolving—is the tension that arises between the pull parents feel to promote “their 
children’s well-being, by (almost) whatever means,” and the egalitarian accommodation 
of “other children’s interest in fair equality of opportunity.”23 That tension is a hint, I 
think, at what Brighouse & Swift’s account actually misses. In Chapter 2, I noted that 
sometimes the thing we have most reason to do is still, in some sense, regrettable—
because we feel the pull of separate moral domains (like the domain of “what we owe to 
each other” and the domain of parenting) but are unable to respond, or respond fully, to 
the demands of both. Unfortunately, Brighouse & Swift do not actually develop their 
account of rights sufficiently to recognize that they have come up against a moral domain 
problem. However their attempt to accommodate “familial relationship goods” gets them 
very close. 
2. FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP GOODS 
 Let us consider in greater detail, then, the “familial relationship goods” at the 
heart of their account. Interests in familial relationship goods, Brighouse & Swift claim, 
can be used to show both that families are important and that many family practices are 
either compatible with or weightier than certain claims about, among other things, 
equality. It seems, given their (and Scanlon’s) account of rights and interests, that this 
might be accomplished simply by observing that sometimes a person’s interest in 
something like equality will be weightier than another person’s interest in a certain 
                                                 
23 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 153. 
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familial relationship good, and sometimes not. But Brighouse & Swift never state it that 
way, and their metric for what specifically counts as a familial relationship good, and 
what does not, is never made entirely clear. This leaves some uncertainty as to which 
rights (if any) familial relationship goods actually ground. Nor do Brighouse & Swift 
offer an exhaustive list of familial relationship goods, though they do mention examples 
like “intimacy and spontaneity” as being specifically what is “indeed valuable about the 
family.”24 They also observe that in order to  
develop into flourishing adults . . . children need to have a particular kind 
of relationship with one or more, but not many more, adults. Of course, 
what exactly they need from it changes as they develop: an infant and an 
adolescent will have different needs. And, again, of course, any child at 
any given time needs the relationship to supply a complex mixture of 
things: a feeling of being special, lessons in self-discipline, paternalistic 
authority within certain domains, and so on. When we say that children 
need parents—indeed that they have a right to a parent—we are saying 
both that there is an essential core to what they need that is best delivered 
by particular people who interact with them continuously during the 
course of their development, and that those particular people are able to 
provide the combination of things needed at any particular time. 
Continuity and combination are implied by the idea that what children 
need is a particular kind of relationship.25  
 
Aside from a (likely inadvertent) use of the maximizing word “best,” all this seems 
plausible. Certainly there is much empirical literature suggesting that the stability of 
parent-child relationships has substantial impact on children’s adult lives.26 So it seems 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 11. 
25 Ibid., 84. 
26 For example, S.M. Bell and Mary Ainsworth, in “Infant Crying and Maternal 
Responsiveness,” 1188, note that “an infant whose mother’s responsiveness helps him to 
achieve his ends develops confidence in his own ability to control what happens to him.” 
See also Celeste Kidd, Holly Palmeri, and Richard N. Aslin, “Rational Snacking.” 
“Attachment theory,” as the work of Ainsworth and related scholars has come to be 
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reasonable to interpret Brighouse & Swift as claiming that familial relationship goods are 
the things parents and children have interest in securing, given their interest in the 
existence and perpetuation of their valued and valuable relationship. But instead of 
identifying relevant rights by balancing interests in familial relationship goods against 
competing interests, Brighouse & Swift claim that if something really is a familial 
relationship good, then the associated interests just are weightier than countervailing 
interests in fair equality of opportunity. At least, that is what they appear to be saying 
when they claim that “familial relationship goods are more important than fair equality of 
opportunity.”27  
There are at least three contractualist ways to read this claim. One is that the 
competing interests Brighouse & Swift identify as “fair equality of opportunity” are 
simply unimportant—that there is a prima facie right to familial relationship goods, but 
not to fair equality of opportunity. Consider a claim like “freedom of expression is more 
important than freedom to use plastic drinking straws.” There might be some context in 
which one person’s interest in using a plastic drinking straw could outweigh someone 
else’s interest in free expression, but it is difficult to imagine this playing out in reality. 
So an assertion that one kind of interest is more important than another could be an 
assertion that the second interest lacks importance, at least in likely contexts of 
comparison. This is not, however, what Brighouse & Swift appear to be claiming. In fact 
                                                                                                                                                 
known, is not universally accepted among psychiatric professionals (is anything?) but my 
experience with critiques of attachment theory has been that they appear to be primarily 
politically, rather than empirically, motivated. In particular, attachment theory generates a 
lot of attention in the “Mommy Wars” mentioned in the preface of this project. 
27 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 143 (emphasis added). 
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they routinely treat equality generally, and fair equality of opportunity in particular, as 
important interests grounding, at minimum, prima facie rights. 
So another possible meaning of the claim that familial relationship goods are 
more important than fair equality of opportunity is that the interests Brighouse & Swift 
identify as “familial relationship goods” are exceedingly important, such that they always 
trump other important interests, or at least always trump these important interests. 
Consider, for example, a claim like “the right to bear arms is more important than the 
right to feel safe.” In this claim, two seemingly important interests are identified 
alongside an assertion that one nevertheless always trumps the other. On the 
contractualist approach, claims of this nature are extremely suspicious. Even though 
everyone should agree that the right to bear arms is grounded in important interests,28 the 
idea that nobody’s interest in feeling safe could ever, under any circumstances, be even 
more important than an interest in bearing arms is surely mistaken. If it were possible to 
construct a clear hierarchy of important interests, then there would not be much place for 
the informal comparison of losses that Scanlon identifies as central to contractualism.29 
So claims of this nature, if they are to be treated as more than rhetorical or question-
begging,30 must be made in the context of some compelling explanation of how one 
                                                 
28 Important interests grounding the right to bear arms include, relevantly, an interest in 
feeling safe, along with more obvious interests like the capacity to defend oneself and 
others from hostile aggressors. 
29 “Much” because, presumably, there would still be a place for conducting an informal 
comparison of losses when dealing with conflicts between identical rights—such as when 
one party’s right to free speech comes into conflict with another party’s right to free 
speech. But this seems like a trivial exception to the observed problem. 
30 Notice that this parallels a potential problem, identified in Chapter 1, with referring to 
something as a “manifesto right.” 
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apparently important interest really does trump another apparently important interest 
every time—which it would, if it were strictly “more important.” Brighouse & Swift do, 
early on, allude to such an explanation, claiming that because familial “relationships are 
vital sources of joy, self-realization, and flourishing . . . it’s more important that human 
beings get to enjoy such relationships than that they get a level playing field on which to 
compete for jobs, money, and status.”31 In context, Brighouse & Swift provide this 
argument as a defense of familial relationship goods against the claim that “the only way 
really to deliver fair equality of opportunity would be to get rid of parent-child 
relationships—to abolish the family—altogether.”32 I think it is true that fair equality of 
opportunity is not sufficiently important to justify the abolition of the family, but I think 
it is likely that fair equality of opportunity is not sufficiently important to limit parental 
discretion at all. This is compatible with the idea of familial relationship goods including 
parental discretion—since it seems to me that parental discretion is a familial relationship 
good, if anything is—being “more important” than fair equality of opportunity, as 
Brighouse & Swift claim. Yet they clearly disagree that fair equality of opportunity is not 
sufficiently important to limit parental discretion at all; much of their work is dedicated to 
identifying ways in which parental discretion should, on their view, be limited by 
egalitarian concerns. So Brighouse & Swift must be excluding parental discretion (and 
what else?) from their idea of familial goods. But they never explicitly say that this is 
something they are excluding from familial relationship goods, much less explain why 
they exclude it. 
                                                 
31 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 33. 
32 Ibid. 
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So a third way to accurately claim that familial relationship goods are more 
important than fair equality of opportunity would be definitional: exclude from the 
definition of “familial relationship good” any interests that are not more important than 
fair equality of opportunity, even if those interests otherwise appear to be familial 
relationship goods.33 It has already been observed that Brighouse & Swift disclaim the 
approach of eliminating conflicts “in the very process of conceptualization and labeling” 
values and principles.34 In spite of that disclaimer, Brighouse & Swift give every 
appearance that their idea of “familial relationship goods” actually has a built-in 
sensitivity to what they take to be the demands of equality. 
 This is best illustrated with an example, though I will first point out the problem 
in theoretical terms. In clarifying the matter of rights grounded by familial relationship 
goods, Brighouse & Swift note that “what parents have a right to are the activities 
internal to the valuable relationships; there is no right to bring about the external by-
products of those activities, and that relationship, that might in fact arise in particular 
contexts.”35 Given their own account of rights, this appears to be a claim that parents 
have a sufficiently important interest in performing certain relationship-affecting 
activities that others are obligated against preventing those activities, but parents do not 
have a sufficiently important interest in the consequences of certain relationship-affecting 
activities that others are obligated against preventing those consequences (on these 
                                                 
33 That is, the kinds of goods that characterize joyful, intimate, spontaneous, self-realizing 
relationships between parents and children. 
34 Ibid., 44. 
35 Ibid., 119. 
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grounds). This is only a coherent position in cases where the interest parents have in 
performing relationship-affecting activities does not depend on the consequences of that 
activity. So for example, if I have a right to read bedtime stories to my children, but doing 
so will give them an advantage at school, no one is obligated (on these grounds) against 
depriving my children of that advantage, either by hampering their education in some 
other way36 or (preferably) improving the education of other children sufficiently to 
eliminate their disadvantage. The problem for Brighouse & Swift is that many of the 
interests parents have in parenting activities exist precisely because of the “external” 
consequences they bring about; the “external” consequences of the activity are an 
important part of why they have an interest in performing it. 
More concretely: Brighouse & Swift think I have a right to leave my house to my 
daughter when I die, because the sentimental value of such a bequest is an important part 
of our loving relationship—so important that others have a duty to refrain from 
interfering in that relationship, even if it is a relationship that somehow foments 
objectionable inequality. They just don’t think I, or my daughter, have any right that she 
actually benefit from such an inheritance, beyond the warm feeling of having been 
remembered in my will. This is because, though I might have a right to do some things 
that happen to confer various “advantages” on my children, Brighouse & Swift think I 
lack any right to actually confer advantages on my children. This seems sufficiently 
strange that I have been accused of engaging an uncharitable reading. But Brighouse & 
Swift are clear on this point: 
                                                 
36 This approach would be a kind of leveling-down, plainly objectionable but on entirely 
other grounds. 
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Requiring that the beneficiary [of an inherited house] actually live in the 
house, taxing the financial benefit (including any eventual sale of the 
house) at 100 percent, so that only the sentimental benefit is realized, is 
entirely consistent with recognizing the relationship goods case for 
permitting the bequest.37 
 
Reference to sentimental benefit as the “only” relationship goods benefit, along with 
reference to the eventual sale of the house being included among the possible financial 
benefits to be taxed, is unambiguous language to the effect that other financial benefits, 
like the financial benefit of living somewhere rent-free, are also legitimately taxable at a 
rate of 100 percent. In other words, Brighouse & Swift view the sentimental benefit of 
inheriting a house from one’s parents as a familial relationship good, but do not view any 
inheritance of economic advantage as such a good: they treat the sentimental and 
economic benefits of testamentary bequests as entirely separable, as “external” 
consequences, essentially by-products of parental activity. They later explain that, on 
their view, parenting just is not about economic benefits. Parenting, they say, is about 
having a relationship of the right kind with one’s child. . . . Of course, that 
kind of relationship . . . requires children to feel that their parents regard 
them as special, and care more about them than they do about other 
people’s children. But . . . it does not, we claim, require parents to act on 
their natural and loving motivation generally to benefit their children 
where doing so will conflict with other children’s interest in fair equality 
of opportunity.38 
 
The claim that parents are not required to benefit their children in such a way is not, of 
course, the same as a claim that parents are not (or should not be) permitted to act in this 
way. There are some activities, like reading bedtime stories to children, that Brighouse & 
                                                 
37 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 140. 
38 Ibid., 153. 
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Swift think do conflict with (at minimum) other children’s interest in equality, but which 
parents are nevertheless permitted to perform. For Brighouse & Swift, it appears that 
whether such activities are permissible hinges on whether they are integral to the 
realization of familial relationship goods, or not. And the actual receipt of economic 
benefits from an otherwise-sentimental inheritance is, apparently, not something they 
recognize as integral to the realization of familial relationship goods. 
But parents and children don’t have any apparent interest at all in bequests aside 
from the interest they have in those bequests being effective. In policy terms, it’s not hard 
to see how (say) an estate tax exemption for sentimentally-valuable real and personal 
property would be an inducement to gamesmanship. The tax code is a system of 
incentives and disincentives; exempting something from taxation creates an incentive to 
put as much of one’s wealth as possible into that form. If I am the child of outrageously 
wealthy parents and can inherit anything tax-free so long as it is of significant emotional 
value to me, that creates an incentive for me to have—or to feign—significant emotional 
attachment to the family mansion, the family yacht, the family jewels, the family garage 
full of family Lamborghinis, and so forth. If I am an aspiring maximalist who wants my 
one child or grandchild to inherit as much of my wealth as possible, I have reason to put 
as much of my wealth as possible into goods to which my heirs can attach reasonable 
claims of sentimental attachment. The practical consequences of tax policy suggest that 
solving the (realistically, rare) problem of compelled divestiture of expensive but 
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sentimentally-valuable inheritance property is probably best left to careful legislative 
drafting and, in especially unusual circumstances, a wise judiciary.39 
In terms of theory, however, it is not at all clear why familial relationship goods 
could ever exclude economic benefits as not-integral. In fact numerous economic 
benefits, like the provision of room and board for minors, are surely familial relationship 
goods if anything is, quite apart from any emotional value the provision of daily needs 
might furnish. Would Brighouse & Swift favor a 100 percent tax on the economic benefit 
to a college-aged child of being allowed to continue living at home while pursuing higher 
education? Such a conclusion is consistent with their account of testamentary bequests. 
But like the inter vivos provision of room and board, the sentimental character of 
testamentary transfers plainly depends on what Brighouse & Swift are treating as an 
external by-product of the bequest: the physical benefit of the transfer. Imagine the 
scenario Brighouse & Swift propose, in which I am free to leave my house to my 
daughter, knowing in advance that by operation of law she will gain no benefit more 
material than a warm feeling of having been acknowledged in a testamentary document. 
What is the actual sentiment of such a bequest? Is it that I love her and want her to have 
the house where she grew up, and an unfortunate but emotionally-irrelevant fact about the 
law is all that makes leaving my house to her functionally identical with leaving her 
nothing? Of course not: under a legal framework where leaving my house to someone 
results only in them nominally “owning” it an instant before its removal from their 
possession without compensation (or, worse, their being compelled to make extraordinary 
                                                 
39 I make no claims here concerning the impact on my argument of encountering a 
shortage of either careful legislative drafting or wise judges.  
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payments to the government for the privilege of living in what was supposed to be their 
own home), such a bequest would plainly be a white elephant—if not a slap to the face 
from beyond the grave. It says, “I remember you, and acknowledge that I am expected to 
leave something of myself in memoriam of our relationship, but you deserve no such 
benefit from me, so I will leave you less than nothing: I will leave you paperwork.” Far 
better under such laws, and assuming I love my daughter as a father should, for me to 
either sell my house to my daughter (if she wants it and can afford to pay fair market 
value)40 or (if she can’t) leave the house directly to the government, sparing my daughter 
the pointless bureaucratic hassle and concomitant extended exercise in heartbreak. 
When Brighouse & Swift undertake to defend their specific claims about private 
schooling and intergenerational wealth transfers against this kind of objection, they first 
suggest that we needn’t be concerned about the cost to children’s interests when denied 
certain advantages within their parents’ reach, because in a society where bestowing such 
advantages is prohibited by law,41 children could have no reason to complain about their 
parents not providing it.42 Their admission that this response is “conjectural” does 
nothing to prevent it from being pointlessly conjectural; that people’s interests could be 
other than they are does not seem relevant to the present weight of an interest that they do 
in fact have. Brighouse & Swift also suggest that parents lack any legitimate objection to 
                                                 
40 For non-lawyers puzzled by the caveat: failure to pay fair market value would in many 
jurisdictions subject my daughter to tax liability for the portion of the market value 
deemed by the relevant authorities to have been “gifted” to her, above any relevant gift 
exemptions. 
41 This, recall, is the kind of society Brighouse & Swift think we should be working to 
create through political activity. 
42 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 138. 
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constraints on their parenting so long as they have an “adequate set of [alternative] means 
by which to realize” the familial relationship goods Brighouse & Swift treat as primarily 
accounting for the family’s value.43 But what “adequate alternative” exists to the familial 
relationship good of having a parent who actually enables you to live your life just a little 
bit freer from various of the wider world’s economic expectations? If my parents have an 
interest in leaving me a house because they wish to spare me the pain of taking an 
unpleasant but lucrative job in response to economic pressures including the price of 
housing, it is not an interest that arises from the importance of expressing to me that wish, 
but from the actual consequences of leaving me their house. 
 In their closing comments on equality and the family, Brighouse & Swift write: 
While it is important to keep clear on how our preferred balance of values 
will not guarantee children fair equality of opportunity . . . this perspective 
has the great merit of focusing our attention on what balancing of values 
really can be justified to those affected by them, especially to those who 
fare badly under them. It thus demands precise specification of the 
different domains of value at stake and careful consideration of the ways 
in which they conflict, and of how we should weigh them when and where 
they do. We need to know which of the mechanisms that currently disrupt 
fair equality of opportunity are worthy of protection despite their 
disruptive tendencies.44 
 
This all appears to be compatible with my account of reasonable parenting. The problem 
is that any ordinary familial practice Brighouse & Swift think is not, on balance, worthy 
of protection, they do not proceed to identify as a familial relationship good the interest in 
which is sometimes or always outweighed by other interests, but as not a familial 
relationship good. The effect is to eliminate conflicts in the process of conceptualization 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 143. 
44 Ibid., 45. 
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and labeling, in spite of Brighouse & Swift’s claim that this is not their intended 
approach. Furthermore, the “precise specification of the different domains of value” they 
foreshadow in this passage never materializes, even though the interests people have in 
familial relationship goods appears to track something very much like my own account of 
the moral domain of parenting. 
Because Brighouse & Swift’s weighing process is not made explicit, political 
heuristics and prejudices are, I suspect, permitted to thumb the scales. Given what they 
claim about rights, interests, and balancing, what Brighouse & Swift needed was a clear 
account of what sorts of interests people actually have, and how those interests should be 
balanced when they come into conflict. Instead, they introduce the idea of “familial 
relationship goods,” which are supposed to be the objects of interests in having certain 
kinds of relationships. This potentially tracks something like the moral domain of 
parenting explored in Chapter 2—until Brighouse & Swift exclude the objects of interests 
of this kind that they happen to believe are less important than certain kinds of equality. 
Is there anything weightier or “more important,” in turn, than familial relationship goods? 
Brighouse & Swift admit that their account does not generate a clear answer to this 
question—“not, alas, because we lack the space but because we do not have such an 
answer; judging the considerations at stake would require us to defend a general theory of 
global justice.”45 As it happens, the first two chapters of this project were dedicated to the 
application of a general theory to questions of precisely this nature, including some 
specification of the relevant moral domains. Scanlon opens the way forward, allowing us 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 144. 
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to undertake an independent inquiry into the weights and balances that Brighouse & 
Swift elide. 
3. BALANCING INTERESTS IN RELEVANT PRINCIPLES 
 So: Brighouse & Swift believe that it would be permissible for governments to 
prevent (effective) testamentary transfers or enrolling children in private schools because 
these things give some children an unfair advantage over other children whose parents 
cannot or do not engage in such practices. They aver that some family practices likely to 
generate unfair advantages, like reading children bedtime stories, are permissible insofar 
as those practices are inseparable from interests weightier than interests in equality, and 
call the objects of these interests “familial relationship goods.” My objection is that 
Brighouse & Swift do not make sufficiently plain the balancing of interests in which 
familial relationship goods must, to accomplish what Brighouse & Swift intend them to 
accomplish, be grounded. But this is not an argument that they have not conducted such a 
balancing, only that it is not something they appear to have ever made adequately 
explicit. To avoid subjecting myself to my own complaint, I need to explicitly conduct 
the balancing inquiry that Brighouse & Swift imply but do not perform. 
It is clear that one of the main interests Brighouse & Swift have in mind is 
equality. They even go so far as to identify themselves as distributive egalitarians with 
regard to familial relationship goods, not in the sense of wanting to distribute children 
(which would violate the relationship goods account by terminating valuable 
relationships) but in the sense of wanting to distribute, among other things, opportunities 
  123 
to secure familial relationship goods.46 The primary mechanism they identify for 
distribution is, roughly, preventing people from sending their children to private schools 
or leaving nice inheritances, and otherwise changing society in ways that, for example, 
shorten the hours that parents spend laboring. This should, they think, allow a greater 
number of parents to dedicate their newly-free time to securing familial relationship 
goods. If someone does have an important equality interest that outweighs my and my 
children’s interests in sending them to a private school, or leaving them a generous 
inheritance, or reading them bedtime stories, then Brighouse & Swift’s policy arguments 
likely succeed no matter the roughness of the road they traveled to get there. This follows 
from my own account of how children should be raised: 
 
                                                 
46 Brighouse & Swift’s project, like this one, is primarily concerned with the relationships 
between parents and children, but it is interesting to note that because familial 
relationship goods exist, by definition, within families, and all families ultimately owe 
their existence to heterosexual reproductive pairings (regardless of the social shape those 
pairings ultimately take), a commitment to improving the overall “distribution” of 
familial relationship goods is guaranteed to run up against the problem of people who 
want to raise children but either cannot or will not create those children themselves. Both 
the forcible redistribution of children and the forcible redistribution of (hetero)sexual 
activity appear unacceptable for what I take to be obvious reasons, though one economist 
has, controversially, raised the possibility of giving the involuntarily celibate 
compensation in the form of cash payouts. In “Two Types of Envy,” Robin Hanson 
observes that sexual activity “could be directly redistributed, or cash might be 
redistributed in compensation.” Hanson goes on to observe that “there seems to be little 
overlap between those who express concern about income and sex inequality. Among our 
cultural elites, the first concern is high status, and the later concern low status.” This ties 
the issue to his work with Kevin Simler, in The Elephant in the Brain, on hidden motives 
and status signaling games. There is not space here for a meta-philosophical exploration 
of the way in which professional philosophers play status signaling games with their 
arguments and publications, but it is certainly striking that egalitarian theorists return 
again and again to criticism of private schooling and intergenerational wealth transfer 
while scarcely seeming to notice numerous inequalities that do not happen to reinforce 
their preferred political narratives—like, for example, status inequalities arising from 
academic hierarchies instead of status inequalities arising from differences in wealth. 
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1. Caregivers should act in accordance with a set of principles for the general 
regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement. 
a. This means, in part, that it is not permissible for caregivers to violate 
anyone’s rights in pursuit of caregiving, because rights are constituted by 
principles that no one could reasonably reject. 
2. Parents are responsible for their children. Such responsibility is both reason to 
meet certain caregiving obligations, and reason to value children in certain ways. 
But different parents will value their children differently, depending on various 
facts about themselves and their world.  
a. Whatever else parents have reason to do, one way that “what we owe to 
each other” influences the domain of parenting is by obliging parents to 
furnish their children with a community-appropriate moral education, 
because a principle allowing parents to neglect such education could be 
reasonably rejected both by other parents and by affected children. 
 
If sending my children to a private school violates someone’s rights, it is not permissible 
to send my children to a private school. Likewise leaving an inheritance, or really any 
other behavior that in fact violates people’s rights. But the operative question is, do 
people actually have important equality interests that outweigh my and my children’s 
interests in the practices Brighouse & Swift identify? On balance, the answer is clearly 
no. 
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A. Private Schooling 
Consider the case of providing children with a private education. Sending children 
to a private school seems unlikely to deprive them of a community-appropriate moral 
education; to the contrary, attending to a child’s education not only meets caregiving 
obligations, but likely also contributes to their acquisition of a moral education. It also 
seems plausible that parents could value their children such that they see themselves as 
having reason to dedicate time and treasure to sending them to a private school, so 2 and 
2.a are satisfied. Is sending children to a private school disallowed by a set of principles 
for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for 
informed, unforced general agreement? A properly contractualist balancing of interests 
calls for an informal comparison of losses47—a consideration of “various individuals’ 
reasons for objecting to [a proposed principle] and alternatives to it.”48 In other words, 
the question is, what do other people stand to lose if parents are allowed to enroll their 
own children in a private education? And what do parents or their children stand to lose if 
they are forbidden from doing so? 
 The idea that permitting parents to enroll children in a private school inflicts 
“loss” on others is, I think, primarily rhetorical. There are clearer, less tendentious ways 
to state what has happened, since “loss” is rather the opposite of what happens when one 
person’s situation improves while other people’s situations are held constant. 
Characterizing one person’s improved existence as a “loss” because others find their 
position relatively worse is a move with some utility in economic analysis, but as moral 
                                                 
47 Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” 128. 
48 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 229. 
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rhetoric I find its ubiquity objectionable because it tends to obscure what is actually 
happening, or likely to happen. Would money spent sending children to a private school, 
if parents were forbidden from spending it in this way, instead be spent in a way that 
improves the distribution of familial relationship goods? Very likely parents would 
simply spend that money on other educational resources, like books or tutors, so treating 
private school spending even as a relative loss immediately assumes too much. Perhaps 
this is why Brighouse & Swift place so much emphasis on the idea of externalities 
imposed on others by one’s personal attainments, noting that some goods, 
like education, are manifestly positional. The competitive context makes it 
obvious that some parents’ buying their children a superior education 
harms the prospects of others. Other goods we might call latently 
positional. Health care might seem different from education—it’s not 
obvious how one child’s being healthier than another is bad for the latter. 
But in fact the relation between health and educational achievement means 
that, in raising your child on a good diet and ensuring that she gets proper 
exercise, you are damaging the competitive chances of less healthy 
children.49 
 
The concept of “positional goods” is borrowed from economics,50 characterized early on 
by philosophers as “a good valuable to some people only on condition that others do not 
have it.”51 More recently, Brighouse & Swift defined positional goods as “goods the 
absolute value of which, to their possessors, depends on those possessors’ place in the 
distribution of the good—on their relative standing with respect to the good in 
question.”52 While these philosophical glosses are not strictly wrong, they obfuscate 
                                                 
49 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 43. 
50 Specifically, from Fred Hirsch’s Social Limits to Growth. 
51 Martin Hollis, “Education as a Positional Good,” 236. 
52 Brighouse & Swift, “Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods,” 474. 
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something about the way positional goods actually operate. Because the value of a 
positional good, or part of the value of a good with a positional aspect, is conditional on 
others not having it, obtaining positional goods first and foremost imposes externalities 
on others who possess the same good. Sending my child to a private school might 
arguably diminish the prospects of children enrolled in public school, at least by 
comparison, but the relevant “cost” of positional goods is really imposed on children 
already enrolled in private school—because the more children there are graduating from 
private school, the less of a competitive advantage it presents to do so. If everyone 
attended privately-operated schools, no one would gain any special advantage thereby, 
and it would lose its positional aspect entirely. Ascertaining the worth of private 
schooling would then be limited to learning whether the education provided was better or 
worse, or more or less financially efficient, than an alternative arrangement in which 
everyone attended public neighborhood schools instead. In either system, however, 
children who are more privileged than my children are relatively disadvantaged when my 
children gain competitive advantages of other kinds, and children who are less privileged 
than my children similarly find themselves relatively disadvantaged. In fact the higher 
one is on any given “slope” of advantage, the more they arguably have to lose from 
competition; we might call this the “silver medal effect,” after the phenomenon of bronze 
medalists at the Olympic Games being happier with their having managed to secure any 
award at all than those who see themselves as having “lost” the gold.53 
 This fact about positional goods makes it very hard to see how they serve as good 
evidence against the permissibility of private schooling. Brighouse & Swift, in spite of 
                                                 
53 See Victoria Medvec, Scott Madley, and Thomas Gilovich, “When Less is More.” 
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some of the things they say about “fair equality of opportunity” being about more than 
jobs, treat it as obvious that allowing parents to enroll their children in private schooling 
specifically disadvantages children who don’t get a private education, and does this by 
reducing the likelihood that they’ll get quality secondary education and employment. 
Suppose permitting private school enrollment actually causes such disadvantages, instead 
of being (as I suspect is very likely) simply correlated with such disadvantages by virtue 
of some shared cause. Even if we allow that this represents a genuine loss, how much of a 
loss does it actually represent? It is a misleading exaggeration to suggest that permitting 
private schooling of some children is either necessary or sufficient to deprive anyone of 
relevant opportunities, since primary education is at most just one of many factors 
determinant of the opportunities one encounters later in life. Some children might 
arguably find their circumstances comparatively worse if other children attend private 
schools, but even this is far from obvious. There is evidence, for example, that the 
existence of market competition in the form of private schools improves the quality of 
education delivered by public schools.54 
Such empirical facts are an important part of a thorough balancing of interests. 
There are even a variety of things that, if they were true, would support an argument that 
losses accrue to the students of public neighborhood schools under a principle allowing 
private schooling. If failure to attend an expensive private school automatically precluded 
children from even one kind of career, lucrative, prestigious, or not, it would be 
extremely difficult to justify a principle allowing private schooling to people who were, 
                                                 
54 See, for example, David Figlio and Cassandra M.D. Hart, “Does Competition Improve 
Public Schools?,” 78, where it is concluded that multiple measures of competition are 
“positively related to student performance on state math and reading tests.” 
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through no particular fault of their own, unable to attend. But, clearly, allowing parents to 
enroll their children in private school does not have this effect, given the number of 
American politicians, movie stars, professional athletes, college professors, doctors, 
lawyers, and so forth who were publicly educated.55 At an even greater extreme, if 
allowing parents to send their children to private school entailed that someone would die, 
that person would have a reasonable complaint against a principle allowing parents to do 
so—but of course, no such person exists. 
In fact Brighouse & Swift arrive at this absurdity, when they note that bedtime 
stories “may indeed be crucial for familial relationship goods,” but wonder if parents 
could “really claim a right to read them in a world where their opportunity cost can be 
measured in the lives of others?”56 While they do not claim that the opportunity cost of 
reading bedtime stories can be measured in the lives of others, the implication is that 
there are at least some seemingly-trivial parenting practices with an opportunity cost 
measured in lives. There does not appear to be any evidence that this is remotely true. If I 
knew that reading a bedtime story to my children would kill someone, I would almost 
certainly not have the right to do so. The problem for Brighouse & Swift is precisely that, 
                                                 
55 While failure to attend an expensive private school as a child does not apparently 
preclude children from even one kind of career, there are several prestigious positions 
that do appear to manifest such exclusions—not in connection with primary education, 
but with undergraduate and (more often) graduate work. The lack of law school diversity 
among justices of the Supreme Court of the United States of America is particularly 
illustrative. This is a well-known fact about the Court, and yet I am unable to find a 
single philosophical text devoted to the abolition of Harvard or Yale, while texts devoted 
to the abolition of private primary schooling are too numerous to list. Likewise, faculty 
hiring committees in higher education are plainly sensitive to institutional prestige and 
pedigree. If primary schools should not emulate such “meritocratic” systems of 
matriculation and advancement—why not? 
56 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 144. 
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outside the world of tortured hypotheticals, it would be totally unreasonable to attribute 
anyone’s death to me reading my children bedtime stories, just as it would be totally 
unreasonable to attribute anyone’s unemployment or long work-day to a principle 
permitting private schooling (aside, of course, from the long work-day of the private 
school teacher!). Claims along these lines are simply rhetoric, exaggerations at best and 
often actively mendacious. Given the facts about the world presently available to me, the 
actual losses imposed on anyone by a principle allowing parents to enroll their children 
in private schooling appear to fall somewhere between infinitesimal and nonexistent. 
It may be worth noting here the background assumptions from which Brighouse 
& Swift appear to be drawing their overblown concerns. I want to do this cautiously, both 
because it is substantially speculative and because it touches on some of the meta-
philosophical concerns I appear incapable of avoiding. But there is, I think, a very 
popular way of talking about the world in which various kinds of suffering is treated—
substantially, mostly, or perhaps even totally—as a consequence of someone else’s not-
suffering. “Privilege,” as the not-suffering is sometimes called, exists in such 
conversations only in conjunction with “oppression.” Every person’s gain is framed as 
another’s loss, and vice versa, in cases large or small, intentional or unintentional. 
Interestingly, this seems like further evidence that people tend to think about morality in 
contractualist ways even when they are totally unaware of contractualism. For what are 
presumably reasons of self-interest, people tend to prefer that putatively moral 
calculations come out in their favor. This often involves “playing up” our own losses, 
while minimizing or dismissing the losses of others as incidental, unimportant, or 
deserved. The informal comparison of losses central to Scanlon’s contractualism, 
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however, is not something that should be sensitive to rhetorical or “narrative” 
exaggeration or minimization of losses. 
For example, when Bruce’s parents enroll him in a private school, Selina’s 
chances of parlaying her public education into a high-paying career are said to be reduced 
because she “can’t compete.” Rather than saying “Selina did not receive an adequate 
education,” it is sometimes asserted that “Bruce is (too) privileged,” even though the fact 
of Bruce getting an adequate or more-than-adequate education is not, on its own, causally 
relevant to Selina’s education. Additionally, when Bruce’s parents enroll him in a private 
school, the money they spend goes to paying for nice buildings and quality instructors 
instead of, say, feeding starving third-world orphans. So Bruce’s posh education is 
sometimes said not only to disadvantage Selina, but also to effectively take food out of 
the mouths of starving children elsewhere in the world. Such stories can be told in very 
emotionally compelling ways, but there is no reason to assume that Selina was ever going 
to be in competition with Bruce for anything, and there is no particular orphan whose 
untimely death can be attributed to specific dollars going to pay for Bruce’s schooling 
instead of being donated to a charitable organization. Furthermore, the dollars spent on 
Bruce’s schooling are not destroyed; education is not the process of sending socially-
desirable smoke signals with piles of burning cash.57 Those dollars pay, among other 
things, the salaries of people who might themselves otherwise be disadvantaged, 
struggling, or even starving. Rhetoric to the effect that every dollar that isn’t expended 
                                                 
57 But see Bryan Caplan, The Case Against Education, for an empirically thorough 
argument that education spending, and especially higher education spending, might be in 
great measure an exercise in sending expensive social signals by engaging in the 
economic equivalent of lighting barrels of money on fire. 
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fulfilling the best-publicized, most politically popular “dire needs” of the moment is 
essentially a dollar spent on murder is just that: rhetoric. Brighouse & Swift even 
acknowledge Rawls’ Difference Principle, admitting that it would be “odd to object to 
parents’ conferring advantage on their children in ways that give their children unfair 
advantages over others if their doing so tends, over time, to improve the opportunities 
available to the less advantaged.”58 But they write about private schooling as if it were 
clearly not the kind of thing that satisfies such demands, even though they present no 
evidence that this is true. In fact they seem entirely confident that the very existence of 
private schools causes substantial losses to, at minimum, children whose public education 
they frame as less valuable simply because a superior alternative exists. If it were true 
that the very existence of private schools caused children needless suffering, and that a 
feasible alternative principle would not instantiate such suffering, it would indeed make 
sense to doubt the permissibility of private schooling. But first, there does not appear to 
be any particular reason to think that private schools cause suffering, and certainly 
Brighouse & Swift furnish no reason to think so. Second, alternative principles to one 
that allows parents to enroll their children in private schools appear to be infeasible. 
That is: any principle forbidding parents from enrolling children in private 
schooling is infeasible, because a principle permitting private schooling imposes losses 
that are tenuous and speculative at best, while a principle forbidding private schooling 
would impose a number of easily-identified and totally concrete losses on a long list of 
people. Parents with responsibility and liberty interests in diverting time or treasure 
toward enhancing their children’s education would lose an opportunity to do so. 
                                                 
58 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 44. 
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Alternative education venues often cater to discipline cases, heterodox cultural or 
religious preferences, children with special needs, and children with unusual 
extracurricular interests, enabling parents to satisfy their children’s needs and wants in 
ways that public neighborhood schools often can’t—or won’t. The children of these 
parents would also be denied the opportunity to benefit from parental concern and 
discretion—and note that this includes children who might additionally lack such 
opportunity as a result of their financial status. Most private schools can be attended on 
scholarship,59 such that a principle forbidding private schooling deprives promising 
students with disadvantaged backgrounds a chance at improved outcomes as surely as it 
deprives wealthy students of the same. Many parents who are not wealthy make personal 
sacrifices to send their children to private schools anyway. This not only provides 
educational opportunities to children but also potentially enhances family relationships by 
demonstrating parental love in a memorable and consequential way. Even children who 
attend public neighborhood schools and have no interest at all in attending private 
schools suffer losses under a principle forbidding private school enrollment. I have 
already mentioned that competition from private schools tends to enhance public 
education. Additionally, limited opportunities to secure competitive advantage by 
participating in student government, gaining leadership experience in clubs and other 
extracurricular activities, or graduating as the valedictorian become more available to the 
extent that likely competition redistributes itself across alternative venues. The mere 
                                                 
59 It might be objected that scholarship funds are generally limited, and this is certainly 
true. What is strange about this objection is that the same people who tend to raise it tend 
also to be opposed to the implementation of vouchers, which are essentially publicly-
funded scholarships to help children attend private schools. 
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existence of diversity in school choice increases the total number of opportunities 
available to children generally, by increasing the dimensionality of competition. The only 
way to plausibly characterize the advantages garnered by private education as a problem 
is to view the competition slope as strictly univariate. But there are in fact a plurality of 
position-goods slopes, and eliminating one of them does not increase the number or 
variety or quality of opportunities children have; rather the opposite.  
Brighouse & Swift argue that parents “may not defend decisions to . . . send their 
children to [private] schools, by appealing to their right to confer advantage on their 
children . . . because . . . parents do not have the right to do the things so described.”60 
But this posture conflates two distinct concerns. Parents clearly do not have a general 
right to confer advantage on their children, because while the interests parents have in 
activities that confer advantages on their children ground a variety of what we might 
reasonably call parental rights, pursuit of advantage for one’s children is properly 
constrained by what we owe to each other. So in this extremely narrow sense Brighouse 
& Swift are correct: parents cannot defend decisions to send their children private school 
by appealing to their right to confer advantage, because conferring advantage on one’s 
children is generally not a right. But Swift openly advocates for a ban on private 
schooling, and his advocacy to this end is morally objectionable. Parents have sufficiently 
important interests in diverting their time or treasure toward enhancing their children’s 
education that this imposes a duty on others to not interfere by, among other things, 
making laws preventing parents from doing so. It is certainly feasible to impose such 
duties; in fact the primary limitation imposed on the interests of others by such a duty is a 
                                                 
60 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 119. 
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limitation on whatever interest they have in directing the education of other people’s 
children. More will be said about this interest in Chapter 6, but for the most part non-
parents appear to have pretty negligible interests in directing the education of children not 
their own, even when they arguably have important interests in principles making a 
certain amount of education available at public expense. So it is not merely permissible 
for parents to enroll their children in private schooling; parents have a prima facie right to 
enroll their children in private schooling. Absent some further, weightier considerations 
than those identified by Brighouse & Swift or plainly evident to me, it would be morally 
impermissible to prevent parents from doing so. 
 The point about feasibility is important. If all parents have a right to enroll their 
children in private schooling, but most parents are financially unable to actually do so, 
don’t they have a legitimate complaint? Aren’t their rights being violated? Perhaps! 
Recall that  
the claim that there is a right is a claim that certain limitations on the 
discretion to act of individual and institutional agents are necessary if 
important interests are to be adequately protected, and feasible as a way of 
providing this protection. This claim of feasibility is that the cost these 
limitations impose on our other interests is acceptable given the 
importance of the interests being protected.61 
 
Brighouse & Swift offer no evidence in support of the claim that there are any actual 
costs imposed by placing everyone under a duty to not interfere with the enrollment of 
children in private schools. Their background assumption appears to be that private 
schooling imposes costs in the form of externalities, but even if such externalities 
outweigh any associated benefits (which seems unlikely), Brighouse & Swift would still 
                                                 
61 Scanlon, “Rights and Interests,” 77. 
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need to clear the feasibility hurdle on alternative principles forbidding private school 
enrollment. It is difficult to know what costs would be imposed on other interests by 
whatever set of duties it would take to ensure that every parent was not merely at liberty 
to enroll their children in private schooling but in fact able to do so, and at acceptable 
cost to their own interests in, e.g., financial solvency. But if such costs were sufficiently 
low, a step in this direction might be government vouchers that defray the cost of private 
schooling, perhaps in a way that phases them out above a certain income threshold. One 
concern might be that private schools would raise their gross tuition rates in lockstep with 
the subsidies they received from the treasury, as has arguably occurred in connection with 
higher education subsidies. This may be a point in favor of a charter model of primary 
education over a voucher model; one potentially feasible alternative to merely permitting 
private education, after all, would be to eliminate public neighborhood schools and 
replace them with publicly-subsidized private education for all. If private schools are by 
their very nature superior to public schools (as Brighouse & Swift sometimes seem to 
treat them), this would be an improvement for everyone. This is an especially important 
point to consider when people complain that private or charter schooling somehow 
disincentivizes the funding of public neighborhood schools. If sufficient education could 
be made available to children through publicly-subsidized private schooling, what reason 
would there be to fund neighborhood schools at all? On the other hand, economic 
analysis might show that the cost of guaranteeing universal access to private education 
would bankrupt the nation, in which case, it could not be asserted as a right—it would be 
infeasible. 
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 It is worth noting that the question of actually educating children has scarcely 
been raised. Almost everything argued by Brighouse & Swift on the matter is grounded 
in empirical claims that private schooling statistically correlates with other desirable 
outcomes (primarily, income), presumed by Brighouse & Swift to be a function of the 
positional aspect of educational goods. Whether this is supposed to be the result of 
private schools actually furnishing superior pedagogy, or certificates from those schools 
signaling value of some other kind, is left unaddressed. The general public’s role in 
upbringing, via public policy, is about so much more than projected earnings that further 
discussion awaits in Chapter 6. But for now suffice it to ask: if every child were receiving 
an education that was sufficient, what complaint could anyone possibly have against 
some people receiving more, especially if this tended to actually further-improve 
education and society generally? Perhaps not all children do receive a sufficient 
education, but is this because some children receive a more-than-sufficient education? I 
am skeptical that even a correlation could be persuasively demonstrated, much less a 
causal relationship. 
B. Intergenerational Wealth Transfer 
The issue of testamentary transfer probably gets closer to the egalitarian 
aspirations that appear, at times, to be the true focus of Brighouse & Swift’s concern, 
because the advantages of controlling substantial wealth have much greater reach than the 
advantages of going to the “right school.” Brighouse & Swift do not seem to actually be 
advocating, politically, for an inheritance tax of 100 percent. But they do claim that their 
account of familial relationship goods is compatible with a 100 percent tax rate on 
inheritances, and they do not give any indication of suspecting such a tax rate might be 
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otherwise impermissible. They also do not offer any particular thoughts on where 
resources confiscated from estates in this manner would be best distributed, beyond 
mentioning a desire that society be transformed in ways that distribute familial 
relationship goods (among, presumably, others) more equitably. Their position, rather, is 
simply that neither decedents nor surviving family members have any important familial 
interests in preventing governments from confiscating any amount of testamentary 
property. This might in some ways seem like an easier claim to defend than a more 
particular principle of wealth redistribution, in the sense that Brighouse & Swift are not 
left trying to explain, empirically, how confiscating a certain amount of wealth via estate 
taxes would in fact function to specifically alleviate some particular case of, as they say, 
dire need. It would not be easy, and perhaps it would be impossible, to justify a principle 
permitting the confiscation of estate wealth on grounds that the money gained by doing 
so would be put to better use by government actors than by testamentary heirs. This is 
especially true in connection with government spending in areas like education, where 
costs have wildly outpaced inflation for decades while failing to deliver commensurate 
improvement or, indeed, any obvious improvement at all.62 But at least that approach 
                                                 
62 The phenomenon, sometimes referred to as “cost disease,” does not occur in every 
sector of the economy, but in the United States it is certainly happening in education, 
health care, transportation infrastructure, and housing. As Scott Alexander explains the 
issue, in “Considerations on Cost Disease,” 
Imagine if tomorrow, the price of water dectupled. Suddenly people have 
to choose between drinking and washing dishes. Activists argue that 
taking a shower is a basic human right, and grumpy talk show hosts point 
out that in their day, parents taught their children not to waste water. A 
coalition promotes laws ensuring government-subsidized free water for 
poor families; a Fox News investigative report shows that some people 
receiving water on the government dime are taking long luxurious 
showers. Everyone gets really angry and there’s lots of talk about basic 
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would put Brighouse & Swift in a position of balancing alternative principles in 
connection with empirical facts. What they are left with instead is an assertion that 
parents have no right to testamentary transfer grounded in a right to confer advantage, 
which is a moot point if there are other interests grounding a right to testamentary 
transfers. 
In fact there are other interests of exactly this variety. The people who lose under 
a principle limiting intergenerational wealth transfer certainly include parents and 
children with direct interest in such transfers (and in the disposition of their own 
property), but also include individuals who reap the indirect benefits. The clearest case 
concerns wealth that exists in the form of business ownership interests and other 
investments, since resources devoted to the generation of wealth are among the most 
consequential in the health of a nation’s economy. Confiscating wealth that would 
otherwise pass to someone’s heirs creates overinvestment in tax-sheltering ventures, 
disincentivizes investment in new business ventures, encourages the premature closing of 
functional businesses, and otherwise depletes a nation’s savings and investment capital 
                                                                                                                                                 
compassion and personal responsibility and whatever but all of this is 
secondary to why does water costs ten times what it used to? 
I think this is the basic intuition behind [why] so many people, 
even those who genuinely want to help the poor, are afraid of “tax and 
spend” policies. In the context of cost disease, these look like industries 
constantly doubling, tripling, or dectupling their price, and the government 
saying “Okay, fine,” and increasing taxes however much it costs to pay for 
whatever they’re demanding now. 
Or, more pithily, 
Look, really our main problem is that all the most important things cost 
ten times as much as they used to for no reason, plus they seem to be 
going down in quality, and nobody knows why, and we’re mostly just 
desperately flailing around looking for solutions here. 
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by incentivizing mere consumption.63 Confiscating wealth that exists in the form of 
savings and investments diminishes opportunities for everyone by siphoning fuel from 
the engines of commerce. A principle forbidding intergenerational wealth transfer 
imposes some loss on everyone participating in the economy—or, in other words, on 
basically everyone. Individuals forced by inheritance taxes to, for example, sell or 
surrender their family home or business can raise even stronger objections to such a 
principle, given the magnitude of their losses. 
 Whether these interests are sufficiently important to ground a right against 
government confiscation of 100 percent of one’s wealth at the time of one’s passing 
depends, in part, on what others gain under a principle permitting such confiscation, and 
also in part on what is gained or lost under alternative principles. So for example, as with 
                                                 
63 As one commentator observes,  
There is a vast amount of research by academic economists since the 
1990s and 2000s linking bequests, gifts and other such windfalls to self-
employment, in the UK, the US and around the world. Inheritances are 
especially strongly correlated with new business start-ups . . . . Savings 
that were used to finance investments and loans to the broader economy 
are therefore having to be liquidated to pay for [inheritance taxes], and the 
proceeds used by the state to pay for its day-to-day expenses, such as 
wages and benefits. . . . For the economy to grow sustainably, we need 
more savings, more capital and more investment. Yet wealthier pensioners 
are encouraged to be short-termist. Paradoxically, given that the tax bites 
at 40pc, spending £1,000 on a holiday, rather than saving the cash, costs 
just £600 for somebody expecting to pay the tax. Poorer folk don’t have 
that luxury: for them, spending £1,000 costs just that. There are, of course, 
many ways of avoiding inheritance tax: working farms are tax-exempt, for 
example. The result is an inefficient allocation of capital: wealthy people 
are buying agricultural estates, artificially propping up their price, rather 
than investing in the stock market, which could generate better returns and 
help businesses expand. 
Allister Heath, “Axe Inheritance Tax, It Causes Too Much Damage,” The Telegraph (12 
Feb. 2013), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/9865475/Axe-inheritance-tax-
it-causes-too-much-economic-damage.html. 
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private education, to whatever extent intergenerational transfers could be reasonably 
claimed to foreclose the pursuit of important interests to those who lacked wealthy 
progenitors—or, of course, to actually kill people—a legitimate objection would arise. 
One common way for precisely these claims to be forwarded is by arguing that 
intergenerational transfers increase wealth inequality,64 and that wealth inequality kills.65 
Such slippery-slope arguments seem rarely to take seriously the observation that it is 
probably not inequality, but poverty, that kills. My having very little money might lead to 
a variety of problems for me, but the fact that you have a very large amount of money 
does not especially make that worse, unless you are monopolizing so many resources that 
I am frozen out of the necessities of life. Claiming that inequality kills is about as 
plausible as claiming that bedtime stories kill. It is possible to construct a narrative in 
which, like a butterfly’s flutter causally cascading into a typhoon, facts about wealth 
inequality appear to be “responsible” for someone’s death. But such just-so stories are 
more like egalitarian articles of faith than accounts with meaningful explanatory power. 
So long as people have enough, they cannot reasonably object to others having more by 
virtue of that fact alone. 
 I will further examine the question of inequality versus insufficiency in the next 
section of this chapter. Are there other objections individuals are likely to be able to raise, 
on their own behalf, against a principle forbidding a 100 percent inheritance tax? Part of 
what makes this inquiry complicated is that there are so many alternative principles 
                                                 
64 See, for example, Yoko Niimi and Charles Yuji Horioka, “The Impact of 
Intergenerational Transfers on Household Wealth Inequality in Japan and the United 
States.” 
65 See David A. Ansell, The Death Gap: How Inequality Kills. 
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available (for example, a principle permitting up to 99 percent inheritance tax, or up to 98 
percent inheritance tax, and so forth), and discussing them in a reasonably complete way 
requires not only a fairly comprehensive understanding of economics—in particular, the 
enormously meaningful differences between material goods, money, and wealth—but 
also a fairly comprehensive understanding of estate law, tax law and policy, and the 
intricacies of government welfare spending. Careful elaboration on even one of these 
issues would well exceed the scope of this project. But it should simplify things 
somewhat to observe that the kinds of objections an individual might raise to a 100 
percent inheritance tax will likely be objections that at least some individuals could raise 
to a 50 percent inheritance tax, or a 10 percent inheritance tax—indeed, to almost any 
amount of inheritance tax at all. It seems likely that there will almost inevitably be 
someone who lacks the financial liquidity to relinquish part of the family home, business, 
or other property, such that almost any amount of inheritance tax could potentially violate 
someone’s interest in the disposition of that home or business by forcing them to liquidate 
an asset with substantial non-monetary value. 
 Whether such a person could reasonably reject a principle permitting confiscation 
of this kind will depend on the losses imposed on others by a principle forbidding such 
confiscation. Here it is more difficult to simplify the inquiry, because such losses will in 
general depend on the aim of the confiscation. The usual explanation for confiscating 
wealth (testamentary or otherwise) is the financing of government programs. Alternative 
tax approaches, as well as complex institutional arrangements like the recognition of fiat 
currency, make it very unlikely that inheritance taxes are ever necessary for the provision 
of, e.g., social welfare programs; at best, they are just one possible source of revenue 
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among many, and not even an especially bountiful one. In fact the higher an inheritance 
tax rate is, the more likely people will be to divest themselves of as much of their wealth 
as possible before they die, so higher inheritance taxes will likely tend to reduce 
inheritance tax revenues over time. The basic pattern of egalitarian arguments on such 
matters—presented here with an eye to charitable simplification, but admittedly without 
nuance—is that if Bruce has more than he needs, and Selina has less than she needs, then 
the obvious answer is to take some of what Bruce has, and give it to Selina. It is well-
understood, I think, that the problem with such approaches is that we’re not only 
concerned with making sure that Selina has enough. It is also important that the process 
of confiscating resources from people with more than they need is broadly morally 
permissible; for example, confiscating Bruce’s resources by executing him is going to be 
objectionable in ways that simply imposing a sales tax is not. For that matter, 
confiscating Bruce’s resources in a way that destroys the economy or creates political 
instability is going to be objectionable in ways that will require government actors to 
either find alternative solutions for people like Selina, or recognize their suffering as 
unfortunate and regrettable—but, under the circumstances, also inevitable. 
 At the risk of further muddying the waters, I should acknowledge that worries 
about economies and political stability point to a host of related issues that bear on the 
question of intergenerational wealth transfer, none of which I can hope to conclusively 
resolve here. I am less confident in my analysis of the permissibility of intergenerational 
wealth transfer than I am about the permissibility of private schooling in part because I 
am inclined to suspect that some confiscation of personal wealth by government actors 
may be permissible under principles no one could reasonably reject. Further specifying 
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which wealth it is permissible to confiscate sometimes seems more like a practical 
concern than a theoretical one. However my growing worry is that I am simply biased 
toward something like the American status quo, where estates have been taxed for 
decades. Given my current understanding of tax law and economic policy, it is not 
obvious to me that this kind of government confiscation of wealth is ever morally 
permissible: I am unaware of any principles permitting such confiscation that no one 
could reasonably reject. Given the alternatives available (sales taxes, mostly, but perhaps 
also inflationary issuance of fiat currency), the actual losses imposed on people by 
forbidding such confiscation appear to be nonexistent, though I find myself in the 
awkward position of asserting a negative. Still, if the government could not confiscate 
wealth, ever, would that be sufficient to harm any interest weightier than the interest we 
each have in maintaining testamentary control over our assets? I cannot think of one, 
especially given the small percentage of national revenue the United States currently 
secures through wealth confiscation. I have a much easier time grasping the 
permissibility of transactional taxation, to the extent that the interests people have in 
economic exchange are actually served by the existence of a functioning government; so 
long as economic regulation serves those interests, the people paying taxes on their 
transactions could not raise a reasonable objection to financing such regulation. Perhaps 
it would be similarly appropriate to tax wealth to the extent required to preserve that 
wealth? Even then, I see no reason why transactional taxation could not secure all the 
revenues necessary for the operation of an appropriately limited government.  
My suspicion is that economic claims are ultimately orthogonal to the real 
concerns of egalitarians advocating for estate taxes. If we assume that resource 
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distribution is in fact an easy problem for which non-economy-destroying, non-
government-toppling solutions are in ready supply, and that an inheritance tax will be 
necessary to satisfy someone’s dire need, and that imposing such a tax will not 
necessitate enforcement activities we are likely to find morally objectionable on other 
grounds, it would appear to follow that no one could reasonably reject a principle 
permitting an inheritance tax, even perhaps a 100 percent inheritance tax. I do not think 
any of these assumptions are warranted, and so my suspicion is that parents have a prima 
facie right to intergenerational wealth transfers, even though I think a conclusive 
assertion to that effect would require more economic evidence than I have adequate 
expertise to furnish. But I also do not think any of these assumptions get at the heart of 
what estate tax advocates are trying to accomplish. I do not think that the alleviation of 
“dire need” is the primary goal of such advocates, and even if it were, estate taxes seem 
like an incredibly ineffective approach to such ends. Rather, it seems to me that their real 
goal is economic equality. 
4. INEQUALITY—OR INSUFFICIENCY? 
In the first section of this chapter, I showed that Brighouse & Swift’s account of 
rights and interest-balancing is compatible with, indeed very nearly identical to, 
Scanlon’s account, making them quasi-contractualists appropriately subject to 
contractualist critique. The second section examined “familial relationship goods”—an 
account of, as Brighouse & Swift phrase it, “what is valuable about the family,”66 which 
they intend to explain why liberals should not be anti-family (children have the right to 
enjoy certain kinds of relationships with their parents) while preserving criticism of 
                                                 
66 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 11. 
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putatively inegalitarian practices like testamentary transfers and private schooling 
(because these things undermine equality in objectionable ways). I suggested that the 
correct way for Brighouse & Swift to accomplish their apparent aims would be to show 
that principles permitting testamentary transfer and private schooling can be reasonably 
rejected. Insofar as the work done by “familial relationship goods” in Brighouse & 
Swift’s account looks like a partial recognition of what I have identified as the moral 
domain of parenting, what they needed to show was that even if the moral domain of 
parenting called for parents to value their children through testamentary transfers and 
private schooling, the moral domain of what we owe to each other forbids such things, 
because permitting them violates someone’s rights—and what we owe to each other has 
priority. Brighouse & Swift do argue that testamentary transfers and private schooling 
result in advantages to which no one has any particular right, but they never show that 
testamentary transfers or private schooling, as such, actually violate anyone’s rights. 
Lacking a right to some particular advantage is not the same as lacking a right to the 
practice from which such advantage results; Brighouse & Swift attempt to account for 
this by proposing that some such advantages can (and should) simply be taken away by 
operation of law. In section three of this chapter, I conducted the necessary comparison of 
losses to show that testamentary transfers and private schooling do not violate anyone’s 
rights, and in fact that interference with private schooling typically violates the rights of 
parents and children alike. I also argued that principles permitting estate taxes on grounds 
that forbidding them subjects individuals to dire need could be reasonably rejected, 
insofar as it is not estate taxes but government spending generally on which the 
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alleviation of such needs depends. But my argument against estate taxes remains 
incomplete, because I set aside the matter of inequality and insufficiency. 
I expect that Brighouse & Swift will disagree with all of my conclusions for the 
following reason: they believe that something we owe to each other, something 
demanded with priority by the moral domain of right and wrong, is equality. Given 
prevailing attitudes about the value of equality, it is difficult to fault Brighouse & Swift 
too severely for assuming, in effect, that equality is something we owe to each other. 
After all, liberalism itself is often reduced to the slogan, “liberty, fraternity, equality,” and 
legal and political appeals to “equal rights” drive a substantial portion of contemporary 
American political discourse. I do want to be clear that I am imputing this position to 
them—both the belief, and its contractualist formulation—but since they self-identify as 
egalitarians and adopt a quasi-contractualist account of rights, I don’t think it is 
unreasonable to interpret their views in this way. Indeed, if I grant for purposes of 
argument that equality is something we owe to each other, I think much of Brighouse & 
Swift’s argument succeeds admirably. The way they build equality considerations into 
their account of familial relationship goods neatly parallels the built-in sensitivity of 
parenting to the demands of what we owe to each other. If there is a general right to 
equality, then parenting practices that differentiate childhood experiences surely violate 
that right.  
What contractualism helps to show, however, is that there are in practice no 
general rights—because there is no fixed hierarchy of interests. One must always, in the 
final analysis, conduct an informal comparison of losses, because that is the only way to 
fully meet the requirement of justifiability to others. This is something Brighouse & Swift 
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appear to understand, intuitively if not explicitly, given their helpful labelling of “prima 
facie” rights, which are just the kinds of important interests that tend to be weightiest in 
those contexts where they typically arise. To claim that I have a right to “equal” anything 
is to claim that I have an important interest in certain things being the same, and that this 
interest is weightier than anyone’s interest (including my own) in those things being 
different. It can often seem as though people have such interests, but as Scanlon observes, 
the “reasons for favoring equality are in fact quite diverse, and . . . most of them can be 
traced back to fundamental values other than equality itself.”67 I think Scanlon is, in this 
case, entirely too modest. I have yet to encounter, in the literature or in life, a complaint 
about “inequality” that turned out to actually be about equality. So I find myself quite in 
agreement with Harry Frankfurt’s assessment that while 
the pursuit of egalitarian goals often has very substantial utility in 
promoting a variety of compelling political and social ideals . . . the 
widespread conviction that equality itself and as such has some basic 
value as an independently important moral ideal is not only mistaken. It is 
an impediment to the identification of what is truly of fundamental moral 
and social worth.68 
 
 The main contractualist case for appeal to sufficiency rather than equality is that 
actual interests in equality are vanishingly rare—perhaps, nonexistent. To reasonably 
reject a principle permitting some apparent inequality, it must be the case that the losses 
brought about by that principle are greater than the losses brought about by alternative 
principles. Some objections to inequality Scanlon identifies are a desire to alleviate 
suffering, a belief that it is wrong for people to be treated as or made to feel inferior, or 
                                                 
67 Scanlon, “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality,” 202. 
68 Harry G. Frankfurt, On Inequality, 89. 
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an objection to giving some people an unacceptable degree of control over the lives of 
others.69 Others he identifies as related to certain kinds of “fairness.”70 What is odd about 
Scanlon’s treatment of these matters is his steadfast assertion that he does “not mean to 
attack equality or to ‘unmask’ it as a false ideal.”71 His primary mistake, I think, is in his 
belief that these various objections to inequality constitute “further reasons for caring 
about equality”72 than Frankfurt’s “doctrine of sufficiency”—that what is “important 
from the moral point of view is not that everyone should have the same but that each 
should have enough. If everyone had enough, it would be of no moral consequence 
whether some had more than others.”73 Specifically, Scanlon thinks the doctrine of 
sufficiency is limited to concerns about the alleviation of suffering; possibly he takes this 
position since even Frankfurt has historically focused on economic sufficiency as a foil to 
economic egalitarianism. But more recently Frankfurt has clarified that he “categorically 
reject[s] the presumption that egalitarianism, of whatever variety, is an ideal of any 
intrinsic moral importance” and is “convinced that equality as such has no inherent or 
underived moral value at all.”74 
                                                 
69 Scanlon, “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality,” 203–207. 
70 While some such discussion can be found in “The Diversity of Objections to 
Inequality,” it is expanded substantially in Scanlon’s recent Why Does Inequality Matter? 
71 Scanlon, “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality,” 203. 
72 See ibid., 203–204, note 3. 
73 Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” 21. 
74 Frankfurt, On Inequality, 65–66. 
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I agree with Frankfurt; moreover, I think his position follows from Scanlon’s 
contractualism. There are no general objections to inequality. Aside perhaps from the 
occasional transhumanist advocate for total cybernetic unification of individual 
consciousness through some yet-to-be-devised technological means, there aren’t actually 
any egalitarians who seek the elimination of differences between humans. Since it is not 
actually differences to which egalitarians actually object, but to the objectionable features 
of certain differences, this is where reasons to reject relevant principles must be 
grounded. It might be objected that it is certain kinds of differences to which egalitarians 
object, but then the natural question is, why those differences rather than others? Since 
there does not appear to be any reason to object to difference as such, “equality”—like 
the “manifesto rights” discussed in Chapter 1—is a term that confuses discourse and 
tends to get deployed as a way of asserting moral urgency without being required to 
actually demonstrate moral urgency.  
Scanlon himself falls prey to the phenomenon in his own recent criticism of the 
relationship between wealthy parents and childhood education. “As things are,” he writes, 
“economic inequality is a severe threat to substantive opportunity, not only because the 
rich can provide more for their children but also because their political influence blocks 
the provision of sufficiently good public education for all.”75 If the political influence of 
the wealthy actually “blocked” the provision of “sufficiently good education for all,” that 
would indeed be objectionable, quite apart from any appeal to “equality.” But Scanlon 
offers no evidence that this is actually so. To the contrary, Americans donate tens of 
billions of dollars to educational charities every year, with much of this money coming 
                                                 
75 Scanlon, Why Does Inequality Matter, 71–72. 
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from captains of industry as politically diverse as Bill Gates and the Koch brothers. 
Furthermore, charitable contributions are only a small percentage of the approximately $1 
trillion the United States spends on education annually—more per student than almost 
any other nation on Earth—and about half of the tax revenue supporting that spending 
comes from the top 10 percent of American income earners. Of course, it is quite possible 
that the amount of money spent on education is but loosely (if at all) connected to the 
provision of a sufficiently good education to anyone. But the point is that, if the political 
influence of the wealthy is in fact blocking the provision of sufficiently good education 
for all, it appears to be doing so through the perplexingly counterintuitive means of 
directing astronomical, historically unprecedented amounts of wealth toward the 
provision of public education, not only locally but globally. And—after all that—Scanlon 
still uses the word “sufficient” to describe the kind of education to which he thinks 
children are entitled: not equal, but sufficient. Why not also say that economic 
insufficiency is a severe threat to substantive opportunity—or whatever? Not only 
because the poor cannot provide enough for their children but also because they lack 
sufficient political power to address the issue? This seems like the right sort of reason for 
rejecting various principles for general behavior. “I do not have enough” seems to carry 
moral weight that “I am not the same” does not. 
In the final analysis, then, it seems to me that the reason Brighouse & Swift reach 
the conclusions that they do, in spite of having the correct view of rights and interest-
balancing, is that they construct their account of “familial relationship goods” with a 
built-in sensitivity to the demands of equality. It is an understandable misstep; Scanlon 
himself appears to forget his own contractualism when faced with matters of inequality. I 
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think that perhaps American culture in the 21st century has reached a point where 
“because equality is important” is something people are often likely to accept as a 
“reason” capable of justifying a wide variety of activities. I do not think it is actually a 
good reason for much, if anything, but others seem to, possibly because it is presented 
that way in popular media, institutions of learning, and so forth. It is one third of the 
liberal slogan, after all. It is, to borrow Frederic Maitland’s observation on trusts, so 
familiar to us all that we never wonder at it. And yet surely we ought to wonder—
especially when equality comes into conflict with the values of parenting, values that in 
many instances appear biologically ingrained in us as a species. Perhaps one way forward 
is to recognize that equality, like parenting, is its own moral domain? I doubt there is 
much need for such a moral domain, but then—I am not an egalitarian. Should others see 
fit to take up the project, I am open to the possibility that there is a moral domain called 
“equality” and that when its demands come into conflict with the moral domain of 
parenting, the priority of what we owe to each other might serve to mediate between 
them. But it is clear to me that equality itself is not something we owe to each other, nor 
something we should in general allow to interfere with activities that realize the values of 
parenting. 
5. CONCLUSION 
 The idea that parents in Western societies are allowed to do “too much” for their 
children is, at heart, an assertion that parents are permitted to violate the rights of others 
in the process of raising their children. To the extent that parents do violate the rights of 
others in the process of raising their children, they are not engaged in reasonable 
parenting. But what, precisely, is it that parents are being allowed to do “too much?”  
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Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, whose work has garnered substantial public 
attention, suggest that private schooling and large inheritances may constitute “too 
much”—and hint that even reading children bedtime stories is something that should 
bring to mind concerns of unfairness. On their view, “familial relationship goods,” like 
feelings of intimacy or opportunities for spontaneity, justify many parental practices, but 
only to the extent that those practices are inseparable from relevant feelings of love and 
belonging. Bequeathing “large” inheritances (on their view, even something as modest as 
a house appears to qualify as likely too large) and enrolling children in private schooling, 
they claim, do not qualify, because such practices are primarily about conferring 
positional advantages on children rather than generating valuable familial sentiments. 
Brighouse & Swift do not explicitly conduct a balancing of the relevant interests, 
however, and it seems to me that principles forbidding such practices are substantially 
more objectionable than principles permitting them. This is in part because the most 
compelling objections to such principles are that they lead, not to inequality, but to some 
sort of insufficiency—and neither private schooling nor large bequests appear to cause or 
even especially contribute to objectionable insufficiencies. 
On that last point there is, of course, empirical disagreement. Even Scanlon claims—
wrongly, I think, and certainly without providing justification—that the political 
influence of the wealthy “blocks the provision of sufficiently good public education for 
all.”76 I entertain no illusions concerning my ability to actually change anyone’s mind on 
that score. Nevertheless I expect there is some value in polemic evaluation of publicly 
notable philosophical argument. What I hope I have adequately defended here is the 
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position that, on balance, parents have a prima facie right to enrollment of their children 
in private schools, that testamentary transfer is permissible and likely also a right, and 
that anyone who wishes to interfere with parents effectively doing these things needs to 
assemble evidence that principles permitting such activities can be reasonably rejected. 
But this addresses only half the argument Brighouse & Swift make against parental 
discretion and authority; the matter of autonomy will be taken up in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5 
PARENTING AND RETROSPECTIVE AUTONOMY 
 
“Individual autonomy,” writes Matthew Clayton, “is the ideal of each individual 
being the author of her own life.”1 Elsewhere, T.M. Scanlon observes that individuals 
generally have good reason to want what happens to them to be affected 
by the choices they make under appropriate conditions. One reason is that 
their choices under good conditions (for example, when they are well-
informed about the alternatives and able to think clearly about them) are 
likely to reflect their values and preferences, so the outcomes they choose 
under those conditions will be more likely to be ones that they will like 
and approve of. A second reason is that outcomes that result from their 
choices have a different meaning than outcomes determined in some other 
way. . . . So one thing that individuals have strong reason to want is to 
have what happens to them depend on how they react when given the 
choice under sufficiently good conditions for making such choices.2 
 
Conceptions of autonomy play a variety of roles outside moral and political philosophy—
in neuropsychology, for example, or debates about determinism or personal identity. 
Such discussions are not irrelevant to the present inquiry, but for the most part must be 
set aside, not because they are not interesting or important but because I have absolutely 
no hope of resolving them to anyone’s satisfaction here. Those who think autonomy is an 
illusion or a false ideal will not be in much position to dispute the primary claim of this 
chapter, which is that parents have the right to shape their children’s values in ways that 
philosophers of childhood like Clayton, Harry Brighouse, and Adam Swift think 
impermissible on autonomy grounds. On the other hand, any particular account of 
autonomy that can be framed in terms of reasons to want what happens to us to be 
                                                 
1 Matthew Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing, 14. 
2 T.M. Scanlon, Why Does Inequality Matter?, 61–62. 
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affected by the choices we make, under “sufficiently good” conditions, should be broadly 
compatible with my claims. 
 In Chapter 4, I argued that principles permitting parents to (among other things) 
enroll their children in private schooling cannot be reasonably rejected on grounds that 
they foment inequality, because people don’t have sufficiently weighty interests in 
equality. I allowed that an objectionable insufficiency could be grounds to reject such 
principles, but observed that, empirically, it is unlikely that e.g. private schooling could 
reasonably be said to cause any particular insufficiency. Scanlon observes that identifying 
morally relevant considerations for acting as we do (or should) is a “continuing process,”3 
so none of the foregoing precludes the possibility that some other interest might be 
sufficiently weighty to give rise to reasonable rejection of relevant principles. Brighouse, 
Swift, and Clayton identify autonomy as such an interest. My task—if I am to 
successfully refute arguments that parents have no right to deliberately shape their 
children’s values (e.g. by enrolling them in private religious schools or teaching them that 
all religion is superstition)—is to show that a principle generally forbidding parents from 
deliberately shaping their children’s values can be reasonably rejected. I will not 
accomplish this by denying that people have any particular interest in autonomy, as I did 
with equality, since I agree that autonomy is an important interest. So I have to show 
                                                 
3 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 157. Scanlon does not especially develop this 
point, but because contractualist analysis is sensitive to various facts about people and the 
world, it is never really done. It is almost always at least possible that some relevant 
interest or empirical fact has been overlooked, so no question is ever really closed. This 
is, I think, a powerful and important feature of contractualism—the observation that 
wanting to be able to justify our actions to others is not a strictly a matter of theory but 
often a practical, ongoing process as we routinely engage in social negotiations with 
others around us. 
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either that there is some yet-weightier interest to account for, or that deliberate values-
shaping from parents does not, in fact, undermine autonomy. 
 Such an undertaking is complicated in part by the different kinds of autonomy 
arguments that arise from the question of how children should be raised. One concerns 
the process of becoming autonomous. A major hurdle for any argument dealing with 
autonomy as it relates to children is that children do not appear to start life with much in 
the way of autonomy. Two commonly-asserted prerequisites for plausibly autonomous 
choice are (sufficient) rationality and information, neither of which infants seem to 
possess in any amount. By the time children can be said to have some capacity for 
making rational, informed decisions, the way that they have been raised will have already 
had a substantial impact on whatever psychological framework they have for choice. 
Children, even infants who are unaware of the fact, seem to have a present interest in 
becoming the kind of person who is the author of his or her own life, and acts that 
interfere with this present interest—acts that undermine the development of a capacity for 
autonomous choice—I will refer to as violating children’s diachronic interests in 
autonomy, that is, their interest in developing and one day possessing the capacity to be 
the author of their own life, insofar as such a thing can properly be said to be possible. 
Physical abuse leading to permanent brain damage sufficient to seriously impair a child’s 
intellectual development would be a paradigmatic violation of diachronic autonomy, but 
there are presumably a variety of ways to interfere with a child’s development of the 
capacity for autonomy. 
A second way in which autonomy relates to the question of how children should 
be raised is in the nascent autonomy of minors who are sufficiently developed to have 
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reason to want what happens to them to be affected by the choices they make, but whose 
actual choices remain immature in ways that give parents and others good reason to 
interfere anyway. Parental acts that immediately prevent a child from being the author of 
his or her own life interfere with that child’s synchronic interest in autonomy. The 
theorists most explicitly concerned with children’s synchronic autonomy are “children’s 
liberationists” who argue that all “adult rights are to be extended to all children.”4 This 
claim is, first of all, incoherent on the view of rights I hold, because adults and children 
typically have (some) different interests, underpinning (some) different rights. Second, 
much of the liberationist agenda can only be realized with the assistance and direction of 
appropriate (adult) agents or advisers. The assumption that children’s rights must be 
overseen by guardians of one kind or another is common—especially as discussed in 
Chapter 3—but it is particularly problematic for children’s liberationists who put 
themselves in the position of essentially re-inventing parental authority while denying the 
importance of parental authority. Arguing that a child really is the present author of her 
own life because the practical author of her life has fiduciary obligations toward her is an 
extremely convenient fiction, but it is definitely a fiction. Responding that the child will 
be in a good position to approve her agent’s actions later, meanwhile, is not a claim about 
synchronic autonomy. Children’s liberationism is a view with relatively little academic or 
advocacy activity occurring today.5 But while the movement unquestionably raises 
                                                 
4 See David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood, 66. 
5 One of the few plainly liberationist monographs of the last decade, psychotherapist 
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl’s posthumous Childism, includes a bibliographic essay at 299–
335 that evidences a spike in children’s liberationist literature beginning in the 1970s, 
alongside other anti-oppression movements, followed by a decades-long plateau or, 
perhaps, gradual decline. I can only speculate as to why children’s liberationism has 
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interesting questions concerning the lack of seriousness with which adults often treat the 
expressed present preferences of children, concerns about children’s synchronic 
autonomy nevertheless remain uncommon. Most theorists seem to share the intuition that 
infants, at minimum, clearly lack a capacity for and, really, any particular interest in 
synchronic autonomy. 
One reason for separating autonomy arguments into synchronic and diachronic 
varieties is to be clear about the kinds of complaints people might have, or the kinds of 
justifications that might be offered, in connection with the idea of children being the 
authors of their own lives. There is a third kind of argument that seems, at times, to blend 
or perhaps simply confuse synchronic and diachronic autonomy. One version is an 
argument that adults with present objections to their past upbringing have had their 
autonomy violated in some way; another is that the possibility a child’s adult self might 
                                                                                                                                                 
never really caught on, while analogous treatments of race, gender, and sexuality have 
flourished both academically and politically, but I expect a particular phrase plays a 
significant role. Richard Farson’s assertion, in “Birthrights,” 327, that children should be 
afforded “the right to conduct their sexual lives with no more restrictions than adults,” 
has been repeated in some contexts to justify “consensual” sexual relationships between 
children and adults. In particular, the phrase is repeated in a book defending adult-child 
sexual relationships written by a criminologist who would, more than thirty years later, 
himself be convicted of sexually abusing a child. See Chris Pleasance, “Revealed: 
Paedophile Criminologist Paul Wilson Wanted Age of Consent Scrapped and Defended 
Child Abusers Saying They ‘Look After’ Their Victims,” Daily Mail (26 Nov. 2017), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3971690/Paedophile-criminologist-Paul-
Wilson-wanted-age-consent-scrapped-defended-child-abusers-saying-look-victims.html. 
Given that most cultures direct strong legal and social condemnation toward pedophilia, 
its association in the public eye with children’s liberationism seems adequate to explain 
why children’s liberationism is largely dead-letter, whether or not that association 
constitutes a fair read of the movement’s aims. In fact Farson himself makes a sort of 
knowledge-is-power claim that “children will be best protected from sexual abuse” by 
acknowledging their right to “all sexual activities that are legal among consenting 
adults.” But even if he is right about that, it is unclear how much the claim’s truth would 
derive from empirical facts about the way sexual abuse occurs, and how much from just 
an analytic deflation of what counts as “sexual abuse.” 
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develop a complaint about some aspect of their upbringing constitutes a violation of their 
autonomy. Such retrospective autonomy—the idea that adults should in a literal or 
figurative sense be the authors of their own upbringing—is not, I think, a real autonomy 
interest. I label the idea here to aid in identifying a problem with certain influential 
arguments about upbringing, namely, that aspects of upbringing adults retrospectively 
prefer had been otherwise should not be identified as violations of diachronic autonomy. 
The primary implication of my claim is that it is permissible, oftentimes even a right, for 
parents to influence their children’s values in deliberate ways. This is something various 
theorists attempt to deny by appeal to retrospective autonomy, typically by conflating it 
with diachronic autonomy. 
1. MATTHEW CLAYTON ON AUTONOMY 
Take, for instance, Matthew Clayton, who briefly mentions diachronic autonomy 
before making an extended argument about retrospective autonomy instead: 
parents are required to educate their child so that she has the wherewithal 
to lead an autonomous life as an adult. . . . [and] are forbidden from 
imparting particular convictions to their child or enrolling her into 
particular associations or practices. . . . [Specifically,] it is morally 
impermissible for parents to baptize their child or encourage her to believe 
that religion is mere superstition.6 
 
The “wherewithal to lead an autonomous life” I take to be a reference to diachronic 
autonomy, but whether particular convictions are imparted is a separate question from 
whether one possesses a capacity for autonomy. Clayton argues that conviction-imparting 
approaches to upbringing are impermissible on both normative and instrumental grounds. 
Like Scanlon, Clayton thinks morality is largely explained in terms of “justificatory 
                                                 
6 Clayton, “Debate: The Case Against the Comprehensive Enrolment of Children,” 353. 
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burdens,” requiring a discussion of the reasons to which parents can “legitimately appeal 
in justification of their conduct with respect to their children.”7 I will not reproduce 
Clayton’s entire argument here, but the basic outline is that he thinks the parent-child 
relationship, as a “non-voluntary coercive relationship that has profound effects on the 
child’s life prospects and her self-conception,” must be governed by “ideals and 
principles that do not rest on the validity of any particular reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine.”8 This is supposed to follow from an approximately Rawlsian account of 
legitimate paternalism—that, to the extent that they have yet to develop rational 
preference of their own, we should choose for our children as we would choose “for 
ourselves from the standpoint of the original position.”9 In other words, on Clayton’s 
view, the only legitimate justification parents can offer to their children in shaping their 
values are the kinds of justification they could reasonably offer to anyone, regardless of 
their own personal conception of the good. To do otherwise would be to violate 
children’s interest in being the authors of their own lives. 
 Instrumentally, Clayton thinks that “children should be treated in accordance with 
norms that will command their retrospective consent or at least will not retrospectively be 
rejected.”10 This claim is backed by a series of thought experiments intended to 
demonstrate that it is always objectionable for others to decide “one’s characteristics or 
goals without one’s consent or in the absence of confidence of eliciting one’s 
                                                 
7 Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing, 92. 
8 Ibid., 93–95. 
9 Compare John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 249. 
10 Clayton, “Debate: The Case Against the Comprehensive Enrolment of Children,” 355. 
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retrospective consent.”11 Each thought experiment describes an emergency surgery 
during which a doctor elects to perform additional, arguably beneficial procedures in the 
absence of prior consent. In the third, descriptively titled Fertility Fix 2,  
Claire is rendered unconscious by an accident and is undergoing surgery 
on her brain and other parts of her body. The surgeon knows that surgery 
on this particular part of the brain causes patients to form a strong desire to 
bear children. In the course of the operation the surgeon discovers that 
Claire is infertile and fixes that as well.12 
 
Clayton’s intuition is that Fertility Fix 2 might be morally permissible, provided Claire’s 
newfound inclination toward maternity is an unintentional but unavoidable side effect 
genuinely known in advance, because she will retrospectively approve of the procedure. 
In the absence of such knowledge, however, Clayton’s intuition is that the fix is not 
permissible, because “others are not permitted to enroll individuals into comprehensive 
practices without their autonomous consent. . . . [or] to impart comprehensive convictions 
to individuals prior to their possession of the capacity for a conception of the good,” and 
the desire to be a parent is presumed a comprehensive conviction.13 Since children 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 361. 
12 Ibid., 358. 
13 Matthew Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing, 103. It is not clear to me that 
positive attitudes toward bearing and raising children can actually be classified as a 
conception of good rather than something that must figure into any complete account of 
the good. Regardless of whether one would prefer to bear and raise children oneself, the 
perpetuation of one’s community will always depend in part on someone bearing and 
raising children—recall, from Chapter 2, that parenting is valuable. The diversity of 
arguments about hypothetical persons and lives-worth-living is far too expansive to take 
up here, however it does seem to me that the kinds of comprehensive commitments 
Clayton thinks it is permissible to impart to children, viz. “liberal” values, would also 
include childbearing and childrearing among them. Whether Clayton would disagree with 
me about that, or simply did not consider the further ramifications of implying that a 
desire for childbearing and childrearing is only one conception of the good, is also 
unclear. But more will be said in Chapter 6 about the relationship between children, their 
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initially do not have any particular conception of the good, Clayton concludes, it is wrong 
to give them such a conception, or habituate in them related convictions, because they 
might eventually develop other conceptions or convictions that are incompatible with 
their upbringing, preventing their retrospective approval. 
In spite of offering both normative and instrumental arguments for his 
“precondition view” of autonomy, however, Clayton suggests that the prohibitions he has 
in mind restrict 
parental conduct that is motivated by adherence to a particular 
comprehensive view, rather than particular kinds of parental behavior as 
such. There is no independence-based objection to taking one’s child to 
church to allow her to witness the nature of Christian worship if one’s aim 
is to develop her capacity to deliberate and act autonomously rather than 
to participate as a Christian. And . . . parents are also individuals with their 
own comprehensive interests. The duty to respect their child’s 
independence does not necessarily forbid them from pursuing their own 
interests even if a side-effect of that pursuit is that their child develops an 
allegiance to similar projects. It is important to distinguish between 
conduct that involves the assertion of a right to determine one’s child’s 
goals, and activity that, as a by-product, tends to attract one’s child to 
those goals.14 
 
In other words, on Clayton’s view, undertaking activities that impart comprehensive 
convictions to my daughter, prior to her possession of the capacity for an individual 
conception of the good, actually is permissible, provided (1) it was not my intention to 
impart such convictions and (2) doing so does not result in convictions that are “more 
costly to abandon later in life than if she received a different upbringing.”15  
                                                                                                                                                 
communities, and community views to which they do not, or do not yet, subscribe. 
14 Clayton, “Debate: The Case Against the Comprehensive Enrolment of Children,” 362–
363. 
15 Ibid., 363. 
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2. BRIGHOUSE & SWIFT ON AUTONOMY 
 Brighouse & Swift think that Clayton’s position is at least partially in error. 
Specifically, they think that “for most parents to refrain from acting on their own 
judgments about how to live their lives in their dealings with their children” would be 
“too costly” because parents cannot in general “simultaneously shield our children from 
those values and commitments that are central to our identities and share ourselves with 
them in the way that the healthy parent-child relationship demands.”16 To state their 
objection in contractualist terms: Brighouse & Swift think that children have an important 
interest in autonomy, and an important interest in having a certain kind of relationship 
with their parents. While enforcing our own conception of the good on incapacitated 
strangers seems likely to impose substantial costs on them in ways that might also apply 
to our children, not imposing our own conception of the good on our children can, at least 
in some cases, impose even greater costs on our children. These costs, measured by 
Brighouse & Swift in terms of familial relationship goods, are of course not relevant in 
the case of incapacitated strangers. On Brighouse & Swift’s view, Clayton fails to 
account for all the relevant interests children have in receiving a certain kind of 
upbringing. 
 This is not to say that Brighouse & Swift think parents have a general right to 
shape their children’s values—or even to bring them to church. It is their position that 
common approaches to parent-child relationships both foment inequality and diminish 
autonomy. In connection with autonomy, Brighouse & Swift are especially concerned 
with “the need to protect children from excessive parental influence, while respecting the 
                                                 
16 Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, Family Values, 170. 
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interest that both parents and children have in the right kind of parent-child 
relationship.”17 What sort of influence qualifies as excessive? Espousing what Clayton 
calls an “end-state view” of autonomy, Brighouse & Swift identify diachronic autonomy 
as their main concern, asserting that parents have “a duty to do what they can to ensure . . 
. that [children] develop the capacity for autonomy.”18 In other words, Brighouse & Swift 
think that children have an important interest in developing the capacity for autonomy, 
which places limits on what it is permissible for parents to do. 
This appears to satisfy the demands of reasonable parenting, as far as it goes—but 
what exactly is this “capacity for autonomy?” And what goes into its development, or 
interferes with that development? Brighouse & Swift list a few requirements for 
autonomy, as well as some “kinds of belief and preference formation” they find 
“potentially problematic.”19 
Brighouse & Swift’s Positive Dimensions of Autonomy (PDAs)20 
1. Cognitive ability to reflect on and revise beliefs using a capacity for individual 
judgment.  
2. Emotional capacity to reflect on and revise one’s beliefs in a way that is neither 
overconfident nor underconfident. 
3. Sensitivity to when reflection is important and valuable, and when it is 
unimportant or futile. 
 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 149. 
18 Ibid., 150. 
19 Ibid., 164. 
20 Ibid., 165–166. 
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Brighouse & Swift’s Problematic Preference Formations (PPFs)21 
1. Preferences and beliefs formed by deliberate manipulation via the provision of 
false information about the options available or the costs and benefits attached to 
the options. 
2. Preferences adapted to apparently unchangeable circumstances. 
3. Preferences deliberately accommodating unjust background conditions. 
 
It is not obvious what the precise relationship between autonomy and PPFs is supposed to 
be, given Brighouse & Swift’s view that all three PPFs are “somewhat present in each of 
our lives”—and are generally overcome by the positive dimensions of autonomy.22 In 
fact they think “many of our commitments must be formed nonautonomously” and claim 
that “it is not the genesis of one’s beliefs and commitments that tells us whether they are 
autonomous, but their relationship with one’s current judgment.”23 They do specify that 
their objection is to preference formation (and, presumably, anything else) resulting in an 
agent’s “inability to reflect on and revise [personal beliefs and commitments] using their 
capacity for individual judgment.”24 This translates to a claim (contra Clayton) that 
“raising one’s child within one’s religion is morally permissible—as long as that is done 
in a way consistent with the development of her autonomy.”25 But since Brighouse & 
Swift clearly think that PPFs are an ordinary part of every life, it follows that they either 
think no one is autonomous, or think PPFs are consistent with the development of 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 164. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 165 (emphasis added). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 173 (emphasis added). 
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autonomy. If they believe that people are generally autonomous, they must believe that 
PPFs are generally consistent with the development of autonomy.  
I suspect that Brighouse & Swift are trying to claim that PPFs of sufficient 
severity or quantity are objectionable because they interfere with the development of 
PDAs, but their concrete examples lend no clarity. In fact the most severe case of PPF 
they identify is in the story of Emily, a woman who decided to leave a fundamentalist 
faith community even though she felt bad about leaving her family and friends and 
genuinely feared that doing so condemned her to divine retribution in the hereafter. 
Concerning Emily, Brighouse & Swift write, “it is hard to believe that her prospective 
autonomy was adequately protected (even though she ultimately defected and seems 
capable of extremely thoughtful reflection on her decisions).”26 The parenthetical aside 
shows that Emily’s case can’t possibly support the idea that her diachronic autonomy was 
violated. Whatever mistreatment Emily endured—however objectionable it was in itself, 
even perhaps as a violation of her synchronic autonomy—does not appear to have either 
interfered with her development of the capacity for autonomy, or deprived her of any 
particular liberty at the moment of choice. It made her feel quite badly about choosing to 
abandon her community, but “being made to feel quite badly about causing substantial 
pain to one’s family and friends” is not something to which I think a consistent and 
principled objection can reasonably be raised. There are a variety of circumstances in 
which causing substantial pain to one’s family and friends is likely justified, and yet a 
failure to feel badly about doing so would surely reflect a failure to appreciate their value. 
Emily’s decision to follow through on her developed preference to leave her community 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 171. 
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was certainly made emotionally costly by her upbringing, but given that she was 
(apparently) raised with the emotional capacity to bear that cost, however subjectively 
difficult it felt to do so, she can’t really be said to have been denied the capacity for 
exercising her individual judgment, or to have become non-autonomous. Certainly she 
could complain that her decision to leave her community was not made under what 
Scanlon refers to as “appropriate” or “good” conditions,27 but that would be a complaint 
about the present condition of herself and her community, not about her past 
development of some capacity: it would be a synchronic autonomy complaint. 
One difficulty with identifying concrete examples of non-autonomous humans is 
that it requires us to assert that someone else must not be the author of their life. It is one 
thing to say, “Emily, you were raised in ways forbidden by rules no one could reasonably 
reject,” or “Emily, you live in a community that behaves in ways forbidden by rules no 
one could reasonably reject.” It is quite another to say, “Emily, you are not an 
autonomous human being; you lack the capacity.” How are we to actually know that an 
apparent agent is unable to reflect on and revise their preferences? Brighouse & Swift are 
surely correct that practices preventing a child from developing into an autonomous adult 
would violate a rule no one could reasonably reject; the cost to that child’s interests 
would be so high it is hard to imagine any way of justifying such behavior. But the PPFs 
that appear intended to play the role of “things that are objectionable because they 
                                                 
27 This presumably means something like “conditions conducive to recognizing relevant 
reasons and reflecting on their relative weight in a way that allows us to make defensible 
claims about the justifiability of our actions,” though Scanlon does not actually make this 
very clear. He does mention being well-informed and able to think clearly as examples of 
good conditions for choice-making. Presumably we can at least sometimes still act 
autonomously even when conditions are sub-optimal, so long as conditions are 
sufficiently good, but the threshold for this, too, seems difficult to establish. 
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prevent children from becoming autonomous adults,” Brighouse & Swift admit, are in 
fact broadly compatible with the development of autonomy. The example of Emily 
reinforces the point: adult humans appear to develop autonomy, in the sense of 
possessing PDAs, under a wide range of parenting conditions, even including fairly 
serious abuse and privation. Short, perhaps, of causing brain damage or engaging in 
extreme (and rare) practices like physical torture, it is unclear how parents could violate 
children’s diachronic autonomy even if that were their explicit goal. Certainly parents are 
often in a position to render the development and exercise of autonomous choice more 
costly, for example by attempting to instill in children a belief that they should never 
question their beliefs, or that they should not value their own preferences. But first, there 
may be good reasons for parents to instill such beliefs in their children, for instance if 
they live in a world where the likely alternative is for children to become alienated from 
their community through overweening skepticism or obsessive narcissism. In fact some 
people who lead lives of relative self-abnegation are quite adept at articulating their 
reasons for doing so. Second, given the number of children who eventually apostatize 
from their parents’ religion or oppose their parents’ political goals, there seems to be very 
good reason to doubt that anti-questioning or anti-preference beliefs are something that 
can actually or reliably be instilled in children, deliberately or otherwise.  
It might be suggested that the most charitable approach is to interpret Brighouse 
& Swift as claiming something like the following: for the conditions of making choices 
as an adult to be sufficiently good that the choice can be correctly described as 
autonomous, one of the conditions must be that the adult did not, in childhood, suffer 
relevant PPFs in greater number or severity than their acquired PDAs were equal to 
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accommodating. Since the condition for that single instance of non-autonomous choice 
was set many years before the moment of non-autonomy, whoever was responsible for 
inflicting those PPFs (or failing to inculcate the requisite PDAs) is responsible for 
prospectively depriving the chooser of an autonomous choice, or even many autonomous 
choices, but not of the general ability to revise personal beliefs or the capacity for 
individual judgment. Rather, life is a series of choices, various of which might be 
individually autonomous or non-autonomous depending in part on an enormous diversity 
of (among other things) parenting practices that lead to PPFs. Unfortunately this 
interpretation has the drawback of treating much of what Brighouse & Swift claim about 
autonomy as mere rhetorical overstatement, since it would be vanishingly rare to lack 
autonomous choice so entirely that one could be properly said to lack the capacity for 
autonomy. Taking such claims as rhetorical might reflect an acceptable tradeoff if it also 
aided in the clear practical identification of parenting practices likely to cause PPFs, but 
hypothesizing a diversity of PPFs does not seem especially helpful in actually identifying 
what those PPFs are. At most, we could ask individuals, like Emily, whether certain of 
their life choices proved quite difficult, look for the most likely external causes of those 
difficulties, identify them as possible PPF-inducing practices, and strive to moderate our 
own behavior in plausibly responsive ways. But this would face us with an enormous 
empirical question, massively confounded by the degree to which personal psychological 
differences in independence or resilience impact perceived autonomy—as well as 
evolving attitudes about past experiences, which might lead people to view present 
preferences as problematically formed even though, at the moment of formation, no one 
could have reasonably rejected the principle permitting the preference-forming activity.  
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3. RETROSPECTIVE AUTONOMY 
In spite of their criticism of Clayton’s position—a criticism I cheerfully 
endorse!—Brighouse & Swift reach practical conclusions that are almost 
indistinguishable from Clayton’s. Each ultimately denies that parents have any right to 
deliberately shape their children’s values. Their disagreement over the precise contours of 
what it is permissible for parents to do that inadvertently shapes children’s values arises 
in the context of general agreement that parents have no right to deliberately shape 
children’s values (beyond such non-comprehensive shaping as might be required for 
participation in liberal society). Their mutual denial of parental rights is framed in terms 
of diachronic autonomy. That is, the common objection is not that deliberate shaping of 
children’s values violates their synchronic autonomy (for indeed children are often, albeit 
not always, cheerfully complicit in their own indoctrination or “enrollment”), but that 
deliberate shaping of children’s values—somehow—prevents them from developing a 
capacity for autonomy. But neither Clayton nor Brighouse & Swift ever actually show 
this to be true. Instead of giving examples of children whose upbringing prevented them 
from becoming autonomous adults, they raise examples of adults who have objections to 
the way that they were raised. 
The lure of what I am terming retrospective autonomy is easy enough to see. 
Thinking in terms of retrospective autonomy allows theorists to criticize parental 
influence while avoiding complicated questions about the temporal disconnect between 
children’s present and future interests. If we want to know what sorts of parenting 
practices hinder adult autonomy, it seems reasonable to begin by looking for adults who 
exhibit (or claim to exhibit) arguably non-autonomous behavior or some otherwise 
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diminished capacity for autonomy, then ask them how they were raised. Or one might 
consider one’s own experience in terms of costs that appear to have been imposed by 
one’s upbringing. Neither of these approaches even requires a robust account of what 
autonomy is, much less any quantifiable facts about what it means for autonomy to be 
“diminished.” All that is required is to find narratives concerning choices that felt hard, or 
painful, or costly, and sketch some plausible-looking causal arrows between the child-
that-was and the adult-now-complaining. “This choice was difficult (or impossible) for 
me to make, because my parent taught me thus-and-such” does look like a claim about 
autonomy as it relates to upbringing. But it is clearly not being made by Brighouse, Swift, 
or Clayton as a synchronic autonomy claim, assuming one’s parents are no longer 
actively intervening in one’s adult life. So theorists talk about pre-emptive or prospective 
autonomy violations and argue that, because children have an important diachronic 
autonomy interest, it is impermissible for parents to (at least, deliberately) influence 
children’s values in ways that might lead to hard, painful, or costly choices in the future.  
But the word “autonomy” has become a moving target. Brighouse & Swift define 
autonomy as a combination of cognitive ability, emotional capacity, and practical 
judgment, but describe its absence in terms of being faced (in adulthood) with 
emotionally costly choices, regardless of one’s actual ability or capacity to endure such 
costs. Clayton defines autonomy as a matter of self-determination, but describes its 
absence in terms of retrospective consent. What is peculiar about these accounts is that 
their theoretical concerns are clearly expressed in terms of diachronic autonomy, but the 
examples and thought-experiments on offer are limited to clearly autonomous adults 
raising retrospective objections to their upbringing.  
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That is: Brighouse, Swift, and Clayton think children have an important present 
interest in becoming autonomous adults. I agree! They also think that deliberately 
shaping children’s values interferes with their becoming autonomous adults, if not 
entirely, then by making certain choices more painful or costly. But there are many 
choices that should be painful or costly, even when they are justifiable, and the difference 
between permissible and impermissible parenting activity here seems in most cases to 
hinge on whether that activity is objectionable on other grounds than autonomy. 
Assuming it is possible to torture someone in such a way that they actually lose the 
ability to make certain choices autonomously, that would be good reason to reject a 
principle permitting torture. It’s just that torturing people is impermissible quite apart 
from any autonomy concerns it raises—and the kinds of arguments commonly raised 
concerning autonomy seem to follow that pattern. To support the claim that deliberate 
values-shaping, absent activity that is objectionable on other grounds, undermines the 
development of autonomy, Brighouse, Swift, and Clayton all rely on retrospective 
complaints about the extent to which certain choices felt more difficult or costly as the 
result of a given upbringing. But these are not arguments about diachronic autonomy at 
all. They are not about developing a capacity for autonomy. They are objections to 
something else. 
Consider a series of hypotheticals concerning rights to physical property. Suppose 
I own a piece of real property, and I cut down all the trees growing there. If I later gift 
you this property, but you don’t like the lack of trees, you can hardly be said to have a 
complaint against me. Next imagine the case where I hold the land in trust for your 
benefit. In this version, I think the trees should all be cut down; as established in Chapter 
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3, whether or not it is permissible for me to cut them down will depend on the terms of 
the trust, not on whether there is some chance that you will later wish I hadn’t done so. 
Finally consider the strongest case, wherein you own a piece of property in fee, and I cut 
down all your trees. Whether my doing so was permissible will depend on the 
justifications that I am able to give you. Generally it would not be permissible for me to 
cut down trees belonging to you, but there might be a variety of plausible explanations 
for doing so—perhaps there was a forest fire and your trees were cut down as an 
emergency measure. Regardless, if your present interests were given insufficient weight, 
or if I cannot otherwise reasonably justify my actions to you, then I have wronged you; 
you have a complaint against me. But if, fifteen years from now, you develop a sudden 
and novel desire to construct a house, and then realize that doing so is going to be harder 
than you’d like because fifteen years ago some mad philosopher cut down all your trees, 
it would make no sense to say that I had prospectively wronged you. It would be 
unreasonable to come to me and demand that I justify my choice to make it harder for 
you to build a house. Your complaint against me, if you have one, arises when I violate 
your rights, not when events unfold such that my past actions turn out to have created 
present difficulties. In none of these hypotheticals is there a point at which I can actually 
be said to have prospectively violated your rights; either I did or I did not violate your 
rights when I acted, so the way you might later feel about (say) proximately-imposed 
costs can only be considered retrospectively. 
Concerns about upbringing and the development of autonomy follow the same 
pattern. A parent who in fact violates a child’s present interest in becoming an 
autonomous adult—their present diachronic autonomy interests—violates the first prong 
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of reasonable caregiving by engaging in behavior disallowed by a set of principles for the 
general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement. But to actually interfere with a child’s development into an 
autonomous adult appears substantially more difficult than it is sometimes made out to 
be. This is particularly evidenced by the way theorists writing about diachronic autonomy 
appear almost always to resort to retrospective autonomy when furnishing concrete 
examples. A parent who behaves in ways that no one could reasonably reject now cannot 
possibly be violating anyone’s rights, even if events unfold such that their children have 
reason to regret their upbringing at some later date. A sincere claim that “I did not know, 
and had no reason to suspect” is one we ordinarily accept as legitimate reason to not view 
others as morally blameworthy. Restated in Scanlon’s terms, Brighouse, Swift, and 
Clayton are claiming that we can reasonably reject a principle for the general regulation 
of behavior that permits shaping the values of children in ways that they might later come 
to reject (with the apparent exception of non-comprehensive liberal values). To this 
Brighouse & Swift add that children’s interest in certain familial goods at least 
sometimes outweighs their interest in diachronic as well as retrospective autonomy, but 
when it comes to practical concerns this does not appear to distinguish their position from 
Clayton’s. None of these theorists successfully makes the case for rejecting principles 
permitting the deliberate shaping of children’s values, because the reason they think such 
rules can be rejected is that deliberate shaping of children’s values violates children’s 
interests in diachronic autonomy—it prevents children from developing into autonomous 
adults. But retrospective complaints are not actually evidence that one’s diachronic 
autonomy interests have been violated. 
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4. AUTONOMY AND ENCULTURATION 
  Is there reason to reject the alternative principle—one forbidding the deliberate 
shaping of children’s values in “comprehensive” ways? In fact we all have a variety of 
reasons to want the values and preferences we actually have to reflect, not only our own 
judgment, but also the judgment of others. We have reason to adopt the judgment of 
experts on matters in which we are not expert. We have reason to prefer political systems 
and personal lifestyle choices that history has shown likely to yield desirable outcomes 
for individuals and societies. We have reason to value things that are valued by people in 
our families and communities. And perhaps most importantly, the way that we value our 
own children gives us a variety of interests, as parents, in their upbringing. What interests 
do parents have in taking their children to church, or enrolling them in parochial schools, 
or teaching them that religions are all superstitions, or other activities intended to shape 
children’s values? One, I think, is simply an interest in living according to the tenets of 
one’s religion; people who believe that God requires them to raise their children in a 
particular way certainly have an interest in doing so. But another interest people have in 
passing their values to their own children is grounded in the fact that we live in a world 
where parents who do not give their own children some conception of the good are likely 
to find that someone else is willing and anxious to do so, with rather less regard for that 
child’s own interests than a parent will tend to show. 
 That is—suppose Clayton, Brighouse, and Swift are correct, and sending children 
to parochial school or teaching them that all religion is superstition is likely to result in 
their adoption of a particular conception of the good, one they may eventually come to 
regret having acquired. This is posited as a reason to reject principles allowing parents to 
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deliberately shape children’s values by engaging in values-shaping activities. If such 
activities really do shape values in this way, surely public education does, also—or, for 
that matter, video games and television programming. In fact the number of people in the 
world quite anxious to deliberately shape children’s views on every conceivable matter—
peers, churches, schoolteachers, political parties, interest and identity groups, drug 
dealers, corporations, clubs, the list seems endless—makes it very unlikely that any 
particular child could possibly reach adulthood without having their values deliberately 
shaped by someone. Brighouse & Swift think that such influences might even result in 
children becoming non-autonomous: 
A public culture that emphasizes instant gratification, and in which large 
sums are spent promoting materialism and shaping teens’ and young 
adults’ perspectives on sex, places considerable demands on parents. 
Given the difficulty of the task, parents should try to ensure that their 
children become autonomous. This formulation implies that the pursuit of 
the child’s prospective autonomy must be quite self-conscious, but allows 
that a parent may fulfill her duty even though, owing to factors outside her 
control, her child does not in fact become autonomous.28 
 
I have already argued that this is not quite right, insofar as the general capacity for 
autonomy does not appear to be so easily destroyed, even if some particular choices end 
up being made in arguably non-autonomous ways. But Brighouse & Swift do identify a 
serious concern, namely, that one way to value our children is to see ourselves as having 
reason to counter bad influences on their developing values. Their answer appears to be 
that parents should emphasize the development of PDAs, but what exactly is the process 
for teaching children how to reflect on and revise their beliefs, if one is forbidden from 
beginning by deliberately sharing the beliefs that one has with one’s children? Recall that 
                                                 
28 Brighouse & Swift, Family Values, 168. 
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Joel Feinberg’s response is to acquaint children “with a great variety of facts and 
diversified accounts and evaluations of the myriad human arrangements in the world and 
in history.”29 Clayton, Brighouse, and Swift all seem to basically agree, insofar as they 
are prepared to allow children to inadvertently acquire values from the example of their 
parents—and, apparently, anyone else who happens by. 
 But to approach parenting in this way would violate requirement 2.a of reasonable 
parenting. Recall from Chapter 2 that parents are obliged, by the domain of parenting and 
what we owe to each other, to furnish their children with a community-appropriate moral 
education—most importantly, a grasp of the justifications for action that they and others 
in their community are likely to accept or reject. If I have engaged in any reflection at all 
concerning my values, I am in a better position than my children to identify what sorts of 
things they ought to value, and I owe it to them to impart such wisdom as I’m able: to act 
on my children’s moral education, not to react to the moral education they happen to pick 
up along the way. Subjecting them to the process of enculturation—giving them a 
meaningful “insider” understanding of community and cultural values—is an important 
and effective approach to protecting them from having their values shaped for 
exploitation by others. It is something I have an important interest in doing, and 
something my children have an important interest in having me do.  
 Central to the process of enculturation is the moral education of coming to 
understand the “reasons that other people accept.”30 Scanlon identifies three good reasons 
for acquiring such a moral education: 
                                                 
29 Joel Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future,” 139. 
30 See Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other 74. 
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1. Because others might be correct and we might learn something from them. 
2. Because others may represent an emerging consensus that will affect us. 
3. Because the continuation of the common life of our community may be 
threatened. 
 
All of these reasons are closely tied with the idea of coexistence, since both our 
willingness and ability to coexist with one another will depend in part on having some 
substantial overlap in the reasons we accept. They also track the interest we have in 
cultural reproduction—a phrase that tends to imply the enculturation of others, but most 
especially the fruits of our own biological reproduction. Anyway the continuation of the 
common life of our community is something that parents should not be prevented from 
taking reasonable steps to achieve. So long as the cost to others of allowing people to 
enculturate their children is acceptable, parents have a right to do so. The various 
objections of Brighouse, Swift, and Clayton are claims that the cost to children of 
allowing parents to deliberately shape their children’s values is unacceptable: it deprives 
children of autonomy. But they fail to ever show that this is actually true. In fact I think, 
for the many reasons discussed in this chapter, it is clearly false. Because parents have 
reason to reject a principle forbidding the deliberate shaping of their children’s values, 
and because doing so does not actually prevent children from developing a capacity for 
autonomy, parents can generally be said to have a prima facie right to deliberately shape 
their children’s values. This does not mean parents have a general right to deliberately 
shape children’s values by any means they happen to prefer; the permissibility of any 
particular values-shaping activity will always depend on its compatibility with relevant 
rules no one could reasonably reject. Rather, because deliberately shaping children’s 
values does not by that fact alone violate anyone’s present interest in developing into an 
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autonomous adult, the fact that an activity is deliberately values-shaping is insufficient to 
show that the activity is impermissible. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In its most basic formulation, the central claim of reasonable parenting is that 
parents should behave in accordance with rules no one could reasonably reject. If they do, 
they have a prima facie right, in the parlance of Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, 
against interference in raising their children in accordance with their personal values. Of 
course, while it should be sufficiently clear by now as to require no further repetition of 
the point, it doesn’t hurt to mention that, on the account of rights I find most persuasive, 
various facts about people and the world we live in might intervene in the analysis in 
ways that alter the conclusion. I have done my best to show how the facts Brighouse, 
Swift, and Clayton raise in support of their positions are inadequate to show what they 
are intended to show, but it must be allowed that other facts of which I am presently 
unaware could save their arguments in various unforeseeable ways. 
With that caveat always in mind, it seems clear enough that parents have an 
important interest in the enculturation of their children—in giving children a meaningful 
understanding of community and cultural values by communicating their accumulated 
wisdom. Children have an important interest in learning such things from their parents. In 
Chapter 2, I observed that reasonable caregivers are obliged to furnish their children with 
a moral education, because a principle allowing parents to neglect such education could 
be reasonably rejected both by other parents and by affected children. Theorists like 
Brighouse, Swift, and Clayton argue for a variety of limitations on the moral education of 
children, grounded in the idea that giving children comprehensive commitments or 
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deliberately shaping their values prevents them, somehow, from becoming autonomous 
adults. But their normative arguments fail to adequately account for all the interests at 
stake, while their instrumental arguments confuse diachronic autonomy violations—in 
which parents interfere in the development of children’s autonomy—with retrospective 
“autonomy” violations. These retrospective autonomy complaints arise when adults who 
appear to be as autonomous as anyone else nevertheless couch complaints about the way 
they were raised in terms of autonomy. But complaints about one’s upbringing developed 
in adulthood are not the kinds of complaints that matter from a contractualist perspective, 
which prioritizes the ability to justify our actions to others. Parents can only act, in the 
moment, on reasons that are accessible to them in the moment, and parents have great 
reason to deliberately shape their children’s values, including their children’s conception 
of the good. Not only is it in the interest of cultural reproduction, but also in the interest 
of protecting children from having their values shaped, overtly or surreptitiously, by 
people who do not properly value them. 
I anticipate that the strongest objections to my position are most likely to arrive in 
the form of thought-experiments about bad parents. What about children raised in less 
respectable religions, or genuine cults? What about children who are raised to be racist, 
or violent, or otherwise objectionably anti-social? In short, what about parents who do not 
properly value their own children—as evidenced by the ways they violate their children’s 
rights, including (but by no means limited to) their failure to provide those children with 
an appropriate moral education? Surely there is a limit to what parents are permitted to 
do? Of course there is. One of the most important features of Scanlon’s contractualism 
and view of rights generally is precisely that it can identify such limits without resort to 
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dubious claims about retrospective autonomy or raising children without deliberately 
shaping their values. By considering the interests various parties have, and weighing 
those interests against various alternatives, I expect we can identify many ways in which 
it is permissible for people to interfere with—and contribute to—the upbringing of 
children not their own. The role of community in upbringing is the subject of the final 
chapter of this project.
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CHAPTER 6 
PARENTING, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE “COMMON LIFE” 
 
When, and to what extent, are non-parents justified in interfering with existing 
parent-child relationships? The paradigmatic example of such interference, and the one 
on which I will focus in this chapter, is the adoption of laws that interfere, in various 
ways, with upbringing. Extant philosophical discussions of upbringing tend to approach 
parenting with suspicion, framing inquiry with questions of approximately the form, 
“what makes parenting in general legitimate?”1 But answers to that question don’t 
constitute a complete account of relevant permissibility without additional consideration 
of a question like, “what makes interference with parenting legitimate?” In Chapter 2 I 
discussed how the biological fact of parent-child relationships, in light of what we owe to 
each other as outlined in Chapter 1, grounds various responsibilities and attendant 
parental interests in fulfilling those responsibilities, interference with which can 
constitute a violation of parental rights. Among those, as further examined in Chapter 5, 
is the right and responsibility to enculturate one’s children, that is, to provide them with a 
moral education suitable to participation in the life of their community. But not all 
parents live up to their responsibilities, and in addition to being valued by their parents, 
children are valuable as present and future participants in what T.M. Scanlon calls our 
“common life.” Because non-parents can benefit in various ways when their community 
has children enculturated into it, non-parents can be said to have some interest in the 
upbringing of other people’s children. What philosophers asking after the “legitimacy” of 
                                                 
1 See for example Anca Gheaus, “The Right to Parent One’s Biological Baby,” 432. 
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parenting really want to know, I suspect, is the conditions under which the various 
interests non-parents have in the character and continuation of their community are 
weightier than the interests parents have in directing their children’s upbringing—that is, 
when non-parents are justified in interfering in relationships established by the 
acquisition or assumption of parental responsibilities. I do think some principles 
forbidding community interference with parent-child relationships can be reasonably 
rejected—albeit not in the ways that various contemporary scholars tend to claim. Some 
such claims have already been examined, in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, but the fact that 
Harry Brighouse, Adam Swift, and Matthew Clayton are mistaken in their particular 
assertions does not mean there aren’t other ways for communities to permissibly 
intervene in parent-child relationships.  
I offer in this chapter a discussion of such issues that is, inevitably, incomplete—
there always seems to be more relevant information available for consideration than it is 
possible to actually consider. Nevertheless something should be said about the ways that 
communities value children, and how to compare the losses posed by various principles 
for the regulation of community behavior in connection with children. Some of these 
losses will be explored in particular via discussion of a recent effort by Danish 
policymakers to enculturate the children of Muslim migrants into the common life of 
Denmark. Along the way I will make frequent reference to the idea of community 
interests or values, but this is not intended as a personification of communities or an 
aggregation of individual interests. All I mean by community interests or values is the 
interests or values that individual members of a given community share, or at least 
substantially share, in common. 
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1. THE VALUE OF CHILDREN TO COMMUNITIES 
In distinguishing between the valued and the valuable, Scanlon suggests that it is 
“natural to say, and would be odd to deny, that I value my children; but it would be odd 
for me to put this by saying that they are valuable (except in the sense that everyone is).”2 
What he means by this, as discussed in Chapter 2, is that there are non-generalizable 
reasons to value our children. While this is certainly true, in making this point Scanlon 
overlooks something significant about children, namely, that they are valuable, not in the 
sense that everyone is, but in a generalizable way. This is why, in my treatment of the 
valued and valuable, I suggested that others in general have no reason to value my 
children any differently than they would value any other stranger’s children. Recall that, 
for Scanlon, to  
value something is to take oneself to have reasons for holding certain 
positive attitudes toward it and for acting in certain ways in regard to it. 
Exactly what these reasons are, and what actions and attitudes they 
support, will be different in different cases. They generally include, as a 
common core, reasons for admiring the thing and for respecting it, 
although “respecting” can involve quite different things in different cases. 
Often, valuing something involves seeing reasons to preserve and protect 
it . . . .3 
 
By contrast, to “claim that something is valuable (or that it is “of value”) is to claim that 
others also have reason to value it, as you do.”4 The domain of parenting is concerned 
with the moral rights and obligations of parents in connection with the ways in which 
they value their own children—that is, the reasons particular parents see themselves as 
                                                 
2 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 95. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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having for their attitudes and actions toward their children. But we also value children in 
a more general way that is neither the way in which parents value their own children nor 
the way in which we value everyone. We all have reason to value children as the 
unrefined material (so to speak) of communal perpetuation and construction. Valuing life 
in our communities often means, in part, valuing children: taking ourselves to have 
reason to protect children and enculturate them into our communities. 
Not everyone thinks we have such reasons, or at least that it is obvious that we 
have such reasons. This may be in part because some communities are not especially 
meant to persist beyond the lifespan of any current members; for example, a particular 
group of friends may constitute a community of certain shared values that has little or no 
reason to induct new members over time. The apparent non-obviousness of the value of 
children to communities may also result from the fact that the reasons we have to 
enculturate children into communities that are meant to persist typically grow weightier 
as the communities we care about, and to which we belong, grow smaller. As Scanlon 
observes, 
We all enjoy relations with others that are based at least partly on our 
appreciation of the same values, and when we come to differ in the 
interpretation of these values, or in the importance to be placed on them, 
these relations are threatened. I can no longer participate wholeheartedly 
in our activities if I no longer see them as important, or if I think that the 
rest of you are completely misguided in your ideas about how they should 
be pursued.5 
 
One practical implication of this and related passages is that when we belong to populous 
communities, we have relatively little reason to be concerned about the loss of this kind 
of relationship. This is because the loss of one community member out of a great many is 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 76. 
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unlikely to prevent continued participation in “our” activities, unless they happen to be 
someone who plays a special role for either the community or for us individually. But 
even at the level of being a citizen of a vast and populous nation, we still tend to act in 
ways that evidence our taking ourselves to have reason to protect the children of our 
community and enculturate them with relevant values, inducting them into the 
community. Perhaps the most obvious present evidence of this value is the public funding 
of children’s primary education that occurs in all but a handful of countries worldwide, 
and the billions of dollars’ worth of additional philanthropic aid devoted to such efforts 
every year. While much is made of the importance of having literate and numerate 
populations, it remains that substantially less (albeit admittedly not zero) effort and 
attention is devoted to addressing the illiteracy and innumeracy of hundreds of millions 
of adults around the world. Aspire as we may toward a world of universal literacy and 
numeracy, it is not primary education but the primary education of children to which the 
overwhelming majority of educational resources are directed.  
There are a variety of facially plausible practical explanations for this trend. For 
example, the “return” on educating children is likely much higher than on educating 
adults; teaching a 5-year-old how to read cascades into further opportunities that a newly-
literate 65-year-old is unlikely to be afforded (or, for that matter, interested in pursuing). 
Or the cost of educating children to a certain standard, both in terms of capital and in 
terms of effort, may also be much lower than it is for adults.6 And some illiterate or 
                                                 
6 At least with regard to language and literacy, it is commonly believed that children 
naturally learn more quickly than adults, possibly by virtue of a period of biological 
sensitivity. Recent inquiry suggests that children might actually learn faster simply by 
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innumerate adults presumably prefer to not be more educated than they are, in ways that 
cannot be addressed without objectionably paternalistic intervention. But such 
explanations are substantially post hoc, insofar as they are not the kinds of reasons people 
generally give for creating systems of publicly-funded primary education for children 
(specifically) in the first place. Rather, the public funding of childhood education has 
historically been justified first and foremost by the claim that education creates better 
citizens.7 Whether primary education as presently constituted actually accomplishes this, 
and whether it does so with anything approaching reasonable efficiency, are interesting 
(and open) questions. But the implementation of policy shielding children, and children 
alone, from any productive labor beyond government-subsidized intellectual self-
improvement is clearly to treat children as valuable in a way that not everyone is treated 
as valuable.8 
Perhaps it will be suggested that in fact everyone is valuable in this way. Maybe it 
is only (say) scarcity of resources that prevents us from allowing just anyone to dedicate 
                                                                                                                                                 
virtue of having more free time and motivation. See Nienke Meulman et al. “Age Effects 
in L2 Grammar Processing as Revealed by ERPs and How (Not) to Study Them.” 
7 As Thomas Jefferson influentially observed, “Every government degenerates when 
trusted to the rulers of the people alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe 
depositories. And to render even them safe their minds must be improved to a certain 
degree.” Notes on the State of Virginia, 206. 
8 Someone might think we should publicly finance primary education not because we 
care about the future of our community, but simply because it is good for children’s 
welfare that they be educated. But again: this is a reason that can be generalized to 
everyone, and so it fails to explain why we particularly value children in this way—
unless someone wants to assert that it is good for children to be educated, but not for 
adults to be educated, which would be a sufficiently puzzling perspective that I am 
unsure of the appropriate response. 
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their lives to personal academic improvement at public expense.9 Allowing everyone to 
spend their childhood thusly engaged might just happen to be one way to distribute such 
opportunities as society is able to afford. While I am unaware of anyone actually making 
such an argument, it is true that in recent years the United States has seen increased 
political interest in the implementation of tuition-free (i.e. 100 percent taxpayer-funded) 
higher education for, apparently, everyone. This might well be the consequence of people 
coming to see the value of educating children as merely derivative of the more general 
value of educating everyone. But even if this is so, it still would not explain why children 
are so often styled as having a right to free, compulsory primary education,10 for which 
there appears to be no analogous political interest touching on higher education, nor why 
the right to education so often manifests as a legal right with an age limit.11 Likewise 
assertions that children must be educated to satisfy some equality or autonomy interest 
would presumably apply just as well to illiterate or innumerate adults. In those rare cases 
                                                 
9 In the United States, at least, it is of course true that everyone is permitted to dedicate 
their lives to such personal academic improvement as their own time and resources 
permit, but that is why it is important to not elide the clause, “at public expense.” There 
are a handful of adult lifestyles that approximate the public education paradigm, but even 
these are qualified in ways that rarely, if ever, apply to children. Research professors at 
public universities (or publicly-funded private universities) are, tenure notwithstanding, 
not typically entirely free from the demand that they make some contribution to their 
field. An adult who lives on government welfare and makes extensive use of public 
libraries might also fit the description of someone who has dedicated their life to personal 
academic improvement at public expense, but as far as I know, we do not allow just 
anyone to live indefinitely on government welfare, either. 
10 See for example the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 Nov. 1989, 28 ILM 
1448, art. 28. 
11 For example, article 11, section 6 of the Arizona Constitution reads in part, “The 
legislature shall provide for a system of common schools . . . which . . . shall be open to 
all pupils between the ages of six and twenty-one years.” 
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where the law does mandate adult education—language education for citizenship, for 
example, or continuing education for professional licensure—it is usually at their own 
expense and/or to secure privileges that not everyone has reason to secure. The 
compulsory education of such adults is not something for which anyone appears to be 
seriously advocating.12 
I don’t wish to belabor what will seem, to many, an obvious point, but I do want 
to cut off any objection that maybe we don’t value children-not-our-own in ways that 
others also have reason to value them, or in ways that we don’t also value adults. I want 
to make it as clear as I can that Scanlon’s failure to recognize children as uniquely 
valuable represents a substantial omission. Very probably, it was an inadvertent 
omission, since children do not appear to be valuable in connection with communities 
that aren’t intended to persist beyond the deaths of constituent members, and there 
doesn’t appear to be any reason to think that Scanlon would reject this corrective on the 
claims he makes in What We Owe to Each Other. Nevertheless, it is an important 
corrective, given that what Scanlon explicitly claims concerning the value of children is 
clearly mistaken. Historically, humans have attended to the education and enculturation 
of children with great interest. Ancient cultures viewed it straightforwardly: raising 
children well is what must be done if we are to have worthwhile adults in our community. 
                                                 
12 The closest case I am able to find is a recent proposal to introduce compulsory adult 
education in certain Nordic nations, some of which already offer subsidized (not free) 
courses in primary- and secondary-education subjects. See Anne Quito, “Nordic 
Politicians Are Debating Making School Mandatory for Senior Citizens,” Quartz (10 Jul. 
2016), https://qz.com/724166/nordic-politicians-are-debating-making-school-mandatory-
for-old-people/. The proposal does not appear to have led anywhere, however, and in any 
event focused on the economic interest in updating job skills, not on the “citizen-
building” arguments so commonly made in favor of compulsory childhood education. 
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“Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from 
it”13 is literally Proverbial, words attributed to Solomon the Wise. There is also Aristotle: 
“It makes no small difference . . . whether we form habits of one kind or of another from 
our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.”14 Even the 
ancient Roman word for “children” identified their value as future participants in the 
community life: 
The most common [Roman word for children], liberi, is associated with 
the concept of libertas, “freedom,” not in our western liberal sense of 
being independent of others, but in the sense of being a member of the 
(free) community . . . . The liberi were on the one hand those junior 
members of a household who were free, as opposed to the slaves, servi; 
and on the other hand a collective group of free-born Roman boys and 
girls, contrasted with adults of citizen status. They were the future citizen 
community.15  
 
Some recent empirical inquiry downplays the influence of upbringing to focus on genetic 
or alternative sociological factors, but it remains the case that, for example, a majority of 
children adopt the religion of their parents,16 and frequently their parents’ politics as well. 
In other words, one reason we have to attend to the raising of children is that we want 
them to become a certain kind of adult, and yes, their upbringing appears to make some 
meaningful difference. While parents have further, individual reasons to attend to the 
raising of their own children, “we want children to become certain kinds of adults” is a 
                                                 
13 Proverbs 22:6 (KJV). 
14 Nicomachean Ethics, II.1, 1103b24–25. 
15 Thomas Wiedemann, Adults and Children in the Roman Empire, 32. It is additionally 
interesting that, as the concept of citizenship lost its currency in the late republic, the 
word liberi also faded from central use. Ibid. at 33. 
16 See generally Vern L. Bengtson, Families and Faith. 
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reason that is generalizable. Something valuable about children is that they have 
tremendous potential to become members of our communities and cultures, a potential 
that already-acculturated adults seem to possess in much smaller measure.17 
Consider the narrow case of language acquisition, a case so universal that it is 
often overlooked. The transmission of language is a basic form of enculturation, perhaps 
the most basic. This is especially so if something like the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (that 
language structures perception) turns out to be true, but it is unnecessary to undertake 
complicated epistemological inquiries to see the extent to which language matters in our 
lives. The importance of language is immediately apparent in any attempt to apply 
Scanlon’s contractualism in a practical context, through the central role played by the 
desire to be able to justify our actions to others. Of course, in the abstract, one always has 
some theoretical ability to justify one’s actions to others insofar as one acts in accordance 
with principles that no one can reasonably reject. But in practice, the ability to justify 
oneself to others implies a capacity for communication with them. Likewise, actually 
                                                 
17 This is not to say that adults entirely lack the potential to become members of 
communities to which they do not already belong. Although some communities do not 
permit non-native induction, adults do sometimes join new religions, learn new 
languages, get new jobs, and move to new places. Integrating oneself into a new 
community as an adult, however, tends to involve a process of reconciling one’s existing 
values with those of one’s adopted community. This process often demands a great deal 
of compromise and mutual toleration, if it is to be at all successful, and in many cases it is 
a process that is never quite convincingly completed. This is something that secular urban 
and suburban citizens of wealthy nations sometimes overlook, living as they tend to do in 
geographic and social communities with relatively high turnover (so to speak), where 
community dynamism minimizes the practicality of robustly shared values. But there are 
still places in the world where epithets like “newcomer” and “move-in” are routinely 
applied to individuals with decades of community membership, and religious converts 
often refer to themselves as converts even when they are octogenarians whose conversion 
took place in adolescence. Native community membership carries so much weight in 
some contexts that it becomes a jealously-guarded status signifier. 
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attending to the values others have (something Scanlon thinks we have a variety of 
reasons to do) will be difficult, perhaps impossible in the absence of communication: 
attending to the values of others is substantially facilitated by the existence of clear ways 
to learn what those values are. So we have very good reason to prefer to live in 
communities where we are able to communicate with others, and to acquire new language 
skills when we find ourselves in communities where we are not able to communicate. To 
the extent that infants have no language and are in no position to acquire it independently, 
any desire we have to coexist with them over time is a reason to teach them how to 
communicate with us, even if we are not their parents. 
But children cannot learn every language, so the existence of more than one 
linguistic community means that children inevitably acquire their primary language or 
languages against someone’s interests—though any interest a speaker of (say) Spanish 
has in having some particular Russian child also learn Spanish is surely extremely slight. 
Furthermore, even though being multilingual comes with measurable cognitive benefits, 
it appears to do so at the cost of fluency: empirical inquiry suggests that monolingual 
children tend to acquire more vocabulary in their one language than bilingual children 
acquire in either of their two.18 Assuming that being multilingual is still in general 
preferable, for whatever reason, to being monolingual, even the most remarkable of 
polyglots can speak only a small fraction of total human languages. So the first, along 
perhaps with the second or third, language a child learns will substantially influence how 
their life goes: the opportunities they have for economic exchange, education, friendship, 
                                                 
18 Jose S. Portocarrero, Richard G. Burright, and Peter J. Donovick, “Vocabulary and 
Verbal Fluency of Bilingual and Monolingual College Students,” 415. 
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romance, understanding others, and simply being understood are strongly contingent on 
the number of people with whom it is possible to pursue these things. While language 
barriers are not an absolute bar to any such pursuits, they unquestionably constitute a 
significant impediment. Every member of a linguistic community has some interest in 
having others learn their language, so that their linguistic community can continue to 
enjoy a common life and so that they can each individually have good opportunities to 
pursue romance, work, and so forth.19 
When it comes to common living, language is the tip of the cultural iceberg—or 
perhaps it would be more accurate to call it the foundation of a substantial edifice. To be 
richly understood by others, much more than language alone must be shared. A child who 
grows up excitedly anticipating a bar mitzvah or quinceañera acquires something in 
common with parents, relatives, friends, and neighbors who cherish memories of their 
own coming-of-age ceremonies. A child who participates in family traditions, religious 
rites, and cultural celebrations comes to value the things that their community values, 
even if those things are not universally valuable. And if, as adults, they come to reject 
those values, there will be people who are sorry about that, but children who do not 
participate in such traditions and ceremonies and celebrations are denied the opportunity 
to enjoy robust membership in their community. So there is good reason to transmit 
various of our values to children, including children not our own, both so that we can 
enjoy a common life with them and so that they can enjoy a common life with us. Not 
                                                 
19 There is a rich literature on “linguistic rights” of which I do not give a detailed account 
here—in part because such rights are often asserted as manifesto rights, rather than moral 
rights. But readers hoping for a more detailed discussion of the moral and political 
importance of language might consult Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten’s Language Rights 
and Political Theory. 
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every community will have such reasons in equal measure, and some people will 
presumably have other reasons to not participate in this process, but basically everyone 
belongs to some community they have reason to perpetuate, even if they do not recognize 
or act on those reasons, or have other, overriding reasons against participating in the 
processes of reproduction or enculturation. Among other things, these reasons motivate 
public policy aimed at protecting children, educating them, providing them with adequate 
sustenance, and so forth. 
Pointing out that children cannot learn every language is just one example of the 
broader observation that children cannot be members of every community. The diversity 
of communities renders the ways in which we value children similarly diverse, and how 
that plays out in practice ultimately depends on how the interests and values of parents, 
children, and the community can be balanced. A mother who grows up speaking English 
in the United States, but immigrates to Mexico as an adult, may put a premium on 
ensuring that her children speak fluent Spanish, enculturating them into the most 
geographically-influential linguistic community even though this might in some ways 
deprive her of a measure of common life with her children. Conversely, the citizens of 
Mexico might value cultural diversity in ways that lead to various accommodations for 
immigrants who only speak English, rather than attempts to encourage linguistic 
integration. This would have the effect of privileging one kind of common life (in this 
case, the enjoyment of cultural diversity in a certain geographic area) above others (like a 
shared national identity that includes a common language). In order to determine the 
correct approach to such choices, communities, like parents, must consider not only how 
it is that children should be valued, but also what we owe to each other. 
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2. BURDENING THE INTERESTS OF PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND COMMUNITIES 
That is to say, community members, like parents, must act in accordance with 
rules no one could reasonably reject. The ways in which we value our own children is 
relevant to their moral development (and more), since part of valuing our children 
properly requires recognition of our responsibility to furnish them with a moral 
education. Deficiencies in that moral education will interfere with children’s ability to 
coexist with others. But valuing the children of others as nascent members of our 
community also means taking ourselves to have reasons to interact with them (and their 
parents) in ways that it would be strange to call “upbringing.” What we owe to each other 
is relevant to the relationship between parents and children, but also to the practical 
questions that arise when any particular child is valued by different people in different 
ways. Such questions are often deployed as rhetorical objections to the assertion of 
various children’s and parents’ rights: “What about child abuse?” “What about bigoted 
parents?” “What about children whose eventual adult values come to conflict with their 
received enculturation?” What such questions tend to have in common is a suppressed 
premise that some children are not being properly valued, for example by having their 
rights violated. Indeed, sometimes children aren’t properly valued. But sometimes the 
problem is instead that relevant values have come into conflict. When values do come 
into genuine conflict, if we are committed to taking liberalism and coexistence 
seriously—and I think we should be—then what we need to do is address such conflicts 
in accordance with principles that no one similarly committed could reasonably reject. 
 In order to accomplish this, it is essential to identify and weigh relevant interests, 
which is not something that can be done in the abstract. “In considering whether a 
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principle could reasonably be rejected” we must “consider the weightiness of the burdens 
it involves, for those on whom they fall, and the importance of the benefit it offers, for 
those who enjoy them.”20 So it is not possible to identify principles for resolving values 
conflicts without conducting an “informal comparison of losses,”21 which is not an 
abstract inquiry. Furthermore, since a “central feature of contractualism” is that the 
“justifiability of a moral principle depends only on various individuals’ reasons for 
objecting to that principle and alternatives to it,”22 the role played by community interests 
or values is not that of a personified collective. Children clearly have various interests in 
e.g. nutrition, education, loving care and guidance, membership in a community, and so 
forth; equally clearly, parents have various interests in their children’s health, safety, 
moral education, community membership, and so on. But when we speak of a 
“community interest” in protecting or enculturating children, what is really being 
discussed is the individual interest every member of the community has in continuing to 
be a member of that community—as Scanlon puts it, in the “continuation of our common 
life.”23 
 It is important, in the process, to not conflate these various interests—by failing to 
adequately distinguish children’s interests from community interests, for example, or 
treating parental interests as purely derivative from those of their children. The result of 
such conflations is mistaken assignment of losses, for example in arguments that children 
                                                 
20 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 208. 
21 Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” 128. 
22 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 229. 
23 Ibid., 76. 
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are being harmed by a policy that is actually burdening community interests. The case of 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, considered in Chapter 1, furnished a compelling example of this, not 
in the Court’s opinion but in the argument offered by the losing party. In that case, the 
State of Wisconsin argued not only that it had various interests in advancing childhood 
education, but that removing children from the public school environment would foster 
ignorance “from which the child must be protected by the State.”24 This argument is 
glossed by Joel Feinberg as Wisconsin attempting to mediate a conflict between parental 
supervisory interests and children’s education interests.25 But Yoder wasn’t, ultimately, a 
case about education at all; it was a case about control over community participation 
(and, by extension, quality of community membership). No one disputed that the Amish 
petitioners were raising their children into productive adults who exercised admirable 
citizenship. What was disputed was who should decide whether it was more important for 
Amish children to spend their last few years of childhood preparing to leave or remain in 
the community of their birth: the state, or their parents. The children’s interest in 
community membership could arguably be satisfied either way, insofar as each approach 
offered the advantage of better-preparing children to participate in some community 
(rather than another), so casting their parents’ supervision as a burden but the state’s 
supervision as a protection was simply prejudicial rhetoric from Wisconsin. 
 For an upbringing maximalist whose ideas about what constitutes a child’s “best” 
life are heavily informed by their own enculturation into a majority view, it will be 
especially tempting to conflate the interests of children and the interests of community. If 
                                                 
24 406 U.S. 205, 222. 
25 See Joel Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future,” 138. 
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it is in my interest that other people’s children come to share my values, and it also seems 
to me that the best possible life for others would require them to come to share my 
values, then the fact that it would burden some parent’s interest if their child should come 
to share my values looks like two wins and a loss. I might attempt to justify my 
interference in their parenting by appeal not only to my own interests, but to the imputed 
interests of their child. Of course I could be mistaken about the interests people actually 
have, but that is its own separate problem; even if I am right about all the relevant 
interests, this is not the appropriate way to weigh interests. The question is not whether 
some individual, or several individuals, have very weighty reasons to prefer a certain 
state of affairs. The question is whether anyone has sufficient reason, on balance, to 
reject principles for behavior that permit the relevant activity. 
 So, to select what seems like an obvious example, communities are quite justified 
in preventing parents from training their children to engage in terroristic attacks. It is 
certainly the case that being a terrorist is not the best possible life a child could live; 
moreover, it is certainly the case that a child could reasonably reject any rule permitting 
her parents from using her as a terrorist. But when it comes to community intervention in 
parenting, parents who behave wrongly are not appropriately subject to interference in 
their parenting practices by that fact alone. For communities to appropriately interfere 
with parenting, that interference must be in accordance with a rule that no one could 
reasonably reject. Who could reasonably reject a principle allowing government actors to 
remove children from the care of parents who train them to be terrorists? Such a principle 
surely burdens the interest parents have in raising their own children, and perhaps in 
whatever ideological interests they have driving their commitment to terrorism, but an 
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alternative principle forbidding government actors from removing children from such an 
upbringing burdens the interest that the children and their possible victims have in living 
their lives instead of being perpetrators or victims of terrorism. This proposed principle 
for removing children from the care of parents who train them to be terrorists is 
underdeveloped—for example, relevant public policy would need to further account for 
what would happen to those children after they were removed from their parents’ care—
but under all but the strangest of political circumstances I don’t think it is a principle 
anyone could reasonably reject.26 
 Of course there are many ways to burden community interests without physically 
harming anyone. I have already mentioned one that seems especially worth examination: 
a community interest in continuation of the common life enjoyed by its members is 
burdened when children are not enculturated into that community. In pluralistic 
communities accommodating a variety of overlapping values commitments—that is, in 
our oft-maligned Western liberal democratic post-Enlightenment societies—this strikes 
                                                 
26 It is difficult to know, sometimes, how specific it is necessary to be in identifying 
contractualist principles and related empirical assumptions, since empirical assumption 
space is vast, perhaps infinite. This is a feature rather than a shortcoming of 
contractualism, I think, as it is the result of a moral theory that seeks to account for things 
as they actually are, rather than as we might ideally prefer them to be. I have attempted to 
be reasonable in the assumptions I have made about the circumstances in which parents 
might decide to train their children as terrorists. But in case I have underspecified this 
particular principle, I observe that parents living under the oppressive rule of a genocidal 
government might well be in a position to reject a principle allowing government actors 
to remove children from their care, even if those parents were training their children to be 
terrorists. If the next step after removing such children from the care of their parents 
would be for the government to execute those children, or subject them to some kind of 
torture, it seems clear that parents (as well as children) would be in a position to reject a 
principle allowing their children to be taken by government actors. I do not think that 
very many people in the world are actually in this position, but it must be admitted that 
some probably are. 
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me as the burden that primarily drives public policy discourse on children and childhood, 
lurking in the background of a number of different debates. Only through the 
enculturation of children can we perpetuate our language, social norms, and political and 
economic endeavors. In Western liberal democratic post-Enlightenment societies, such 
endeavors tend to include the funding of social programs that attend to the destitute, 
elderly, and infirm, which is one reason that nations with negative birthrates so often find 
themselves looking for ways to effectively incentivize explicitly reproductive activity27—
without which economies and the social programs they support threaten to collapse. But 
the perpetuation of unified linguistic, social, and political values at a national scale exists 
                                                 
27 In fact there is nothing particularly new about governments prodding citizens for more 
babies, a practice that surely pre-dates Western liberal democratic post-Enlightenment 
societies and which I would not be at all surprised to learn has its origins in the first pre-
historic utterance meaning, approximately, “I want some grandchildren!” But in countries 
with ubiquitous, affordable, effective birth control, low infant mortality, high housing and 
childcare costs, demanding careers available to both sexes, declining religiosity, 
increasing average age of marriage, and ever-growing legal constraint on granting special 
recognition or benefits to people for reasons connected with their sex or sexuality, 
governments have been forced to get creative in their prodding. Singapore, for example, 
answered a 0.78 birth rate by partnering with a popular brand of breath mints to promote 
a night of patriotic sexual activity for “financially secure adults in stable, committed 
long-term relationships.” Rachel Nuwer, “Singapore’s ‘National Night’ Encourages 
Citizens to Make Babies,” Smithsonian (8 Aug. 8 2012), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/singapores-national-night-encourages-
citizens-to-make-babies-15402105/. The Japanese government went so far as to open its 
own speed-dating services. Chris Weller, “The Japanese Government is Setting Up 
Speed-Dating Events to Help With Its ‘Demographic Time Bomb,’” Business Insider (5 
Oct. 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/japanese-government-dating-services-2016-
10. Other incentives, like child tax credits or parental leave-of-absence legislation, are 
relatively ubiquitous across Europe and the North America. Even China, which for 
decades enforced a “one child” policy on most of its citizens, has lately relaxed that 
policy somewhat and turned toward (mostly, unsuccessfully) encouraging Han Chinese 
women (but not women of other ethnicities) to marry and have children. Leta Hong 
Fincher, “China Dropped its One-Child Policy. So Why Aren’t Chinese Women Having 
More Babies?,” New York Times (20 Feb. 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/opinion/china-women-birthrate-rights.html. 
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in tension with values pluralism.28 This tension, and the burdens it can impose, is easy to 
overlook from the perspective of someone already enculturated into a majority view, 
however, as the extent to which anyone even notices that the common life they value 
depends on the creation and enculturation of children depends on their noticing that they 
have some reason to be concerned about the future of their community. 
3. THE ENCULTURATION OF MUSLIM MIGRANT CHILDREN IN DENMARK 
 To offer an illustrative example: the country of Denmark recently made 
international headlines when it announced that children living in neighborhoods 
designated “ghettos” would be required to attend “mandatory instruction in ‘Danish 
values,’ including the traditions of Christmas and Easter, and Danish language” for 25 
waking hours per week, beginning as one-year-olds.29 Failure to enroll results in a 
stoppage of welfare payments to a child’s family—and the law primarily impacts Muslim 
immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia. For a country with almost six 
million inhabitants, more than 8 in 10 of whom are of Danish ancestry, to worry that half 
a million non-Western immigrants and their descendants pose a threat to its cultural 
future may strike the inhabitants of more diverse nations as faintly amusing.30 Yet despite 
                                                 
28 Likely the perpetuation of unified economic endeavors also exists in tension with 
values pluralism, but this seems like a sufficiently complex matter that I will set it aside. 
29 Ellen Barry & Martin Selsoe Sorenson, “In Denmark, Harsh New Laws for Immigrant 
‘Ghettos,’” New York Times (1 Jul. 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/europe/denmark-immigrant-ghettos.html.  
30 About 12% of Denmark’s population consists of recent immigrants and their children 
(including Western immigrants), while in the United States today at least 25% of 
inhabitants are first- or second-generation. See “First- and Second-Generation Share of 
the Population to Reach Record High in 2065,” Pew Research Center (23 Sep. 2015), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/09/28/modern-immigration-wave-brings-59-million-
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Denmark’s official “do it for Mom” ad campaign resulting in a slight increase in the 
indigenous fertility rate, it remains firmly below replacement levels,31 while the fertility 
rate of non-Western immigrants is comparatively high. This is not the kind of trend that 
leads to encouraging demographic projections for anyone who values Danish culture, and 
appears to be the primary motivation of the new preschool program. Something arguably 
comparable might be occurring in places like the United States, but in a “nation of 
immigrants” with one of the world’s largest populations and a long history of 
multiculturalism, it seems unlikely that Americans have much to be concerned about. 
English is a language with hundreds of millions of native speakers and hundreds of 
millions of secondary speakers. American culture, such as it is, has had a profound 
impact on culture, commerce, and governance around the world. There are a variety of 
ways in which certain classes of American might have their “common life” threatened, as 
organized religions shrink, rural economies tank, manufacturing jobs move overseas, and 
so forth. But at the level of national identity, cultural heritage, and linguistic community, 
whether or not it is strictly wise to do so, Americans are in a comparatively good position 
to shrug at immigration as it may relate to the future of our common life. Danes, by 
contrast, entertain a more reasonable fear for the future of their language and culture, 
because their community is substantially smaller, more isolated, and less globally 
imitated. 
                                                                                                                                                 
to-u-s-driving-population-growth-and-change-through-2065/ph_2015-09-
28_immigration-through-2065-11/. 
31 See Alexandra Sims, “Denmark’s Bizarre Series of Sex Campaigns Lead to Baby 
Boom,” Independent (2 Jun. 2016), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/denmark-s-bizarre-series-of-sex-
campaigns-lead-to-baby-boom-a7062466.html. 
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 Denmark’s answer—mandatory preschool programs aimed in part at the Danish 
enculturation of the young children least-likely to receive such enculturation at home—
raises a number of questions, but the one that interests me most concerns the burden 
Denmark’s lawmakers appear to perceive Muslim immigrants to be putting on the 
continuation of their community’s “common life” by raising their children without input 
or guidance from the state. There are a variety of other reasons a nation might have to 
implement such a program, but remember that the relevant question is not “are there good 
reasons to implement this program.” The question is, does a principle allowing Denmark 
to make welfare payments conditional on infant and toddler participation in a program of 
education aimed at enculturating children into the common life of the cultural majority 
violate a rule that no one could reasonably reject?  
 To answer that question, we must identify the reasons people have for objecting to 
that principle and alternatives to it. If I am the Muslim parent of a child who I value, in 
part, as someone I created and am training to participate in the common life of Islam, 
principles that undermine my ability to enculturate my child burden my important 
interests. Even if I am not a parent, if I am a member of the Muslim community in 
Denmark, I value the children of other Muslims as future peers and participants in the 
common life we enjoy, so I would still have some reason to reject a principle allowing 
government to undermine the likelihood that such children will eventually be members of 
my cultural community. But if I were a native Dane, I would value the children of 
Muslims in my geographic community for much the same reasons, albeit with different 
content: I might value the children of immigrants as future peers and participants in the 
common life of all Danes, or all Europeans, or all Westerners. I would value their 
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acquisition of my language, and their participation in my cultural traditions. An 
alternative principle, one making the Danish enculturation of Muslim children merely 
optional (or even forbidden), may threaten the continuation of the common life I enjoy 
with my fellow-citizens, at some future point where I found myself surrounded by people 
whose values are substantially divergent from my own. This will depend in part on how 
compatible Danish culture is with the common life of Muslim migrants, and my 
hypothetical Danish self might be concerned as a result of bad empirical assumptions; for 
example, I might have been misled by political actors, if it turns out that the immigrant 
population of Denmark can and will assimilate without government-sponsored childhood 
intervention. But considering other mass migrations through history, it at least does not 
seem obvious that a language or culture with fewer than six million native subscribers is 
immune from relatively rapid extinction.32 
 Part of the difficulty of this analysis is that the burdens associated with the 
principles under consideration are substantially speculative. How much of a burden does 
25 hours per week of state-funded preschool really place on the parental enculturation of 
a child? Conversely, at what point can it really be claimed that one’s linguistic or cultural 
community is so small that unassimilated cultural minorities put a meaningful burden on 
                                                 
32 One stark example of such extinction is the depopulation of North and South America 
wrought by the Columbian introduction of European diseases. Scholars differ on the 
ultimate toll, but there appears to be agreement that anywhere from millions to tens of 
millions of native Americans died, both transforming the culture of those who remained 
and leaving them more vulnerable to eventual European conquest. Lesser examples 
abound, though the difference between cultural extinction and cultural evolution—or 
“language” and “dialect”—complicates the identification of clear cases. For example, 
official Chinese treatment of Cantonese as a “dialect,” and therefore not a language to be 
taught in schools, may be driving Cantonese toward extinction. See Verna Yu, “Can 
Cantonese Survive?,” America: The Jesuit Review (5 Jun. 2018), 
https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2018/06/05/can-cantonese-survive. 
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the continuation of the common life? That is—there is some sense in which “the bigger, 
the better” always applies to the interest we have in the communities to which we belong. 
My opportunities for employment, education, romance, and so forth are likely greater in a 
community of a billion than in a community of a million. But what we might allegorize 
as the “marginal value” of increased community size is surely logarithmic. Assuming 
similar distributions of opportunity across “large” and “really large” communities, a 
community with a hundred thousand potential employment opportunities is no worse for 
me in this regard than a community with a million such opportunities, because the 
amount of time I can spend looking for suitable employment puts a cap on the number of 
opportunities it is even possible for me to give meaningful consideration. The persistence 
of cultures and languages found on various Pacific islands or within European 
microstates would appear to suggest that a community of ten or twenty thousand is 
basically adequate to support a “common life” for centuries on end—provided its 
participants continue to bear and raise children within the community, and influences 
functioning to sever community ties never grow too severe. The burden of having one’s 
culture and language vanish is surely tremendous for the remnants who find that the 
common life they once enjoyed is simply no longer feasible, for want of co-participants. 
But it seems vanishingly unlikely that any of the approximately five million native 
Danes, or the hundreds of thousands of Muslim immigrants in Denmark, is in any 
plausible danger of actually becoming such remnants, either by the implementation or 
absence of half-day cultural preschool. 
 Perhaps I am wrong about this; perhaps the slow extinction of indigenous Danes 
has already begun. But suppose for now that I am right, and that no one in Denmark is 
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likely to be burdened by the experience of losing their community to the ravages of 
government action or inaction. What about the burdens imposed on parents and children 
by the Danish preschool program? A principle allowing the government to mandate 
Danish enculturation for the children of Muslim immigrants might, if the schooling 
works as apparently intended, impose a burden on the children’s acquisition of common 
values from their parents, depriving them of some measure of enjoyment of the common 
life with one another—so both parents and children are burdened, though the seriousness 
of the burden is unclear. An alternative principle forbidding such enculturation, by 
contrast, might also burden parents and children; presumably some people want to 
assimilate, and the enculturation programs offered by the Danish government may very 
well convey substantial benefits in exchange for eroding children’s other community ties. 
So it may be helpful to simply imagine the kinds of conversations a Muslim immigrant 
might have about the program with, say, a Danish social worker or Member of 
Parliament, and the kinds of justifications they might offer to one another under various 
principles. 
 What justification might be offered in support of a principle allowing mandatory 
Danish enculturation of the children of Muslim immigrants, that would not also apply to 
a principle making enculturation opportunities optionally available? I expect justification 
of this nature would be comparable to any justification of compulsory schooling 
generally: “your child has important interests in learning the dominant language of their 
geographical community, and to participate in its dominant culture, and these are 
important interests with which parents cannot be allowed to interfere.” But I would 
expect a Muslim parent to answer, “my child also has important interests in learning the 
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language and culture of her parents and her peers, and I have reason to believe that 
mandatory preschool for such young children unreasonably intrudes on those interests. 
Furthermore, I have an important interest in having my child come to share my values. 
Even if your policy arguably benefits my child in ways that can justify the burden it 
imposes on her, the burden of your education policy is then heaviest on me. I can 
reasonably reject a principle allowing its implementation.” 
 Such a response might arguably reflect bad parenting, insofar as one way to value 
one’s children might be to take oneself to have reason to bear the burdens of principles 
that only or primarily benefit one’s offspring. I am certainly sympathetic to the idea that 
some amount of self-sacrifice is an important feature of quality parenting. But that is a 
question for the moral domain of parenting, not the moral domain of what we owe to 
each other. Within the domain of what we owe to each other, parents are in a special 
position to reject principles that permit government enculturation of their children, 
because they are the primary bearers of the caregiving burdens imposed by biological and 
cultural reproduction. Having borne the burdens of an undertaking is a reason to reject 
principles that allow us to be deprived of the benefits of that undertaking, and one 
standard benefit of bearing the burdens imposed by biological and cultural reproduction 
is that the number of people with whom you can enjoy a common life is increased. 
Mothers in particular bear a substantial biological burden in the creation of new lives for 
inclusion in their family and community. Each surely has her own reasons for 
undertaking pregnancy, but I cannot imagine the goal of enlarging and perpetuating 
someone else’s community is a common one. Even parents who place children with 
adoptive families tend to exhibit, when feasible, a preference for close ethnic, racial, and 
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religious matches,33 suggesting that even when parents have decisive reason to not pursue 
a common family life with their children, they still regard themselves as having some 
reason to prefer their child be raised with as common a community as possible. Things 
causal parents might see as counting in favor of exercising such preferences in adoption 
placements include a responsibility to “give back” to their community, a spiritual 
obligation to see to the child’s religious education as best they can, or even (in cases of 
ethnic and racial matches) a hope that the child will enjoy a greater sense of inclusion and 
identity by growing up around people who physically resemble her. Those parents who 
do undertake the burden of actually raising their own children have yet further reason to 
reject principles mandating what amounts to the recruitment of those children into other 
communities—communities that in some cases do not even have members willing to 
assume the burden of perpetuating their own common life through biological and cultural 
reproduction.34 
                                                 
33 This is especially interesting in light of the difficulties it can pose for members of 
minority communities. After experiencing a succession of heartbreaking refusals to place 
a child with him and his wife, based on their mixed-faith household, one commentator 
wrote: “Our hearts sank. Again, it was a birth parent request. It all seemed a bit 
ridiculous. We went back to the drawing board. Would we only be allowed to adopt a 
half-Sikh, half-Hindu baby whose birth parents hailed from particular states in India? We 
were losing all hope.” Ayan Panja, “Adoption: Giving Due Weight to Birth Parents’ 
Religious Preferences,” The Guardian (19 Nov. 2010), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/nov/19/adoption-children-birth-
parents-religion. 
34 In English literature, these ideas are perhaps most eloquently expressed in the Dr. 
Seuss classic, Horton Hatches the Egg. For those unfamiliar with the story, Mayzie (a 
lazy bird) convinces Horton (an elephant) to do the tedious work of incubating her egg 
while she takes some time off. She promises to not be gone long—but it soon becomes 
apparent that she has no particular intention of ever returning. As rhymed-and-metered 
fate would have it, a chance reunion of egg, bird, and elephant occurs just as the egg 
begins to hatch, at which point Mayzie accuses Horton of stealing it and demands its 
return. But what emerges from the egg is more elephant than bird, wings notwithstanding, 
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 It is interesting to imagine alternative scenarios in which indigenous Danes have 
some reason, aside from their own lifestyle choices, for low native birthrates. Suppose 
indigenous Danes shared a genetic susceptibility to a plague that swept their country, 
sterilizing anyone who survived infection. Would this make a case for mandatory 
enculturation of migrant children? Certainly it would strengthen the interest that 
indigenous Danes had in seeing to the enculturation of children in their broader 
community, but would it clearly be weightier than the interest that the parents of those 
children may have in preventing their children from abandoning the community of their 
birth to fill out the ranks of someone else’s community? I do not think that it possibly 
could. The reason I do not think so is that the kinds of reasons I would accept for 
overriding parental care and authority do not include the pending extinction of a 
stranger’s culture. Indeed I do not know anyone who would accept such a reason, and 
with good reason! To speak of, in essence, redistributing children is horrifying, precisely 
because of where children come from—how children are made.35 The contractualist 
commitment to coexistence is not a commitment between cultures. It is a commitment 
between individuals. And if my community, language, or culture is threatened with 
extinction, there may be a variety of obligations owed to me by those who wish to behave 
in accordance with principles neither of us could reasonably reject, but something I 
                                                                                                                                                 
and one of America’s most venerated poets concludes, “And it should be, it should be, it 
SHOULD be like that!” 
35 In fact the idea of redistributing children is sufficiently horrifying that it is sometimes 
treated as the absurdity in reductio arguments against certain egalitarian positions. A 
good discussion of such arguments can be found in Anca Gheaus’ “The Right to Parent 
One’s Biological Baby.” 
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cannot reasonably demand is to raise other people’s children as my own. They are not my 
children to raise.  
 Of course this conclusion is easiest to reach given premises that are unrealistically 
clear; reality will almost always be more complicated than whatever reproductive 
dystopia we care to concoct. The Danes themselves are not infertile, but simply choosing 
less gravid lifestyles than their immigrant neighbors. Could they reasonably reject a 
principle forbidding the conditioning of welfare payments on preschool experiences 
intended to enculturate children into the common life of cultural Danes? One concern 
they might have is that the wealth of their nation not be used to undermine their own 
value commitments; welfare benefits are made possible by the productivity of Denmark’s 
citizens, and if migrants do not assimilate in ways that make them economically 
productive, too, everyone’s standard of living might suffer. The social-democratic values 
that dominate Denmark’s political culture might also be at stake if the rising generation 
acquires its values more from the communities their parents departed than the community 
where they arrived. If the preschool program removed children from their homes over the 
objection of their parents, this might resemble a forced redistribution of children 
sufficiently to deprive the Danes of their reasonable objection to a limiting principle. But 
it is not at all obvious that Muslim migrants are unconditionally owed such welfare 
payments. Are the concerns of indigenous Danes—that if they do not condition welfare 
payments on preschool attendance, their common life will be burdened—empirically 
justified? I do not know, and I know of no way to conclusively ascertain the facts of the 
matter. The Danish government’s concerns do seem plausible, but that may be the most it 
is possible to say about them. 
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 Can the children of Muslim migrants reasonably reject an alternative principle, 
permitting their welfare payments to be made conditional on preschool experiences 
intended to enculturate children into the common life of cultural Danes? While the 
Danish preschool program admittedly does not redistribute immigrant children, it does 
redistribute a fairly substantial amount of their time, placing some burden on the interest 
they have in spending that time with their parents instead. But it also seems to be at least 
potentially in such children’s interests to learn Danish or otherwise come to better 
understand the people in their geographic community. It further seems true that children 
can be raised with at least some exposure to one, few, or many cultures without ever 
guaranteeing what they will choose for themselves, once they are able—as discussed 
substantially in Chapters 4 and 5. If preschool enculturation was likely to deprive 
children of possible participation in the common life enjoyed by their parents’ religious 
community, that would be a reason to reject a principle requiring them to attend such 
schooling. But it is not certain that preschool enculturation will have such an effect; 
secular Western education does appear somewhat correlated with eventual irreligion, but 
there are still many religious people, including Muslims, succeeding at every level of 
Western academia. Furthermore, the principle does not require children to attend 
preschool; it only makes certain welfare funds conditional on such attendance. Any 
children whose parents opt to forgo both preschool attendance and welfare payments 
might find their interests in e.g. food or shelter burdened by the policy, but would this 
give them a complaint against the policy, or a complaint against their parents’ decision in 
connection with the policy? My instinct is to suggest that children may have reason to 
reject both a principle permitting their parents to keep them home from preschool when 
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such a law is in force, and a principle allowing the government to leverage welfare 
payments in this way. Threatening children’s interests in food, shelter, and whatever else 
welfare payments provide, in order to motivate parents to cooperate with government 
enculturation aims, strikes me as the kind of behavior it would be very difficult to justify 
to others. But whether it constitutes a burden on children’s interests that is greater than 
the burden placed on Danish community interests by alternative principles will depend on 
whether the Danish government’s cultural concerns are actually warranted, which 
remains an unanswered empirical question. 
 Can consideration of the burdens placed on parents by conditioning welfare 
payments on their children’s preschool attendance get us any closer to a clear answer? 
This will turn in part on whether welfare payments are the sort of thing parents are owed 
in the first place—requiring an expanded inquiry into the principles governing the 
redistribution of income and wealth. I will undertake no such inquiry here, but assume for 
the sake of argument that welfare payments are made to Muslim migrants in an effort to 
address an objectionable insufficiency, and place minimal burdens on the interests of 
others, such that the payments are required by a rule no one could reasonably reject. If 
that is the case, then denying such payments to migrants in response to how they choose 
to raise their children would appear to violate the relevant principle. On the other hand, if 
welfare payments are permissible under a rule no one could reasonably reject, but not 
required by such a rule, then it is less obvious that requiring parents to choose between 
welfare payments and preschool, or no payments and no preschool, burdens their interests 
sufficiently that a decisive objection can be raised. 
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 In the final analysis, then, the justifiability of Denmark’s preschool policy 
remains something of an open question: there is simply too much we don’t know, perhaps 
too much that cannot be known. But this puts the Danish community in much the same 
position as parents, responding to reasons that are apparent and accessible to them now, 
even though they do not and/or cannot have complete information, and even though 
various individuals may later have reason to be quite sorry about the selected response. 
This leads me to a couple of loosely-related observations concerning parenting and 
policy-making both.  
 One is that I am tempted to identify the burdens placed on the present interests of 
immigrant parents in directing the upbringing of their children as weightier than 
speculative burdens on community or children’s interests, simply because they are not 
speculative. In contractualist terms, a reason for rejection based on speculation seems less 
weighty than a reason based on established fact, even if the relevant ills on either side are 
equal. Preschool attendance may or may not have the feared or desired enculturation 
impact, but putting financial pressure on adults to raise their children in certain ways 
immediately places a totally non-speculative burden on their interests. So my inclination 
is to conclude that the Danish preschool policy is impermissible, whatever interests it 
may or may not eventually serve. But this would be a mistake in at least two ways. First, 
just as parents have present interests in directing their children’s upbringing based in part 
on the ways they value their children, community members have a present interest in the 
enculturation of children not their own, based in part on the ways they value children 
generally. While many relevant facts might be substantially speculative, the interest itself 
is not speculative at all. Second, in conducting an informal comparison of losses, I don’t 
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think it would be permissible (or wise) to disregard possibilities simply because they are 
not certainties. The challenge is knowing when a possibility is sufficiently great (or 
sufficiently costly) to treat it as a reason. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, 
there always seems to be more information available for consideration than it is possible 
to consider, but that doesn’t justify us in ignoring such information as it is possible for us 
to consider, and plausible eventualities seem like exactly that kind of information. To 
develop this observation further would require more discussion of epistemology than I 
am prepared to undertake here, but the point is that the matter cannot be settled by simply 
discarding speculative concerns, even though it would also be a mistake to overlook their 
speculative nature. 
 Another observation is that policymakers who wish to minimize the kind of 
extended cultural and political conflict that has attended the Danish preschool policy may 
have good reason to emphasize incentives over punishments. I do not think government 
actors are bound by any obvious contractualist obligations in this regard. But consider the 
permissibility of a policy offering cultural preschool to the children of Muslim migrants. 
Doubtless some parents would decline to enroll their children in such a program, but how 
many? If most parents would enroll their children willingly, that would be good evidence 
that the government was not especially justified in making welfare payments conditional 
on program participation. If most parents declined to enroll their children, that fact, too, 
would be helpful empirical information to have in deciding how to proceed. In pluralistic 
societies, cultural conflicts will probably not always be avoidable, but one way 
communities can “interfere” with parent-child relationships in minimally objectionable 
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ways is simply to give parents attractive options. A careful structuring of incentives 
could go a long way toward eliminating any need for disincentives. 
4. CONCLUSION 
 This final point returns us to the beginning of Chapter 1—to the observable 
inclination toward certain kinds of maximalism in legal and philosophical treatments of 
upbringing. Much of this project has been concerned with explaining how maximalism is 
mistaken, but it is not, I think, entirely mistaken. If policymakers can minimize conflict 
with parental interests by furnishing options rather than burdening parents, might the 
same be true for parents contemplating the options of their children? I think so. What Joel 
Feinberg calls a child’s right to an “open future” is not a right anyone actually has, and 
yet parents may be well-advised, in light of the extent to which they are inevitably 
ignorant about future developments in their child’s life, to focus on acting in ways that 
seem likely to give their children more and better options. This is not a contractualist 
obligation, but it is a way of valuing children that is sensitive to contractualist 
obligations—it is a tactic for influencing others while avoiding unjustifiable behavior by 
making certain options more attractive rather than imposing burdens on other people’s 
interests. 
 In this chapter, I have considered a variety of justifications a community might 
have for interfering with parent-child relationships. The first community to which all 
children belong is their family, and all other communities—religious, vocational, 
geographical—are perpetuated, if they are perpetuated, in part by the creation and 
upbringing of children, often but by no means always within the community itself. This 
makes children valuable, not just to their parents (though also to their parents), but to 
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everyone with an interest in the preservation and perpetuation of their own “common 
life.” Sometimes this will lead to values conflicts, but one of the great benefits of 
community is that the challenges and conflicts that arise in our lives are more easily 
overcome when we can draw from the collected wisdom and resources of like-minded 
others. Raising children is just such a challenge, and because children are valuable, 
communities with children are often disposed to be especially supportive of parents. That 
is: communities have reason to participate in parent-child relationships in ways that 
parents often have reason to welcome, especially when there is substantial values 
agreement across the whole community. 
This may be where concerns like those motivating the Danish preschool initiative 
really originate: the growth of sub-communities within a region or nation that not only 
subscribe to alien values, but are in many cases specifically critical of dominant cultural 
values, really complicates the pursuit of community-scale enculturation efforts. Indeed, 
this may be the challenge of 21st century liberalism: how to accommodate, not merely a 
“pluralistic” community incorporating several dozen flavors of Judeo-Christianity and a 
smattering of racial and ethnic minorities, but a proliferation of liberal and illiberal values 
and identities engaging a “common life” characterized primarily by economic exchange 
and the formation of political alliances—often aimed, in part, at homogenizing the 
upbringing of children to ensure the perpetuation of their own culture. But the extent to 
which this may be true, and what (if anything) might be done about it, are inquiries 
beyond the scope of this project. Suffice it for now to conclude that children are valuable 
to communities, and communities are valuable to everyone—and when those values 
come into conflict, the place to look for mediation is the moral domain of what we owe to 
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each other. When what we owe to each other is unclear, given the unavailability or 
inaccessibility of relevant empirical information, it may be that the best option available 
is to do what we can to make our preferred solution attractive to others. 
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